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This work presents the first systematic, exegetical, and comprehensive study of
the concept of love in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Love is often considered
to be among the most important yet perplexing of all human phenomena, and
Kant is generally thought to be among the greatest philosophers in the Western
tradition. I thus find it remarkable that Kant’s views on love have not previously
been investigated in much depth, or with an outlook on the way the concept of
love figures and operates within his philosophy as a whole.
My research will show that love is actually important to Kant’s philosophy,
at any rate a lot more important than commonly assumed. It may come as a sur-
prise to see how often Kant thinks about love, how much he writes about it, and
that he holds various philosophical views about it. In particular, an understand-
ing of how the concept of love functions in Kant’s practical philosophy is neces-
sary for an overall understanding of his ethical project. Even though we might
think otherwise at first glance, love plays an integral role in Kant’s conception
of human life.
Love is a complex and multifaceted concept, and Kant’s philosophical ideas
on love yield no exception to this fact. Not only are these ideas important for un-
derstanding Kant, I also think that his views on love are interesting as such.What
the views are and how they fit together is the topic of the present volume. If one
is generally open to learning from Kant, this book will hopefully show that it is
also possible to learn from what he thought about love. The nature of my work is
mostly interpretative, and in particular I will formulate two exegetical claims,
which mark the core of the study. First, I hold that in Kant we can detect a gen-
eral division of love, according to which love in general divides into love of be-
nevolence [Liebe des Wohlwollens] and love of delight [Liebe des Wohlgefallens].
The general division of love in Kant is a key for understanding love in Kant. Sec-
ond, I hold that by identifying various aspects of love in Kant, such as self-love,
sexual love, love of God, love of neighbour, and love in friendship, and by study-
ing the various things he says about the different aspects of love, we can detect
an ascent of love from the strongest impulses of human nature to the highest ide-
als of morally deserved happiness. It is these two claims that will be clarified and
defended during the course of the work.
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II
There are of course reasons for the lacuna in previous research. In general, the
study of Kant’s moral philosophy or ethics, broadly construed, has tended to em-
phasise the foundations of moral philosophy as articulated in the Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. Traditionally,
fewer resources have been directed to research on Kant’s last major contribution
to moral philosophy, The Metaphysics of Morals, where love figures much more
prominently than in the Groundwork or the Critique of Practical Reason. In the
anglophone research community, the tendency to give less weight to The Meta-
physics of Morals can also be at least partially explained by the fact that a reli-
able, complete translation of the entire work has only been made available in
recent decades. The emphasis on the Groundwork in relation to The Metaphysics
of Morals has tended to yield a picture of a ‘cold’ Kant, a picture of a philosopher
who emphasises duty over everything else and is wary of, if not outright hostile
towards, emotions or affective dispositions as part of the moral life.
When I have discussed my project with non-Kantian academic philosophers,
I have often been met with surprise: ‘Love in Kant? Oh, I didn’t know that Kant
said anything at all about love! If he did, surely it must have been some kind of
antithesis of love that he was really after…’ And so on.Within the community of
academic philosophers in general, Kant’s views on love are clearly not well
known. Within the circle of scholars working on Kant’s ethics, however, this
kind of picture no longer obtains, and as more attention has been given to the
‘Doctrine of Virtue’ in The Metaphysics of Morals and to Kant’s anthropological
works, we now have a much fuller, more balanced, and more comprehensive pic-
ture of the emotional life of the Kantian moral agent.We now know that the role
of the ‘natural’, sensory-aesthetic part of the human cognitive apparatus as re-
lated to ‘pure practical reason’ or ‘freedom’ (to use Kant’s own dualism) is
much more complex and nuanced than commonly assumed by those not all
that familiar with Kant’s ethics. Thanks to the work of Kantian ethicists empha-
sising or defending the importance of emotive elements in Kant’s moral philos-
ophy, what we have been witnessing in the last thirty years or so is the emer-
gence of a ‘nicer’ Kant, whose overall take on moral philosophy is ‘kinder’,
‘warmer’, or more humane than what reading merely the Groundwork might
imply.
My work represents this ‘warmer’ school of Kantian ethics. However, even
my kind of approach might appear too ‘cold’ for those who wish to ground ethics
or moral norms in emotive dispositions, pain and pleasure, empathy or ‘warm-
heartedness’, instinctive benevolence, or the feeling of love. The account of
love in Kant that I seek is meant to be true to the foundations of Kant’s moral
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thought and to the letter of his text, so that the picture I provide will be not only
defensible but also exegetically balanced and accurate. For instance, even in the
context of the ‘nice’ Kant presented here, the feeling of love can never be the ob-
jective foundation of morality. The foundation is pure practical reason and re-
spect for the moral law.
I won’t be talking much about what Kant could or should have thought
about the problem of love; rather, I will systematically reconstruct the positions
he did hold. My aim is to arrive at a general outline of the concept of love as it
figures in my chosen target system, or in other words, in the propositional nat-
ural language ‘data set’ I wish to analyse. That is, I will be investigating how
the word ‘love’ [Liebe] takes on different functions and meanings when it ap-
pears in various contexts within the philosophical writings of Kant.
This kind of approach has its limitations, to be sure, and I am not out to
claim that Kant’s conceptions of love simply sprang from pure reason in a histor-
ical vacuum. In the tradition of Western philosophy, investigations into love date
back to the Presocratic Empedocles. In particular, the notion of Eros in Plato’s
Symposium has had an immense effect on subsequent European philosophy
and culture. The connection between the concept of love and the notion of the
highest good, which we will continue to see in Kant, originates from Plato. Be-
sides Plato, another decisive factor contributing to how it was possible for some-
one to conceptualise love in 18th-century Prussia is the Christian religion, and es-
pecially the teachings of Jesus as they were preserved in the New Testament. It is
not much of an exaggeration to assert that from a decidedly historical perspec-
tive, one cannot understand the context in which Kant writes about love without
acknowledging the existence of at least two historical documents: the Symposi-
um and the Sermon on the Mount.
It would be possible, and highly interesting, I think, to trace the historical
genealogy of the concept of love from Plato to Kant, to consider the parallels
and continuities between, for instance, the way love figures in Aristotle’s and
Kant’s conceptions of friendship, to analyse the extent to which Kant’s concep-
tualisations of love are indebted to, say, Augustine or Aquinas, or to his more im-
mediate predecessors like the British moralists, or Leibniz,Wolff, or Baumgarten,
or indeed to his Pietist upbringing. I would be especially inclined to point out
(and this may be obvious to some) that the link between love and the highest
good is common to both Platonism and Christianity, that this link is sustained
through the Middle Ages in the Scholastic fusion of Plato, Aristotle, and Jesus,
that it remains clearly visible in the British sentimentalists like Hutcheson,
and that it influences Kant’s construction of the regulative ideality of his ethical
system as a whole. But this kind of historical, cultural and comparative approach
is beyond the scope of my study.
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The concept of love is scattered throughout Kant’s massive corpus, and I will
have enough work on my hands in just getting the exegesis right. Likewise, I will
not enter the ‘post-Kantian’ domain and interpret my results in the light of later
strands of German idealism; nor will I use my findings to engage with contem-
porary discussions in the philosophy of love. Although I believe that the ap-
proach and the general framework developed in this book can later be reworked
and used to formulate a contemporary, post-Kantian philosophy of love, this is
not my aim here. This study is very much Kant immanent.
As I mentioned above, Kant’s conception of love has not been investigated
comprehensively or in detail in the literature to date. This is not to say that
there aren’t any discussions of this topic, however. Since a key component of
my argument concerns the novelty of my claims, I feel obliged to say at least
something about how love has previously been analysed and discussed in the
study of Kant. Therefore, I will now offer some general reflections on the state
of previous research, and in doing this, I will refer to individual accounts only
insofar as they are particularly representative of the points I wish to make.
The Kant-Bibliographie 1945– 1990 (Malter/Ruffing 1999), which aims to pres-
ent a comprehensive bibliography of Kant-related academic writings from the pe-
riod between the aforementioned years, lists some 9000 titles, 5 titles of which
contain the word ‘love’ or ‘Liebe’. From this one can plausibly generalise that
from 1945 to 1990 the ‘love ratio’ in Kant scholarship was approximately 1/
1800. Things have changed in this regard, and in the last couple of decades in
particular, research on love in Kant has grown to the point where at least one
or two new papers on the topic are published each year. However, the total num-
ber of research articles in the field still only amounts to a good handful. There is
no danger of drowning in the secondary literature.
I think it is possible to divide the existing research roughly into three cate-
gories. First, there are those accounts that engage with a specific aspect of love
or discuss love within a particular work by Kant. These accounts yield partial
knowledge, and when the discussions are sufficiently detailed and well argued,
they greatly promote our understanding of love in Kant. Most of the research on
love in Kant belongs more or less to this category. Examples of the first kind of
approach include works by Marcia Baron (2009; 2013), Melissa Fahmy (2009;
2010), and Dieter Schönecker (2010; 2013), where the focus is the ‘Doctrine of Vir-
tue’ of The Metaphysics of Morals or neighbourly love more generally. Second,
there are accounts that mention ‘love’ in the title but do not actually provide
an interpretation (in any significant detail) of what Kant had to say about the is-
sues the title refers to (e.g. Miller 1985; Vanden Auweele 2014). Third, there are
accounts that at least ostensibly aim to provide a more general outlook on the
concept of love in Kant, or somehow claim or attempt to articulate general prop-
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ositions about love in Kant (e.g. Streich 1924; Moors 2007; Schönecker 2010;
Grenberg 2014). It is this third category that is actually the most interesting for
the purposes of my work, since what I am after here is precisely a more general
account of this kind. However, none of these previous discussions is anything
close to a book-length monograph (the closest is Streich (1924)). They are not
even articles dedicated solely to this issue, but rather propositions within pa-
pers, which pursue various general aims. I do not wish to come across as blam-
ing these authors, nor am I suggesting that they should have done otherwise.
What I am saying is that regarding the concept of love in Kant, the lacuna in
the research is real.
III
Besides being generally exegetical in the sense that I interpret rather than eval-
uate, my approach has some other features that are worth highlighting. When I
analyse the concept of love by investigating how the word ‘love’ appears in var-
ious propositional structures within a given text or set of texts, I analytically di-
vide the concept of love into different aspects, according to how the word ‘love’
appears in different contexts. For example, a particularly high number of refer-
ences to ‘love’ occur in contexts where Kant is speaking about the ‘self ’ or ‘one’s
own happiness’, ‘sexuality’, ‘God’, ‘neighbours’ or ‘other human beings’, and
‘friendship’. Analysed in these terms, the concept of love will consist at least
of the aspects of ‘self-love’, ‘sexual love’, ‘love of God’, ‘love of neighbour’,
and ‘love in friendship’. Naturally, the interrelationships between the aspects
are also very important. The aspects must be organised into a whole as rationally
as possible. Just how this is to be accomplished, however, is impossible to say
without first becoming well acquainted with the object of study. It is by compar-
ing the aspects with each other that a general structure of the target concept can
be approached. In this way, the concept is marked out by the instances of the
word in the light of the aspects that have been identified, but in contrast with
the mere word, the concept comprises a more comprehensive propositional do-
main, which includes all the aspects (or the proposition sets the aspects consist
of). The comparative arrangement of the aspects should reveal the possible reg-
ularities or invariances between aspects, so that these invariances can then be
said to belong generically to the concept. As such, dividing the concept of
love into different sorts of love is of course nothing new (cf. e.g. Fromm 1957;
Lewis 1963), but the divisions are not self-evident, and the particular way I
make these divisions is novel in the study of Kant.
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To clarify my approach further, I think my investigation into the concept of
love in Kant must be called quasi-inductive. I do not claim to be analysing every
possible aspect of love, let alone every single instance of the word ‘love’ in
Kant’s corpus. I am after a relatively robust yet manageable account of the con-
cept of love, and I therefore limit the construction of the framework to those as-
pects that figure most prominently in Kant’s philosophy.While the method is in-
ductive in the sense that I gather textual data and make generalisations based on
sample populations of the word ‘love’, my results are neither certain nor abso-
lutely necessary. What I will say is merely that my division of the concept of
love in Kant is one possible, plausible, or viable way of setting up a framework
of analysis, and that while my results remain incomplete and hopefully subject
to criticism, this study is nevertheless the first comprehensive approximation of
what the concept of love in Kant’s philosophy might look like.
To return to the basic claims made at the beginning of this introduction:
what is the general division of love in Kant? As noted above, I identify five (or
six) particularly important aspects of love to be discussed in the study: self-
love, sexual love (and love of beauty), love of God, love of neighbour, and
love in friendship. This list is not exhaustive and could be constructed otherwise,
but these aspects do exist in Kant’s writings, and within this framework of as-
pects Kant consistently uses or implies a division between two generic kinds
of love: love of benevolence [Liebe des Wohlwollens] and love of delight [Liebe
des Wohlgefallens]. These two loves appear regularly. In general, love of benevo-
lence in Kant is goodwill that is directed to the well-being of its object. It can be
weak or active, but the wishful or actively sought end of all instances of love of
benevolence is that things go well for the object, no matter how minimal one’s
interest in the well-being of the object actually is. Love of delight, on the other
hand, is a pleasure taken in the physical or moral perfections, or even the sheer
existence, of the object. It does not carry an aim or an interest in the same way
that love of benevolence does. Rather, it is a reaction or a response to an encoun-
ter with the object of love and its qualities. It is primarily a feeling aroused by the
object in conjunction with the cognitive faculties or capacities of the agent.
In different contexts, love of benevolence and love of delight will vary ac-
cording to their objects and the aspects of love to which they relate, so that
they acquire somewhat different meanings and different functions depending
on the aspect in question. However, I have found only one direct reference to
a general division of love in Kant’s published works, and the existence of the di-
vision must be shown and systematically reconstructed with various sources for
each of the individual aspects. The direct remark is contained in the first part of
Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason, where Kant discusses the origin of
evil and, more precisely, its relation to self-love. Kant refers to a general division
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of love in a lengthy footnote: ‘Like love in general, self-love too can be divided
into love of benevolence and love of delight (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACEN-
TIAE), and both (as is self-evident) must be rational.’ (R, 6:45.22–25)¹ In the spe-
cific context of self-love, the general division of love basically means that we
want things to go well for ourselves (love of benevolence), and that we are
pleased (love of delight) when things do work out well for us (overall self-love
is more complicated than this, and I discuss the complexity of the general divi-
sion of self-love in ch. 1.2). The remark in the Religion also asserts that both love
of benevolence and love of delight ‘must be rational’. It is not entirely clear what
this means, and whether the ‘must’ [müssen] should be understood as normative
or as part of the description of the loves in question. It is also not clear whether
the rationality that Kant is talking about here is meant to apply to love of benev-
olence and love of delight generally or merely (or specifically) in the context of
self-love. We know from the passage itself and from several places elsewhere
that Kant allows for the existence of inclination-based love of benevolence
and pathological love of delight (see e.g. ch. 4.1). It is therefore clear that the
phrase ‘must be rational’ cannot be taken to mean ‘must be based on reason’.
In the specific context of self-love, the rationality of love of benevolence for one-
 ‘Wie Liebe überhaupt, so kann auch Selbstliebe in die des Wohlwollens und des Wohlgefallens
(BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE) eingetheilt werden, und beide müssen (wie sich von
selbst versteht) vernünftig sein.’ It is difficult to find a satisfying translation that captures the
parallelism, apparent in the German language, of the two basic forms of love. The love that is
benevolence is, at its basis, willing well. It is commonly translated as ‘good will’, ‘benevolence’,
or ‘well-wishing’. Only the last, I believe, is implausible as a general strategy, since Kant often
explicitly distinguishes between practical love of benevolence and mere wishing [wünschen]. The
translation of Liebe des Wohlgefallens is trickier. Wohlgefallen consists of the adverbial conjunc-
tionWohl (‘well’), the prefix ge,which implies conjoining or linking together, and the verb fallen.
So literally, it signifies something like ‘fall together well’. The verb gefallen as such means to
please or to delight, and Wohlgefallen is indeed sometimes translated as ‘well-pleasedness’.
This is quite possible as a translation, but it suggests satisfaction in an outcome, and while
Kant sometimes uses Wohlgefallen this way, there is also in Kant an underlying sense of Wohl-
gefallen-love as an immediate sensory impulse of positive attraction, better captured by the Eng-
lish word ‘delight’ than ‘well-pleased’. The English term ‘good pleasure’ has a biblical back-
ground and is also plausible, but like ‘well-pleased’ it perhaps obscures some of the
immediateness and the attractive pull of Wohlgefallen. The English ‘well-liking’ (which is also
used by some translators) is unwarranted, I think, for it actually means something like ‘good
physical condition’. Wohlgefallen is sometimes translated as ‘satisfaction’, sometimes as ‘liking’,
and other times as ‘approbation’. In the interest of remaining technically consistent, I use ‘love
of benevolence’ and ‘love of delight’ in this study because I think that overall they best capture
what Kant is talking about, even at the expense of the linguistic parallelism. My solution is nat-
urally open to criticism.
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self means that the inclination-based love of benevolence for oneself includes
the successful long-term use of instrumental reasoning, i.e. it is rational as pru-
dence. Rational love of delight for oneself, on the other hand, means either tak-
ing pleasure in one’s own prudence or a kind of self-contentment that is based
on one’s respect for the moral law (in the last case the love of delight for oneself
would be based on reason) (R, 6:45fn.; see ch. 1.2). However, if we interpret the
words ‘must be rational’ as referring to love of benevolence and love of delight
more generally, beyond the context of self-love, we may note that Kant never
talks of mere non-rational animality in terms of the general division of love,
and his usage of the terms seems to be limited to the context of rational beings.
In this sense, love of benevolence and love of delight always imply reason, even
when a token of benevolence or delight is pathological or based on inclination
(ch. 1). This means that for Kant, love of benevolence and love of delight appear
in rational creatures, entangled in their rational capacities. Some loves are de-
rived from pure practical reason, like practical love of neighbour as the duty
to be benevolent and beneficent to others (ch. 4). Similarly, love of God is an
idea derived from moral reason (ch. 3). It is also the case that Kant’s ethical writ-
ings involve a demand for cultivation, which ethically means the conscious striv-
ing to make one’s cognitive apparatus more fit for what morality demands. This
includes making use of one’s feelings of love in the service of moral reason, and
in this general sense the ‘must be rational’ can be interpreted as involving a de-
mand to cultivate natural feelings of love of benevolence and love of delight in
order to improve oneself morally (see esp. ch. 4.2; ch. 5).
Even though Kant’s published works contain only one direct reference to
love’s being ‘generally’, ‘as such’, or ‘all-in-all’ [überhaupt] divided into love of
benevolence and love of delight, his usage of the terms of the division runs
from the early Herder lectures on ethics (1762–64) up to the late Metaphysics
of Morals (1797) (see ch. 4). The first time the general division of love comes
up explicitly in Kant’s corpus is in the Collins notes on ethics, where ‘all love’
[alle Liebe] is divided into love of benevolence and love of delight (LE,
27:417.19–30).² There, the specific context is love of neighbour. With respect to
neighbourly love, in the 1780s Kant also uses the distinction between patholog-
ical and practical love, which is especially familiar to readers of the Groundwork
 Because the manuscript of these notes is dated 1784/85, it is often thought that they are rough-
ly contemporaneous with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. However, as the notes
are nearly identical to earlier ones ascribed to Kaehler, it has been established that the Collins
notes in fact stem from the mid-1770s, which explains some of their features (like their emphasis
on inclinations) compared to Kant’s mature moral theory (see Denis/Sensen 2015, pp. 3–4; Nar-
agon 2006, entry on ‘Collins 2’ in ‘Moral Philosophy’).
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and the second Critique. The division of love of neighbour into love of benevo-
lence and love of delight resurfaces in The Metaphysics of Morals, and in ch. 4
I investigate how the general division of love of neighbour can be mapped
onto the more familiar pathological-practical distinction. If all the evidence is
taken into account, including what Kant says about love in friendship (ch. 5),
we can see that love for other human beings is generally divided into love of be-
nevolence and love of delight, so that it is possible to love others benevolently 1)
from inclination or 2) from reason, and to take delight in others 3) pathologically
or 4) intellectually (see ch. 4.1; 4.3; 5.2.2; Appendix). From a religious perspective,
God’s love of benevolence is the ground of creation and moral duties, and his
love of delight is (hopefully) an eventual favourable response to the sincere
moral striving of the human being (ch. 3). How exactly the general division of
love in Kant operates is to a great extent the main problem of the whole
study, and my exegetical work is largely meant to corroborate the existence of
the general division of love in Kant. The investigation of the general division
of love reveals that the aspects of love are not isolated from each other but over-
lap to some extent and, taken together, form a dynamic and highly complex net-
work of closely intertwined concepts. It should also be noted that Kant’s concep-
tion of love cannot be entirely reduced to the general division: under the broad and
complex rubric of self-love, we find the strongest, rudimental, non-rational im-
pulses of human nature, namely those of self-preservation (love of life) and sex-
uality (sexual love in the narrow sense), which are discussed in terms of love but
not grasped by the general division (ch. 1.1; 2.2.1).³
The second major claim of the study is that if we look at the different aspects
of love alongside each other, we see an ascent of love from the natural, animal
 The distinction between love of benevolence and love of delight has its historical roots, of
course, but as I already mentioned, in this work I cannot offer detailed historical comparisons
or a proper account of the genealogy of this pair of concepts prior to Kant. A similar distinction
appears, for instance, in Hutcheson’s An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Vir-
tue. There, Hutcheson divides love toward other rational agents into love of complacency and
love of benevolence (see Hutcheson 1990 [1725], pp. 127 ff., Treatise II.2–5), which were translat-
ed into German as Liebe aus Wohlgefallen and Liebe aus Wohlwollen. Apparently, Kant owned the
German translation of Hutcheson’s work (I thank Michael Walschots for providing me with this
information regarding the link between Hutcheson’s and Kant’s conceptions of love). More gen-
erally, amor benevolentiae and amor complacentiae belonged to standard Scholasticism and
were discussed at length by Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae. In his highly intricate conceptual
network of love, Aquinas includes a third general notion: amor concupiscientiae, or love as de-
sire. Through Aquinas, the origin of the general division of love can be traced to Christian the-
ology and Aristotle’s concept of benevolence, especially in his discussions of philia in the Nic-
omachean Ethics.
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impulses toward the highest moral-physical good in the form of cosmopolitan
friendship – or so I will argue. Through the aspects of self-love, sexual love
(and love of beauty), love of God, love of neighbour, and love in friendship,
love is seen to condition important focal points in humanity’s ascent from
crude animality to morally deserved happiness. This picture of an ascent of
love in Kant is obviously an interpretative reconstruction. Kant never systema-
tised his discussions of love into a single whole, but the reconstruction I offer
is nevertheless based firmly on what he said. It is made from the pieces Kant
laid out, even though he himself never put all the pieces together. The picture
contains both descriptive elements, which Kant uses to portray human nature,
and prescriptive elements, which explicate notions of duty as they relate to
love. The ascent concerns both the subjective level of an agent’s character devel-
opment and the communal level of the species. It also contains the regulative
ideal of the highest good as the perfection that we humans ought to strive for.
Overall, this view of an ascent of love is a conceptual classification or a hierarchy
of the different kinds of love as they relate to creation, nature, and the highest
moral-physical well-being. I call this picture the ascent model of love in Kant. The
model consists generally of the various notions of love spelled out by Kant in his
works, the interrelations between these notions, and the way in which the gen-
eral division of love brings a relative unity to Kant’s concept of love as a whole.
The ascent model of love ultimately provides a panoptic view of the aspects of
love discussed in this book. To make the claim more precisely, the ascent
model of love is a viable general model of love in Kant.
For readers familiar with Plato’s Symposium and the famous ‘ladder of love’
discussed in that work, the notion of an ascent model might ring a bell. Isn’t Di-
otima’s and Socrates’ account of Eros in the latter half of the Symposium precise-
ly an ascent model? Am I trying to argue that Kant is actually some kind of Pla-
tonist when it comes to love? The answer to the first question is: yes, the first
ascent model of love in Western philosophy was formulated by Plato. To the sec-
ond question, I’m inclined to answer no, but this must be carefully qualified to
avoid misunderstandings. Naturally, if I am generally arguing that an ascent of
love can be detected in Kant, there are going to be at least some structural sim-
ilarities with Plato’s (or Diotima’s) account in the Symposium.With Plato, one be-
gins by erotically loving the physical beauty of an individual young man, and the
impulses of self-preservation and the sexual instinct likewise lie at the natural
basis of Kant’s conception of love. Echoing Plato’s ‘ladder metaphor’, Kant
often associates love with the notions of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’, and he continually
talks about love in relation to our striving for perfection, or in relation to the cul-
tivation of our faculties – where the ultimate end is obviously the complete high-
est good.What is clearly different, however, is that for Plato, the ‘peak’ of love’s
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ascent is a kind of quasi-mystical vision, where the lover suddenly grasps the
fundamental oneness of the idea of beauty, as if in a single, sweeping intuition.
Now this is not a comparative study of love and the highest good in Plato and
Kant; it is not even a study of the highest good in Kant, and I will not go into
much detail in my comparison. Using Plato’s ladder casually as a heuristic
point of departure through which to elaborate on Kant’s notion of love, I believe
we can say that for Kant, the ‘peak’ we strive to reach is a more communal notion
of love (conditioned by respect) in cosmopolitan friendship. Subjectively, it con-
sists in love for the moral law, the full attainment of which signifies the absence
of all contra-moral inclinations in the agent. Communally, or on the species
level, it consists in the prevalence of benevolence (Liebe des Wohlwollens) and
intellectual delight (Liebe des Wohlgefallens) in equal, reciprocal, and respectful
human relationships that ultimately obtain throughout the planet. For Kant, the
attainment of these highest modes of love is a gradual, laborious, and never-
ending project of moral development. The Kantian agent is never ‘rewarded’
with the actualised, sweeping vision of the beautiful, radiant oneness described
by Plato. For Kant, the ascent of love is less about subjectively coming to ‘see’
something and more about making moral progress in terms of love in one’s in-
teractions with other human beings. I am not saying that Plato’s account cannot
also be construed along these lines, but on the face of it at least, there are clear
differences between the two. Plato’s ladder of love emphasises the vision of the
one as the highest good, whereas my ascent model of love in Kant emphasises
the duty of moral progress.
IV
If I now briefly compare my perspective with the previous, more general propo-
sitions made on Kant and love, I believe the benefits and originality of my ap-
proach can be brought to light. First of all there is an older doctoral dissertation
(55 pages) from Germany with the title The Concept of Love According to Kant
[Der Begriff der Liebe bei Kant] (Streich 1924). Detlev Streich’s main claim is
that love can never be a moral motive for Kant. While this is strictly speaking
true, Streich’s coarse-grained position reduces love to a feeling, and he does
not problematise his conception in the light of Section XII of the Introduction
to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ (see Streich 1924, p. 38), where the feeling of love is
described as a subjectively necessary predisposition for receptivity to duty.
Streich does not discuss love of God or analyse the varieties of self-love; he
only mentions sexual love in passing (Streich 1924, p. 46) and has a particularly
one-sided view of love in friendship (he thinks it’s merely burdensome [lästig])
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(Streich 1924, pp. 42, 44). More recently, in an article on Kant and the biblical
commandment of love, Martin Moors claims to ‘formulate a general evaluation
of Kant’s philosophy of love’ (Moors 2007, p. 266). However, Moors does not ex-
actly provide this, and instead identifies six aspects ‘with regard to Kant’s prac-
tical concept of love’ (Moors 2007, p. 266; emphasis added). Included in Moors’s
account are ‘religious’, ‘theological’, ‘theonomical’, ‘ethical’, ‘voluntaristic’, and
‘anthropological’ varieties of love. From my perspective, the first three would
seem to come close to love of God, the fourth and fifth to love of neighbour,
and the sixth to the notion of passion. (Moors 2007, p. 266) Moors does not dis-
cuss the varieties of self-love in significant detail; he says nothing about sexual
love (and love of beauty), nor does he mention love in friendship. For Moors,
Kant’s notion of love as duty ‘evaporates completely’ (Moors 2007, p. 267), but
he does not notice that an end of the duty of love is the happiness of others.
From a more charitable perspective, Jeanine Grenberg has defended ‘a Kantian
understanding of the role of love in a well-lived human life’, a love the concep-
tion of which is ‘entirely moral’ (Grenberg 2014, p. 211). Grenberg seems to effec-
tively reduce ‘Kant’s notion of love’ (Grenberg 2014, p. 220) to love for the moral
law (see Grenberg 2014, pp. 218–219; cf. ch. 3.1 below). But I think a Kantian
comprehension of love’s role can hardly be reduced in this way, and besides
love for the law, Grenberg provides no account of the many things Kant has to
say about love.⁴ The most interesting, detailed, and modest general proposal
is that provided by Schönecker (2010) in the Introduction to his paper on love
in Section XII of Kant’s Introduction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. First of all,
Schönecker makes clear that his list is not perfect, and the aim is only to dem-
onstrate the complexity of the concept of love (Schönecker 2010, p. 135).
Schönecker divides love in Kant into at least four contexts and twelve different
meanings. The first context is biological and includes 1) sexual love, 2) self-
love, and 3) love of life (self-preservation). The second context is the duties of
love, where Schönecker identifies 4) amor benevolentiae, 5) heartfelt benevo-
lence, 6) love for all human beings, 7) love as an aptitude to the inclination of
beneficence, and 8) practical love. Schönecker’s third context is love in friend-
ship, where he distinguishes between 9) love as friendship with humanity,
10) the duty of benevolence as a friend of human beings, and 11) benevolence
in wishes. The last context is love as a moral predisposition of amor complacen-
tiae, which is 12) love of delight [Liebe des Wohlgefallens].Without going into de-
 Perhaps it would be more charitable to view Grenberg’s account as a work in progress, be-
cause elsewhere she also discusses love in the Herder and Collins notes on ethics (see Grenberg
2015).
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tail, Schönecker’s analysis is very helpful, and from my perspective the only
main contexts that are omitted from his account are love of God and love of
beauty. As Schönecker does not ground his tentative analysis on the general di-
vision of love into love of benevolence and love of delight, it is understandable
that he is not so sensitive to the operation of the division within the contexts he
distinguishes. I think Schönecker’s loves 4– 11 can actually be viewed in terms of
varying kinds or degrees of love of benevolence. Love of delight, on the other
hand, is a broader notion than Schönecker acknowledges in his list; it also fig-
ures in self-love, love of God, and, arguably, in love in friendship. The context of
biological or natural love can also be construed such that the non-rational im-
pulses of love of life and sexual love (the latter of which, in the broad sense, in-
volves more than just biology) belong to an umbrella concept of self-love, which
further includes the general division of love on an actually rational level (see
ch. 1).
V
This study is divided into 5 chapters according to the aspects of love on which I
will focus. In these chapters, I analyse the operation of the general division of
love in the relevant contexts and carve out the various building blocks that,
taken together, form the ascent model of love in Kant. Kant’s discussions of
love take place mainly within moral philosophy, philosophy of religion, anthro-
pology, and teleology, while he does not really talk about love in the framework
of theoretical philosophy (‘love’ is not mentioned in the Critique of Pure Reason).
Apart from the first Critique, my readings emphasise the main published works
from the mature period, and I only use the lecture notes and minor writings as
auxiliary tools of interpretation when helpful. My reading strategy is fairly con-
sistent from chapter to chapter; while I tend to organise my discussions themati-
cally around the problems related to the general division of love, I normally read
Kant’s works chronologically to appreciate the transformations his thoughts on
love undergo over time. I believe that, like any great system or project of human
thought, Kant’s philosophy must be understood as a dynamic and cumulative
endeavour, where more stable positions are found on which details are then
built, while some positions change, wane, or become redefined, and the thought
itself remains constantly at work, constantly in flux. Following the methodolog-
ical advice of Ernst Cassirer, mine is not so much a study of ‘puzzles’ or ‘appa-
rent contradictions’ in the 29 volumes of Kant’s collected works but rather a
study of the dynamic structure of a particular philosophical concept – a concept
which a philosopher can only form gradually over the course of several decades
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of conceptual labour (see Cassirer 1981, pp. 1–2, cf. 137– 138). Such a concept of
love,while certainly not the only possible such concept, can nevertheless be very
beautiful, and can perhaps help us more generally to understand what love is,
how it arises, what it feels like, and what it requires from us rationally. To under-
stand love better is the deeper, underlying aim that has resulted in this book.
In the first chapter, I offer a three-level interpretation of self-love in Kant. I
argue that the concept of self-love can be divided according to ascending levels
of rationality. I show that there is a low, arational, ground-level form of self-love
that consists of the strongest animal impulses of human nature: love of life (self-
preservation), sexual love and parenting (species preservation in the narrow
sense), and instinctive sociality. I call this level ‘animal mechanical self-love’.
My analysis then turns to an actually rational level that I call the ‘middle
level’ of self-love, where self-love is divided (in a very complex way) according
to the general division of love into love of benevolence and love of delight. Last-
ly, I analyse self-love hypothetically, on an ideally rational level of infinite ap-
proximation towards the highest good. I argue that even in this infinite ascent
an element of self-love persists. Overall, I thus argue for the persistence of self-
love on three levels.
The second chapter has two exegetical tasks. I begin by analysing the rela-
tionship between sexual love and love of beauty, which relationship figures
prominently in Kant’s earlier philosophy but wanes towards the 1790s. I then for-
mulate a distinction between narrow and broad sexual love, where narrow sexual
love consists merely of the natural impulse of procreation, whereas broad sexual
love is the natural impulse united with the moral love of benevolence in the con-
text of heterosexual marriage. In comparison with the other chapters in this
study, the chapter on sexual love also contains an evaluative element, which re-
flects the fact that most of the previous research in this area is feminist and
therefore evaluative in orientation (as far as I know, my study is the first to an-
alyse sexual love in Kant from an exegetical point of view). From this perspec-
tive, I show how broad sexual love supports a less misogynistic picture of
Kant than is often presented, even though problems and internal tensions re-
main in Kant’s discussions on the issue of sex.
The third chapter formulates an ascent model of love of God. I begin with the
observation that love of God comprises two ‘directions’: a movement upwards,
from human beings to God, and a movement downwards, from God to human
beings. I call this starting point the two-directionality thesis of love of God. I pro-
ceed by analysing human beings’ love for God and then God’s love for human
beings. For Kant, morality leads to religion, and love for God is the foundation
of all inner religion. It is close to the regulative ideal of loving the moral law,
which involves fulfilling one’s duties gladly [gern] (thus implying the absence
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of contra-moral inclinations in the perfect agent). I show how God’s love can be
analysed in terms of its role as both an end and a ground: God’s love of benev-
olence toward humans is (from a religious perspective) the ground of creation
and duties, and God’s love of delight is a moral delight God in the end hopefully
takes in the sincere moral striving of the human being.
The fourth chapter proposes a novel ‘feeling-action-cultivation’ account of
love of neighbour. I track down Kant’s discussions of neighbourly love from
the early Herder notes onwards, focusing on The Metaphysics of Morals. I pro-
pose that love of neighbour consists of both moral-rational and sensory-emotive
elements and that it includes the cultivation of a moral disposition. Love of
neighbour divides into love of benevolence and love of delight, so that love of
benevolence towards others is either 1) benevolent or beneficent inclination or
2) active rational benevolence (practical love). Practical love is further divided
into beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy. Love of delight is either a patholog-
ical or an intellectual delight taken in the perfections (or even the sheer human-
ity) of another. It is not merely an actual feeling but also a predisposition of sen-
sibility to be subjectively receptive to duty.
The final chapter reconstructs Kant’s mature philosophy of friendship from
the perspective of love. I show the existence of the general division of love in this
context and analyse the way its components function. Love in friendship is at
least love of benevolence, but if the lecture notes on ethics are included as evi-
dence, it is both love of benevolence and love of delight. In general I argue that
in the context of friendship, love (conditioned by respect) marks the path to-
wards the highest good in equal and reciprocal human relationships. Friend-
ships as such are intimate, but the notion of a ‘friend of human beings’ [Men-
schenfreund; Freund der Menschen] brings with it a broader cosmopolitan
outlook that indirectly aims at the ideal moral community in terms of friendship.
I call this overall account the ‘ascent view of love in Kantian friendship’. Taken
together with the previous chapters of this study, this account corroborates the
general division approach and the ascent model of love in Kant.
VI
Before moving to the main discussion, I would like to say a word or two about
certain aspects of love to which I do not devote entire chapters but that also de-
serve mention. First, I approach the notion of love of beauty through the lens of
sexual love (ch. 2.1). This is by no means the only strategy available, and love of
beauty could also be considered for its own sake (even though there are only two
direct passages on it in the Critique of Judgment). One could, for instance, begin
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one’s discussion with the third Critique, establish that love of beauty is love of
delight, and then try to establish links between these passages and Kant’s dis-
cussions in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ and the Vigilantius notes on ethics with an
eye to elaborating further on the general qualities of love of delight. But this
kind of more experimental exegesis is beyond the scope of the present work.
Love of beauty has been recently discussed by Anne Margaret Baxley (2005)
and Gabriele Tomasi (2015), and with reference to their discussions I adopt a
merely reactive attitude in ch. 2.1, pointing out that an exegetical problem con-
cerning love in the Critique of Judgment is left untouched by these accounts.
However, this is not the main point of the chapter, and in all honesty I do not
provide a general account of love of beauty.
Second, I discuss love of honour under self-love. Love of honour is an ambig-
uous notion detached from the general division of love (in itself it is neither love
of benevolence nor love of delight). Love of honour consistently marks a concern
for respect (from others), but it comes in physical and moral variants, the phys-
ical variant belonging to the conceptual cluster of self-love and the moral variant
being grounded in respect for the moral law. My discussion of love of honour is
indebted to the careful accounts provided by Houston Smit and Mark Timmons
(2015) and Lara Denis (2014), but I should still note that neither Smit and Tim-
mons nor Denis attempt to connect love of honour to love’s general concept. I
consider the relationship between love of honour and love in general at the
end of ch. 1.1. The moral ideal of love for the law is discussed in ch. 1.3 and es-
pecially in ch. 3.1. I consider love of human beings in conjunction with love of
neighbour, especially in ch. 4.2.1.
Further, there are various ‘aspects’ of love that are mentioned by Kant only
in passing, in singular isolated contexts or in adverbial constructions, but that
are never elaborated on or systematically developed. Some of these might be
more, some less important for someone interested in a general concept of
love, but since they are not given substantial consideration by Kant in terms
of love, I do not discuss them or incorporate them into my framework. Of
such loves, the most prominent is undoubtedly parental love, yet even though
the natural impulse toward the preservation of offspring belongs to ‘animal me-
chanical self-love’ in the Religion (R, 6:26.12– 18), the only published reference to
‘parental love’ [die Liebe der Eltern] occurs in the Prolegomena, where Kant uses
love of God and parental love as examples through which to explain, formally,
the notion of an analogical relation as such (4:357fn.; cf. 28:1087– 1088). Parents
do have a duty to provide for their children, according to Kant, and children are
said to have a duty of gratitude (which is a duty of love) towards their parents
(MM, 6:280–281; cf. 9:482). When Kant discusses the difference between hatred
and anger in the lectures on ethics, he mentions a parent’s anger toward a
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child’s bad behaviour as an example of anger that presupposes love (LE,
27:687.38–688.1). That parents love their children would seem to be implicit in
Kant’s writings, but he does not discuss the parent-child relation in connection
with love to any great extent. Hence, I do not include parental love in my frame-
work.
Love of truth is mentioned a couple of times in the lectures but never in the
published works (see LE, 27:60–62; 27:448–449). In the first Critique, Kant
writes that ‘we shall always return to metaphysics as we would to a beloved
woman with whom we have had a quarrel.’ (C1, A850/B878)⁵ Although this is
an interesting metaphor, to my knowledge Kant never elaborates on it. Even
more remote examples of ‘briefly mentioned loves’, which for the most part
never appear in Kant’s published works, include ‘love of the fatherland’, as con-
trasted with universal love of human beings (LE, 27:673; see my ch. 5.3), ‘love of
justice’ (LE, 27:688–689), ‘peace-loving’ (C2, 5:61.10; see also LE, 27:687.2), and
the carnivorous ‘love of roast beef ’ (LA, 25:1361.8), none of which are developed
further in terms of love. The existence of constructions like ‘love of roast beef ’
merely shows that, in the most general terms, ‘love’ can be used to signify
any kind of relatively intense liking or desire. From this flexibility of the concept
of love it does not follow that the framework of love should be expanded ad in-
finitum to accommodate ever-new aspects or kinds of love. Rather, it shows the
need to restrict the framework through careful, quasi-inductive evaluations, so
that the concept of love can remain at the same time broad and informative.




According to Kant, it is a basic fact of human nature that we all love ourselves.
Human beings are imperfect rational creatures who want things to go well for
themselves, and there is really no way around this fundamental trait of our spe-
cies. We want to be happy. Indeed, Kant tends to describe self-love [Selbstliebe,
Eigenliebe]¹ as the basic principle of subjective happiness. Self-love is the natural
motivational ground of action, to which the moral incentive (respect for the
moral law) is opposed. Self-love is active within us, and it is only hindered by
morality to the extent that it gives rise to contra-moral inclinations. There are du-
ties in Kantian ethics, of course (e.g. the duties to perfect oneself and to promote
the happiness of others), and in light of our duties we should keep self-love in
check and diminish its influence. Self-love can often appear as selfishness,
and as such it is prone to impede our striving for virtue. It may threaten the free-
dom and happiness of others.
But what does the above actually mean, and can something like this be said
to be the whole picture of self-love in Kant? While the basics are relatively simple
from the perspective of moral theory, self-love poses problems for Kant’s ethics.
It is a significant concept in his moral philosophy and has received attention
from scholars. Treatments of self-love in the previous literature, however, can
be quite varied. Some view self-love as ‘an objective principle of practical reason’
(Paton 1947, p. 91) or even as ‘furthering morality’ (Šimfa 2013, p. 107), whereas
others hold that ‘love is not an attitude that clear-sighted and rational people
could ever take toward themselves.’ (Wood 1996, p. 144) Often, scholars touch
upon self-love in discussing other issues, such as beneficence (Hill 1993), benev-
olence (Edwards 2000), or respect for the moral law (e.g. Reath 2006; Engstrom
2010)². Yet none of the previous readings aim to provide a systematic, exegetical
interpretation of the notion of self-love.
 I have been unable to detect a difference in meaning between the two German terms, even
though it seems that Kant tends to use Eigenliebe when he is contrasting self-love with self-con-
ceit [Eigendünkel] (see e.g. C2, 5:73.12–14).
 Thomas Hill’s focus (1993, pp. 1–2) is generally on the possibility of altruism, and he draws
from a loosely Kantian framework, stating explicitly that his aims are not exegetical. Jeffrey Ed-
wards’s reading focuses on the Groundwork and the second Critique and is in fact a defence of
Hutcheson against the basic framework of Kant’s mature moral philosophy. Andrews Reath and
Stephen Engstrom analyse the moral incentive (or ‘spring’ [Triebfeder], as Engstrom puts it) and
its relation to non-moral agency. In doing this, they also offer very helpful analyses of self-love,
particularly in relation to self-conceit within the context of the second Critique (see Reath 2006,
pp. 14– 17, 23–25; Engstrom 2010, pp. 101 ff.).
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My fundamental goal is to understand the intricate structure of self-love and
the role it plays in Kant’s thought. What, for instance, does Kant mean when he
says that self-love is a predisposition to the good (R, 6:26)? Or when he argues
that it is the source of evil (R, 6:45)? What does he mean when he holds that
all material practical principles fall under self-love (C2, 5:22)? What is the status
of rational self-love (C2, 5:73; cf. R, 6:45–46fn.), and how does self-love relate to
the general division of love into love of benevolence and love of delight? Finally,
what is the place of self-love in the infinite progress towards moral perfection –
will it continue to exist or not?
In what follows, I shall present what I call a ‘three-level’ interpretation of
Kantian self-love, according to which the concept of self-love is divisible into as-
cending levels of rationality. I begin by discussing self-love at a rudimentary,
non-rational level of the cognitive structure of the human being, where it figures
as the strongest impulses of human nature. These fundamental animal impulses
include self-preservation (love of life), preservation of the species (sexuality and
parenting), and sociality. Together, they may be identified as ‘animal mechanical
self-love’, and according to Kant they constitute a predisposition to the good. The
main point of the first section is to lay the ground for the three-level interpreta-
tion of self-love (and for the ascent model of love in Kant more generally) by
showing that Kant discusses the strongest impulses of human nature in terms
of love. I will strive to understand why Kant calls these non-rational animal im-
pulses ‘love’ in the first place, and why he thinks that they constitute a predis-
position to the good. To this end, I will also problematise the relationship be-
tween animal self-love and the ‘self-love of humanity’ (the latter of which
implies what I call the ‘middle level’ of self-love) by looking at notions of social-
ity and love of honour in this context.
Second, I analyse the middle level of self-love in more detail, from the per-
spective of Kant’s moral philosophy. I argue that this level of self-love is best ap-
proached by acknowledging the operation of the general division of love as love
of benevolence and love of delight. This level implies the actuality of reason, and
here self-love can be considered to inform all non-moral ends the agent may
have and the instrumental reasoning related to them. The middle level brings
with it the notion of self-conceit, which Kant incorporates into the framework
of self-love through very complicated discussions. Love of benevolence for one-
self is willing one’s own happiness (or love from others), and this is a permanent
and acceptable part of humanity; self-conceit, by contrast, is a morally reprehen-
sible, delusional delight [Wohlgefallen] taken in a sense of special self-worth in
comparison with others. Self-conceit arises when one makes the self-love of be-
nevolence an unconditional law. Rational self-love, on the other hand, refers to
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the middle level of self-love under moral conditions: it is prudence limited by
morality (love of benevolence) or moral self-contentment (love of delight).
Third, I consider what would happen to self-love in the ideally rational state
of moral existence, where the highest good as moral happiness is realised as
closely as possible. Here, I argue that because the end of morality will necessa-
rily involve happiness, it follows that self-benevolence and moral self-content-
ment will be present in the infinite approximation towards the highest good. I
don’t see a way to conceive of morally deserved happiness without including
some kind of self-benevolence or moral self-contentment, both of which can ar-
guably be cashed out in terms of self-love. Hence, the three levels of self-love in
my interpretation consist of: 1) animal mechanical self-love; 2) the middle level
or general division of self-love; and 3) self-love and the highest good.
I thus argue that while there is an important sense in which self-love is in
tension with morality and constitutes an obstacle to moral progress, it is an ir-
replaceable component of human existence. In Kant’s moral thought, there is
no prescription (or even possibility) of a type of agency that is completely strip-
ped of self-love (even though unselfish acts may very well be commanded). Self-
love cuts through the ascending levels of the cognitive structure of the moral
agent and can also be used to illuminate the notion of moral progress from a
broader species perspective. Although the third and highest level of self-love
is of course idealised, it functions in my argument to illustrate the persistence
of self-love in the infinite approximation to the highest good. No matter how
closely the moral happiness of all rational creatures is realised, the Kantian
agent will still retain some minimum of an attitude of love towards herself.
Overall, then, the three-level interpretation of self-love has two exegetical
functions: 1) it outlines the first relatively comprehensive analysis of the concep-
tual structure of self-love in Kant, and 2) it serves as a preliminary for the ascent
view of Kant’s conception of love as a whole.
1.1 Animal Mechanical Self-Love
We cry for food and flee from fire.We crave sex, even without seeing or thinking
of anyone in particular to have sex with.We will do almost anything to keep our
children alive. We are drawn to others of our kind for warmth, shelter, and ac-
ceptance. These notions clearly express fundamental human desires – desires
that members of our species tend to share. But are these desires expressions
of love? And if so, how?
Kant does think that crude self-preservation, sexuality and care for offspring,
and our instinctive attraction to other human beings can be discussed in terms of
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love. But these loves, at their natural core, are not Kant’s usual concern when he
talks about love. They are not his concern when he writes in the Religion: ‘Like
love in general, self-love too can be divided into love of benevolence and love of
delight (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE), and both (as is self-evident)
must be rational.’ (R, 6:45.22–25)³ As such, the crude natural loves, as funda-
mental impulses of desire, operate completely irrespective of reason. They are
non-rational, and they are neither benevolence nor delight. Given that the first
major claim of my book is that the general division of love into love of benevo-
lence and love of delight is a key to understanding love in Kant, it may seem pe-
culiar that I begin the overall argument by pointing to a love (or a set of loves)
that is not grasped by the general division of love. I seem to begin with a counter-
example to what I wish to argue for. But while the general division of love is in-
deed a key to understanding love in Kant, it does not follow that the concept of
love in Kant is completely reducible to the general division. This leaves us with
the problem of how to understand those loves that Kant discusses as love but
that do not fall into the general division of love. It is this task that I will now un-
dertake with respect to the ‘lowest’ possible level of human existence.
The main point of the first section is to show that Kant thinks of the strongest
impulses of human nature in terms of love. Together, these non-rational drives
may be identified as animal mechanical self-love. But to say just that is not
very conducive to understanding Kant’s view.While the main point is necessary
for the argument of this chapter (and for the ascent model of love in Kant as a
whole), it is equally important to ask what Kant means when he speaks of
love as he does. In particular, there are two questions I find pressing in the con-
text of animal mechanical self-love.Why does Kant call these non-rational drives
‘love’ in the first place? And what does he mean when he says that animal me-
chanical self-love is a ‘predisposition to the good’? In this section I provide some
answers to these questions.
In the first part of Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason, Kant asserts
that there is an ‘original predisposition to good in human nature’ (R,
6:26.2–3⁴; see also 6:43.18–21). The original predisposition to the good consists
of three aspects of the human being (or the whole species)⁵ in an ascending
order: 1) animality (life); 2) humanity (rational life); and 3) personality (rational
responsible life). The third predisposition is about morality, which is not my con-
 ‘Wie Liebe überhaupt, so kann auch Selbstliebe in die des Wohlwollens und des Wohlgefallens
(BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE) eingetheilt werden, und beide müssen (wie sich von
selbst versteht) vernünftig sein.’
 ‘ursprünglichen Anlage zum Guten in der menschlichen Natur.’
 See R, 6:25.17–20.
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cern at this particular point, but the first two are explicitly articulated in terms of
self-love. The first is about non-rational animal self-love, and the second is about
a self-love for which reason is required. Because the latter is relevant to under-
standing the former, I will return to it later on in the section. With regard to the
first predisposition, Kant writes:
1. The predisposition to ANIMALITY in the human being may be brought under the general
title of physical and merely mechanical self-love, i.e. a love for which reason is not re-
quired. It is three-fold: first, for self-preservation; second, for the propagation of the spe-
cies, through the sexual drive, and for the preservation of the offspring thereby begotten
through breeding; third, for community with other human beings, i.e. the social drive.
(R, 6:26.12– 18)⁶
As this passage clearly shows, Kant thinks that certain non-rational animal
drives – self-preservation, sexuality and parenting, and sociality – are species
of ‘self-love’. But why does Kant use the word ‘love’ at all in this context?⁷ He
speaks elsewhere of ‘love of life’ [Liebe zum Leben] and ‘sexual love’ [Liebe
zum Geschlecht] in the context of depicting ‘the strongest impulses of nature’
[die stärksten Antriebe der Natur], linking love of life to self-preservation and sex-
ual love to the preservation of the species (AP, 7:276.28–33). In one sense it is
obvious why Kant might use the word ‘love’ in the context of sexuality: there
has been a close association between love and sexuality ever since the ancients,
as Eros, which is traditionally used to depict sexual desire, is precisely an ele-
mentary notion of love. Another well-documented point in the literature con-
cerning the original predisposition in the Religion is the observation that Kant
owes much of his discussion to Rousseau (e.g. DiCenso 2012, p. 48; Pasternack
2014, p. 94; see also Wood 2009, pp. 127– 128)⁸. In the Discourse on the Arts and
Sciences, for example, Rousseau famously holds that the human being is natu-
 ‘1. Die Anlage für die THIERHEIT im Menschen kann man unter den allgemeinen Titel der
physischen und bloß mechanischen Selbstliebe, d.i. einer solchen bringen, wozu nicht Vernunft
erfordert wird. Sie ist dreifach: erstlich zur Erhaltung seiner selbst; zweitens zur Fortpflanzung
seiner Art durch den Trieb zum Geschlecht und zur Erhaltung dessen, was durch Vermischung
mit demselben erzeugt wird; drittens zur Gemeinschaft mit andern Menschen, d.i. der Trieb zur
Gesellschaft.’
 Even though the predispositions to the good have received attention in the literature (e.g.
Wood 1999, pp. 118– 120, see also pp. 210–212; Palmquist 2009, pp. xxiv–xxv; DiCenso 2012,
pp. 46–50; Pasternack 2014, pp. 93–96), to my knowledge, their status as love has not been ex-
amined previously. The new Kant-Lexikon (Willachek et al. (Eds.), 2015) omits the predisposi-
tions (R, 6:26) altogether from the article on Selbstliebe.
 Interestingly, J.B. Schneewind views animal mechanical self-love as reminiscent of ‘the Stoic
view of our initial tendency toward self-preservation.’ (Schneewind 2009, p. 107)
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rally good, and that developments in the arts and sciences cause moral degen-
eration (Rousseau 1997 [1750], pp. 4–28). In the Discourse on the Origin and
Foundations of Inequality Among Men he states: ‘Man’s first sentiment was
that of his existence, his first care that for his preservation.’ (Rousseau 1997
[1755], p. 161) Rousseau distinguishes between two types of self-love: amour
propre and amour de soi-même. Amour de soi-même is ‘a natural sentiment
which inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation, and which, guided
in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue.’ (Rous-
seau 1997, p. 218) Amour propre, on the other hand, originates in society,
makes people prefer themselves to others, inspires evil, and is also ‘the genuine
source of honour’ (Rousseau 1997, p. 218). So there is a relatively easy answer to
the question: ‘Why does Kant call these drives (self‐)love, if he does not think of
them in terms of his general division of love?’ The easy answer is that sexuality
has been called love ever since the dawn of our culture, and the rest he just picks
up from Rousseau.
But there is a more interesting answer, I think, which does not avoid making
reference to the ancients but is not similarly reliant on Rousseau’s influence. The
fact that Kant calls the animal impulses love may also be explained in terms of
another, more general paradigm of love that has been with us at least since
Plato. This paradigm of love can be called love as desire, and its origins trace
back to Socrates’ speech in the Symposium, where the love object is by definition
something that the lover desires (and, according to Socrates, lacks) (see Plato
2006, 200a–201a). For Kant, the drives of animal mechanical self-love are direct-
ly connected to what he calls the faculty of desire [Begehrungsvermögen]. It is
through the notion of desire and its connection to the classical paradigm of
love as desire that we can shed light on the status of these impulses as love.
Further down in the Religion, Kant explains that ‘there is no question here of
other predispositions except those that relate immediately to the faculty of de-
sire’ (R, 6:28.22–23)⁹. By ‘the faculty of desire’, Kant is referring to ‘a being’s fac-
ulty to be by means of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of
these representations.’ (C2, 5:9fn.¹⁰; see also MM, 6:211; 20:206) Kant divides de-
sire into lower and higher faculties; where the lower faculty is sensuous, the
higher faculty is associated with pure practical reason (C2, 5:24–25). All living
beings act in accordance with the laws of the faculty of desire (C2, 5:9fn.), and
as such, animal desire is necessitated by mechanisms of nature in contrast
 ‘hier von keinen andern Anlagen die Rede ist, als denen, die sich unmittelbar auf das Begeh-
rungsvermögen […] beziehen.’
 ‘das Vermögen desselben [eines Wesens], durch seine Vorstellungen Ursache von der Wir-
klichkeit der Gegenstände dieser Vorstellungen zu sein.’
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with the moral laws of freedom (see LE, 27:344; C2, 5:95–97). Moreover, the fac-
ulty of desire is connected to pleasure and displeasure (see LE, 27:344; C2,
5:95–97; MM, 6:211–213; cf. Frierson 2014, p. 99).¹¹ In a typical case of a
‘lower’ desire, for example a desire for chocolate (or for eating chocolate), we
represent (eating) chocolate as something pleasurable, and the faculty of desire
motivates us to the action of eating chocolate, or in other words, it motivates us
to be the cause of the reality of the pleasure of eating chocolate. But the animal
impulses go cognitively even lower than that. In Anthropology from a Pragmatic
Point of View, Kant speaks of the relationship between animality and the objects
of desire in terms of instincts: ‘the inner necessitation of the faculty of desire to
take possession of this object before one even knows it, is instinct (like the sex-
ual instinct, or the parental instinct of the animal to protect its young, and so
forth).’ (AP, 7:265.23–26)¹² It therefore seems that the primitive nature of desire
in animal mechanical self-love can be understood such that acquaintance
with an object is not even required for the impulse to be operative, and even
when one encounters an actual object (say food or a sexually attractive other),
the satisfaction of the animal impulse does not require that one be able to
form a concept of the object.
In the early ‘Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime’,¹³
Kant speaks of a man who loves women only as ‘things that are to be enjoyed’
[genießbare Sachen] (2:208.3–5) and who is capable of enjoying gratification
 For Kant’s general threefold classification of the faculties of the human mind into cognition,
the feeling of pleasure, and desire, see (C3, 5:178; 20:206). Basically, through cognition we en-
counter objects in the first place, through desire we actualise certain objects, and through pleas-
ure we have feelings for the objects (cf. Frierson 2014, p. 99). Frierson notes: ‘Human action is
caused by desire, which is caused by pleasure, which is caused by cognition.’ (Frierson 2014,
p. 99) This may be the case with the lower faculty of desire, but in the case of the higher faculty
of desire pleasure cannot precede but can only follow the determination of the faculty of desire
(MM, 6:212.27–213.2; see also 5:24.32–40). Frierson’s focus is on empirical psychology, which
may explain why he relates the higher faculty of desire not to pure practical reason (C2,
5:24.35–36) or pure rational principles (MM, 6:212.31) but more loosely to ‘character’ and ‘max-
ims’. According to Frierson, the higher faculty of desire can have empirical determining grounds,
as in the case of a ‘person who smokes [cigarettes] from principle’ (Frierson 2014, pp. 99– 100).
This reading contradicts Kant’s account of the higher faculty of desire as laid out in his moral
philosophy (cf. MM, 6:426.20–26).
 ‘die innere Nöthigung des Begehrungsvermögens zur Besitznehmung dieses Gegenstandes,
ehe man ihn noch kennt, der Instinct (wie der Begattungstrieb, oder der Älterntrieb des Thiers
seine Junge zu schützen u. d. g.).’ Note that here, the ‘object’ seems to refer to another living
creature as such rather than the pleasure taken in interacting with it. This is an ambiguity
that Kant does not clarify in his discussions of desire.
 ‘Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen’.
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‘without ever having to envy others or even being able to form any concept of
others’ (2:208.6–9)¹⁴. The feeling this man enjoys ‘can occur in complete
thoughtlessness’ (2:208.14– 15)¹⁵. Despite the slight difference in terminology,
the example seems to match what Kant says about instincts in the Anthropology
quite closely. As non-rational and instinctive, animal mechanical self-love (as in
the case of the sexual impulse) operates thoughtlessly, without acknowledging
the personhood of others, indeed even without a concept of others. In terms bor-
rowed from Rae Langton, animal mechanical self-love can give rise to solipsism
(Langton 2009, p. 316, see also pp. 325 ff.)¹⁶, where the agent lets the rudimentary
desires intrinsic to animal life override reason and understanding and ends up
taking no account of the ends or the personhood of others, or her own person-
hood. This is how various vices can become grafted onto animal mechanical self-
love.¹⁷
The animal within us is consumed by desire. It is drawn to others, but it does
not understand that others exist as separate from itself, and it knows nothing of
the moral vocation of the organism of which it is a constitutive part. The animal
within us does not understand that others set ends autonomously and that they
have a capacity to be happy. This helps to explain what puts the love in animal
 ‘ohne daß sie andere beneiden dürfen oder auch von andern sich einen Begriff machen
können’.
 ‘bei völliger Gedankenlosigkeit statt finden können.’
 Langton uses the term mainly in the context of sexuality and attaches it specifically to some
of Kant’s discussions of sexual desire or sexual love (see LE, 27:384ff.; Langton 2009, p. 316). I
discuss the issue of sexuality further in ch. 2.
 These are vices of crudeness [Rohigkeit], such as gluttony [Völlerei], lust [Wollust], and wild
lawlessness [wilde Gesetzlosigkeit] (see R, 6:26.18–27.3; cf. MM, 6:424–427). Because I have chos-
en to outline the general conceptual structure of self-love, and because my main focus is under-
standing the broadest conceptual divisions of love related to it, it is not possible for me to an-
alyse specific vices (or the duties to which they are opposed) in detail. Since ‘self-love’ is the
general term in Kant’s moral philosophy to which the moral incentive and the overall framework
of duties is contrasted, the points of contact between self-love and duties would be overabun-
dant considering my aims. There are specific negative duties against suicide, unnatural sex, glut-
tony, and the misuse of substances, which are connected to the animal nature of the human
being (MM, 6:421–427). Kant insists that these duties are grounded in the categorical imperative
(not animal nature) (see MM, 6:422.31–423.6; 6:425.23–26; 6:427.5– 19; GW, 4:429.15–25;
4:425.12–27; 4:421.24–423.14). The success of his various arguments has been widely debated
in the literature (for suicide, see e.g. Paton 1947, pp. 150– 154; Korsgaard 1996, pp. 87–92;
Wood 1999, pp. 84–86; Allison 2011, pp. 183– 184; cf. Timmermann 2007, p. 81; for unnatural
sex, see Denis 1999 and Soble 2003). Here, I cannot add anything new to these debates, and
a proper attempt to do so would throw me off course with respect to my chosen focus on seeking
out and clarifying the most general divisions of (self‐)love in Kant.
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mechanical self-love: animal mechanical self-love is a form of self-centred or
species-centred desire that does not take others into account. It is a kind of
love but not a case of ‘true love’ [wahre Liebe] (see 8:337.33–34), which would
require reason and respect.
We know that Kant grounded the moral good in pure practical reason and
viewed rationality as that which distinguishes humanity from animality. How,
then, is animal mechanical self-love a predisposition to the good? Scholarly dis-
cussion on this topic would appear to be scarce. In particular, previous commen-
tators do not problematise the notion of a predisposition to the good in relation
to animal mechanical self-love; they simply tend to assume that animal mechan-
ical self-love is good without explaining how this could be so.¹⁸ Before moving
on to analyse the middle level of self-love in more detail, let us pause to consider
this question.
‘Predisposition’ [Anlage] is originally a term from biology (see Shell 2015,
p. 96). For Kant, a predisposition is a natural feature, property, or capacity of
an organism (or species) that accounts for its developing in a certain way (see
Allison 2009, p. 26fn.; cf. Wood 1999, p. 211; 2009, p. 113; see also 2:434–435;
cf. MM, 6:399.11). In the Religion, Kant writes: ‘By the predispositions of a
being we understand the constituent parts required for it as well as the forms
of their combination that make for such a being.’ (R, 6:28.17– 19)¹⁹ If the being
is not even possible without a given predisposition, then the predisposition is
original, and if this is not the case then the predisposition is contingent (ibid.,
6:28.19–21). As original predispositions, animal self-love, the self-love of human-
ity, and personality are all fundamental to the human species. As already noted,
even though the predispositions are regularities, they are not static. They are not
ready-made, rigid ‘building blocks’ of organisms but instead involve develop-
mental processes. According to Kant, it is a general feature of nature (including
human history) that ‘[a]ll natural predispositions of a creature are determined
 For instance, Gordon Michalson claims that: ‘All three predispositions […] are good in them-
selves’ and that they ‘effectively constitute the hand we are initially dealt, while […] how we play
it depends upon the way we ourselves introduce the wild card of freedom.’ (Michalson 1990,
pp. 39–40) Stephen Palmquist writes: ‘Animal self-love predisposes living beings to do good
by causing them to preserve themselves, propagate the species, and form social groups for mu-
tual protection.’ (Palmquist 2009, p. xxiv) In the same vein as Michalson, James DiCenso holds
that Kant’s ‘discussion [of the predispositions] starts from an assumption of the goodness of our
nature as such’ (DiCenso 2012, p. 47), whereas Lawrence Pasternack notes merely that ‘the Pre-
disposition to Animality has a kind of innocence’ (Pasternack 2014, p. 94).
 ‘Unter Anlagen eines Wesens verstehen wir sowohl die Bestandstücke, die dazu erforderlich
sind, als auch die Formen ihrer Verbindung, um ein solches Wesen zu sein.’
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sometime to develop themselves completely and purposively.’ (8:18.19–20)²⁰ In the
human species, the unfolding of our higher, rational predispositions can only
take place through a gradual, intergenerational, and indefinitely long cultural
process (8:18–19). As Allen Wood and Paul Guyer remind us, Kant conceives
of the natural predispositions of the human species teleologically (see Wood
1999, pp. 209–211; Guyer 2009, p. 145). The mature Kant views nature as if it
were a system of ends or purposes, where the natural predispositions of the
human being are ultimately referred to our moral vocation, which is connected
to the ideal of the complete highest good (the morally deserved happiness of ra-
tional creatures) as the final purpose of the world (see e.g. C3, 5:429.29–32;
5:434–435; 5:451). Naturally, the highest good of the human species cannot be
reached in a single lifetime or by an individual organism. At best, the species
can gradually approximate the highest good.
But even if we reflect on animal mechanical self-love from the perspective of
our moral vocation, its goodness, or the goodness to which it is predisposed,
may still appear problematic. What exactly is the function of this self-love
with respect to the good? In the second Critique, Kant distinguishes between
two notions of the ‘good’ in the German language, using ‘das Wohl’ for physical
well-being or pleasure and ‘das Gute’ for the moral good (C2, 5:59–60; see also
5:62–63).²¹ In the Religion (written after the second Critique), it is ‘das Gute’ that
appears in the heading of Kant’s discussion of the original predisposition. But as
animal mechanical self-love is physical and not moral, in the light of the second
Critique it should be impossible for animal mechanical self-love to be good [gut]
‘in itself ’ or ‘as such’, against the claims of some commentators (see Michalson
1990, p. 39; DiCenso 2012, p. 47). Indeed, Kant is not making the unqualified
claim that animal mechanical self-love is good [gut] as such. Here is Kant’s
own clarification: ‘All these predispositions in the human being are not only neg-
atively good (they do not conflict with the moral law) but they are also predispo-
sitions to the good (they further compliance with that law).’ (R, 6:28.12–14)²² ‘The
good’ of which Kant speaks here is clearly the moral good, but it is not the case
that animal mechanical self-love is (morally) good in itself. Kant does not elab-
 ‘Alle Naturanlagen eines Geschöpfes sind bestimmt, sich einmal vollständig und zweckmä-
ßig auszuwickeln.’
 Note, however, that even here, where he explicitly defines the concept of the good [das Gute]
in terms of morality, he allows the use of ‘good’ [gut] as an adjective in the context of instrumen-
tally rational action from empirical determining grounds (C2, 5:62.30–31).
 ‘Alle diese Anlagen im Menschen sind nicht allein (negativ) gut (sie widerstreiten nicht dem
moralischen Gesetze), sondern sind auch Anlagen zum Guten (sie befördern die Befolgung des-
selben).’ Translation modified following Pluhar.
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orate on what he means by ‘furthering’ [befördern] the moral good in terms of
animality, but the idea must be that animal mechanical self-love somehow
helps, promotes, or facilitates moral progress or the formation of our moral char-
acter on the species level. But how?
Naturally, animal mechanical self-love is a necessary condition for any kind
of progress on the part of the human species – it concerns the very possibility of
our species as such. If the animal within us didn’t struggle for its own preserva-
tion, if it were repulsed by all representations of sex, if it couldn’t care less about
its offspring (if any even appeared), and if it were prone to isolate itself com-
pletely from others of its kind, there would be no future for the human being.
In this fundamental and necessary sense, animal mechanical self-love enables
moral progress.
Admittedly, if the published Anthropology is included as evidence, Kant’s
use of the notion of the good in conjunction with animal mechanical self-love
is more ambiguous than might be implied by the Religion. In contrast to the sec-
ond Critique’s distinction between the physical ‘das Wohl’ and the moral ‘das
Gute’ (C2, 5:59–60), the published Anthropology divides ‘das Gute’ into physical
and moral goodness (AP, 7:277.6–7)²³. There, in a section titled ‘On the Highest
Physical Good’ [von dem höchsten physischen Gut], the animal mechanical im-
pulses of love of life (self-preservation) and sexual love (species preservation)
are connected with what is physically best for the world [das physiche Weltbeste]
(AP, 7:276.28–277.3):
The strongest impulses of nature are love of life and sexual love, which represent the invis-
ible reason (of the ruler of the world) that provides generally for the highest physical good
of the human race by means of a power higher than human reason, without human reason
having to work toward it. Love of life is to maintain the individual; sexual love, the species.
(AP, 7:276.28–33)²⁴
 Since the Anthropology contains material from several decades of Kant’s thinking, one could
conjecture that this distinction is a remnant of an earlier period of Kant’s thought. Yet the sec-
tions that contain this use of ‘das Gute’ in the published works are not to be found in Kant’s
earlier lectures on anthropology. This suggests that the material was added, or at least architec-
tonically reorganised, well after the publication of the second Critique.
 ‘Die stärksten Antriebe der Natur, welche die Stelle der unsichtbar das menschliche Ges-
chlecht durch eine höhere, das physische Weltbeste allgemein besorgende Vernunft (des Weltre-
gierers) vertreten, ohne daß menschliche Vernunft dazu hinwirken darf, sind Liebe zum Leben
und Liebe zum Geschlecht; die erstere um das Individuum, die zweite um die Species zu erhal-
ten’. Note that it is somewhat unclear whether unsichtbar refers to the invisibility of the reason
or to the invisibility of the process the reason generates.
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This does not have to be viewed as conflicting with the account in the Religion,
but it adds another dimension to how animal impulses are predisposed to the
good. The physically good must be understood in conjunction with pleasure.
In the light of this evidence there is also a sense in which the strongest impulses
of human nature (love of life and sexual love) are good because they give us
pleasure, apparently via good meals (see AP, 7:278.10– 12) and sexual inter-
course.²⁵
As already mentioned, no progress whatsoever is possible on the species
level without animal mechanical self-love. This is the bare minimum that Kant
must have in mind with respect to the relationship between animal mechanical
self-love and the moral good.²⁶ There may, however, be stronger connections. I
discuss the issue of sexual love further in ch. 2, but there is another link that
can shed light on animal self-love as predisposed to the good. This link is the
animal impulse of sociality [Gemeinschaft; Gesellschaft] (R, 6:26.17–18)²⁷. The so-
 This passage may also raise questions about the role of God’s reason in this context. As we
are here dealing with a physical good (pleasure) that human reason does not have to work for
(AP, 7:276.30–31), it seems that Kant’s reference to God’s reason shouldn’t (at least on the face of
it) be primarily understood from the perspective of the moral postulate of God. Rather, the ref-
erence seems to point toward the notion of providence [Vorsehung], which Kant makes use of in
the philosophy of history (see e.g. 8:30.19; 8:121.3; 8:123.23). Interpreted from this perspective,
animal mechanical self-love yields physical pleasure according to a ‘hidden plan of nature’
[der verborgene Plan der Natur] (see 8:272–273), the final purpose of which is the complete de-
velopment of all our predispositions (see 8:18.19–20). Relatedly, in The Metaphysics of Morals,
love of life (self-preservation) and sexual love (species-preservation) are connected with ‘an in-
telligent cause’ [der Ursache […] Verstand] in terms of the critical teleology (see 6:424.12– 18). In
the critical teleological framework articulated in the third Critique, all natural purposes must be
thought of as if they were intelligently caused (even though we cannot know this theoretically) if
they are to be systematically connected to the ideal or the final purpose of the highest good (the
morally deserved happiness of rational creatures). The reason for this is that Kant thinks that the
highest good is possible only if God is postulated (see ch. 3).
 In Kant’s Lectures on Pedagogy, the first principle of education is to discipline the wildness
of animality, and hence the education related to animality is negative: ‘To discipline means to
seek to prevent animality from doing damage to humanity, both in the individual and in society.
Discipline is therefore merely the taming of savagery.’ (9:449.28–30; see also 9:441.18; 9:465.30)
/ ‘Discipliniren heißt suchen zu verhüten, daß die Thierheit nicht der Menschheit in dem einzel-
nen sowohl als gesellschaftlichen Menschen zum Schaden gereiche. Disciplin ist also blos Be-
zähmung der Wildheit.’ This supports the view that animality on its own does not play a positive
role in moral progress.
 In English, this animal impulse might also be termed ‘sociability’, since ‘sociality’ and ‘so-
ciability’ are nearly indistinguishable. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, for in-
stance, ‘sociality’ is ‘sociability’, but ‘sociality’ involves in particular ‘the tendency to associate
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cial impulse connects animal self-love with the self-love of humanity, and look-
ing more closely at this connection might help to explain how animal mechan-
ical self-love is predisposed to the good. Let us therefore turn to the predisposi-
tion of humanity:
2. The predispositions to HUMANITY can be brought under the general title of a self-love
which is physical and yet involves comparison (for which reason is required); that is,
only in comparison with others does one judge oneself happy or unhappy. Out of this
self-love originates the inclination to gain worth in the opinion of others, originally of
course, merely equal worth: not allowing anyone superiority over oneself, bound up with
the constant anxiety that others might be striving for ascendancy; but from this arises grad-
ually an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others. (R, 6:27.4–12)²⁸
Kant’s discussion implies what I call the actually rational ‘middle level’ of self-
love, which I discuss from a moral theoretical perspective in the second section.
Here, the passage in question connects particularly well with Kant’s philosophy
of history, where he uses these kinds of terms to discuss the development of
human societies. Animal self-love makes us approach other animals of our
kind for sex and nurturing and to live in their company, but our rational predis-
position brings with it a comparative and competitive drive. As rational creatures
who live in societies, we observe others and compare ourselves with them. We
constantly evaluate their well-being, their various skills, their wealth, power,
how good they are morally, and so on.We do not want to be worse than others,
and we are afraid that they will strive to be superior to us.We also want them to
think well of us. This rational but non-moral predisposition of self-love motivates
us to emulate and compete. It gives rise to social antagonism, which Kant fa-
mously calls ‘unsociable sociability’ [die ungesellige Geselligkeit] (8:20.30)²⁹. In
in or form social groups’. Since this belongs to the animal level, I use ‘sociality’ for the animal
impulse and (unsocial) ‘sociability’ for the social self-love for which reason is required.
 ‘2. Die Anlagen für die MENSCHHEIT können auf den allgemeinen Titel der zwar physischen,
aber doch vergleichenden Selbstliebe (wozu Vernunft erfordert wird) gebracht werden: sich näm-
lich nur in Vergleichung mit andern als glücklich oder unglücklich zu beurtheilen.Von ihr rührt
die Neigung her, sich in der Meinung Anderer einen Werth zu verschaffen; und zwar ursprünglich
bloß den der Gleichheit: keinem über sich Überlegenheit zu verstatten, mit einer beständigen Be-
sorgniß verbunden, daß andere darnach streben möchten; woraus nachgerade eine ungerechte
Begierde entspringt, sie sich über Andere zu erwerben.’
 The key text here is ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim’. Kant’s basic idea
of unsocial sociability is not his own invention, and similar notions had been previously ex-
pressed by various authors. As noted above, Rousseau called the self-love related to social an-
tagonism amour propre (see Rousseau 1997 [1755], p. 218; see also 1974 [1762], pp. 173–5 (begin-
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unsociable sociability, self-love draws us together to form communities, and the
same self-love also threatens to destroy them (see 8:20.30–33). Self-love can be a
great source of evil, a source of arrogant self-conceit, greed, dominance, tyranny,
and war, but competitive antagonism also drives culture forward and propels the
development of natural human predispositions. The self-love of humanity makes
us advance our various talents, taste, and the argumentative skills we need in
our quest for knowledge (see Cohen 2014, p. 81). It motivates us to emulate
the morality of others, and it is generally a source of our inclination for honour
(see Denis 2014, p. 200). As Kant explains in ‘Idea for a Universal History with a
Cosmopolitan Aim’³⁰, this cultural process grounds a frame of mind ‘which can
with time transform the rude natural predisposition to make moral distinctions
into determinate practical principles and hence transform a pathologically com-
pelled agreement to form a society finally into a moral whole.’ (8:21.14– 17)³¹
This is at base how the self-love of humanity is predisposed to the good.
What is particularly interesting from the perspective of animal mechanical
self-love, and self-love and love more generally, is that the higher (though still
physical and not moral) self-love is rooted in animal sociality. As Wood (2009,
p. 115) notes, unsociable sociability is a ‘modification’ of the social animal pre-
disposition. Being instinctively drawn to others grounds rational comparison
with others, and the development of comparative self-love from this basis can
somehow be morally transformative at the level of society.
Before concluding this section, let us turn to whether this idea can be made
sense of by looking at the connection between animal sociality and what Kant
calls love of honour [Ehrliebe]. According to Kant, the inclination to be equal to
others gives rise to emulation, which we ought to cultivate and which ‘serves
merely to educate our animal nature and make it adequate to humanity, or
the intellectual being within us, and to its laws.’ (LE, 27:695.17–20)³² This emu-
lative tendency gives rise to love of honour (LE, 27:695.25–30; see Denis 2014,
p. 200). Drawing from previous discussions on this topic (Smit & Timmons
2015; Denis 2014), I would suggest that there are two basic kinds of love of hon-
ning of Book IV)). For more detailed accounts of the historical influences behind Kant’s idea of
unsociable sociability, see Schneewind (2009) and Wood (2009, esp. pp. 114–117).
 ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’.
 ‘welche die grobe Naturanlage zur sittlichen Unterscheidung mit der Zeit in bestimmte prak-
tische Principien und so eine pathologisch-abgedrungene Zusammenstimmung zu einer Gesell-
schaft endlich in ein moralisches Ganze verwandeln kann.’
 ‘sie dient nur zur Ausbildung unserer thierischen Natur, und um sie mit der Menschheit oder
dem intellectuellen Wesen in uns und dessen Gesetzen angemessen zu machen.’ Translation
modified.
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our in Kant: one physical, the other moral.³³ The first kind is emphasised in
Kant’s earlier lectures on ethics³⁴, while the latter plays a greater role in his ma-
ture moral philosophy. Physical love of honour is a natural impulse [Trieb] or in-
clination to secure respect and a ‘favourable judgment’ [ein günstiges Urtheil]
from others (LE, 27:408.4–5; 27:408.29). Like the other drives connected to
self-love and unsociable sociability, love of honour has an ambiguous nature.
When we take the judgments of others into account in assessing our own ac-
tions, we indirectly pave the way for morality. This love of honour is a natural
and in itself unselfish (see LE, 27:410.30–31) inclination merely not to be an ob-
ject of contempt (LE, 27:408.35–37). As such, it is not directed to one’s own ad-
vantage (27:408.5–7), but it can easily turn into an ambitious craving for honour,
or arrogant self-conceit, such that we come to view others as inferior and think
of ourselves as being entitled to their highest respect. In Kant’s mature moral
philosophy, on the other hand, it is respect for the moral law that grounds
love of honour. In The Metaphysics of Morals, love of honour is a virtue based
on the self-assessment of our dignity in comparison with the moral law (MM,
6:420.13–30; see LE, 27:609.5–610.9; 27:695–696; 27:667.12–21). Love of honour
is also a basic claim to be respected by others because of one’s fundamental
standing (and equality with others) as a moral being (MM, 6:464.5– 11; see
Denis 2014, pp. 206–207). The moral love of honour is not based on external
concern for the opinions of others: ‘A lover of honour finds in himself no
need to be known [for his merits]’ (LE, 27:665.6–7)³⁵. Hence the two basic
kinds of love of honour differ from each other with respect to their ground.
Even though the physical love of honour can be unselfish, it must be classified
under self-love in the broadest sense because it is based on inclination (and con-
 The analyses of this topic offered by Smit and Timmons (2015) and Denis (2014) are extreme-
ly helpful. However, neither Smit and Timmons nor Denis make an attempt to connect love of
honour with love’s general framework – i.e. they do not problematise the status of love of hon-
our as love. As with the animal impulses of self-love, Kant never discusses love of honour in
terms of the general division of love. Given my previous analysis of love and desire, we can
see why Kant might call the physical love of honour ‘love’: as an inclination, it is connected
with the (lower) faculty of desire. There is also a long-running linguistic convention involved
here: even Aristotle referred to desire for honour as ‘love of honour’ (1984; Nicomachean Ethics,
Book IV, 1125b1–25; see Denis 2014, p. 203). On the other hand, as I will show below, moral love
of honour comes close to respect.
 In particular, I’m speaking about the Collins notes on ethics.
 ‘Ein Ehrliebender findet in sich kein Bedürfnis, bekannt zu sein’.
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nected with emulation).³⁶ Moral love of honour, or ‘true love of honour’ [wahre
Ehrliebe] (see LE, 27:695.26) would seem to be a kind of self-respect.
For the mature Kant, of course, animality cannot serve as the basis of mor-
ality, which must be grounded in pure practical reason. In the Vigilantius notes
on ethics, however, true love of honour can come about when animal nature is
educated by cultivating the natural, inborn tendency to emulation, such that one
learns gradually to test one’s worth not against others but against the moral law
(LE, 27:695.20–26). Kant does not elaborate on how one learns this, but it would
probably be through moral education (see 9:446–449). My conceptual point is
that by looking at love of honour, it is possible to detect a predisposition to
the good in the animal self-love of sociality. Through the unsociably sociable
self-love of humanity, animal sociality connects to love of honour and may
thus be a contributing factor in the acknowledgment of the fundamental equality
of all human beings as moral beings. But as Denis (2014, p. 205) warns us, maybe
the continuity in Kant’s accounts of love of honour shouldn’t be exaggerated,
and my basic claim in this section does not hinge on this tentative suggestion
concerning the role of love of honour in mediating animality and morality.
The bulk of my discussion in this section has been motivated by a desire to
understand. I have merely argued that Kant views the strongest impulses of
human nature in terms of love, and that these impulses can be classified
under animal mechanical self-love. Moreover, I am confident that animal me-
chanical self-love is somehow a predisposition to the good. The social impulse
of animal self-love grounds the unsociably sociable self-love of humanity,
which belongs to the history and teleology of moral progress. Love of honour
is an interesting notion along this trajectory. At the very least, animal mechan-
ical self-love is, for Kant, a necessary condition of the continued survival of our
species.
1.2 The Middle Level of Self-Love
I shall now move on to what I call the broad middle level of self-love. The first
section already identified this level from the perspective of the philosophy of his-
tory. Here, my focus will be moral philosophy. The moral perspective marks the
self-love normally referred to in discussions of self-love in Kant, and it is clearly
 The next section will show, with reference to the second Critique, that all inclination-based
maxims fall under self-love, even if they are not ‘selfish’ in the sense of seeking one’s own ad-
vantage.
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this kind of self-love that Kant had the most to say about. In order to make sense
of this notion, I will consider the operation of self-love in the mature period, fo-
cusing on the Groundwork, the second Critique, and the Religion, while also tak-
ing into account the Vigilantius lectures on ethics and The Metaphysics of Mo-
rals.
I will approach this level of self-love with an interpretative key provided in
the Religion, according to which love in general, and self-love in particular, is
divided into two distinct forms or types of love, namely love of benevolence
and love of delight. For this reason, I will begin by grounding my interpretation
in the Religion and then work my way back chronologically through the Ground-
work and the second Critique.We might call this the general division approach to
the middle level of self-love.
Considering the overall aims of the present chapter and this study as a
whole, there are three main claims that I shall argue for in this section: 1)
Kant’s moral philosophy contains a notion of self-love that requires reason
(and that is hence distinct from and cognitively ‘higher’ than animal mechanical
self-love); 2) this self-love may be plausibly interpreted in terms of the general
division of love, such that self-love is mainly benevolence toward oneself but
also delight in oneself; and 3) while the latter especially brings with it the danger
of self-conceit [Eigendünkel], which is evil, both forms of love are acceptable
under moral conditions.
I take it that none of these claims are trivial, and they may be even more
prone to objections than my assertions in the previous section. It would be pos-
sible to argue on the basis of certain passages in the Groundwork that animal me-
chanical self-love and ‘higher’ self-love are in fact not distinguishable from each
other, and that the general division of love is simply a peculiarity of the Religion,
and not supported by Kant’s other major works. However, I hope to show that
these lines of argumentation will not work. The textual evidence suggests that
Kant developed his account of self-love substantially after the Groundwork,
and since the later works are fairly consistent in outline among themselves,
their picture of self-love is preferable. This is not to say that Kant essentially
changed his mind on self-love after 1785 or that the period following the Ground-
work was marked by complete uniformity. I wish only to suggest that certain dis-
tinctions that we find in later works were not yet clearly in place in 1785. A fur-
ther possible objection against my claims is that, even if it were granted that part
of self-love involves reason and that the general division of love has something
to do with it, this self-love still contains elements, or some meaning, that cannot
be grasped in terms of the general division. At face value, this objection seems to
me to be the most promising, and its success hinges on whether or not the gen-
eral division is robust enough to capture Kant’s most all-encompassing formula-
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tions of self-love, where self-love informs all instrumentally rational non-moral
activity. I believe the general division is indeed robust at the middle level and
that the general division of love, together with the multilevel account of self-
love, makes it possible to harmonise the self-love discussed in the Groundwork
with the later works while continuing to appreciate their apparent differences.
As mentioned above, in the fourth section of the first part of the Religion
(‘Concerning the Origin of Evil in Human Nature’)³⁷, Kant introduces the idea
of a general division of love, which is applicable to self-love in particular:
‘Like love in general, self-love too can be divided into love of benevolence and
love of delight (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE), and both (as is self-evi-
dent) must be rational.’ (R, 6:45.22–25)³⁸ The first amounts to wanting [wollen]
things to go well [wohl] for oneself, and it is rational insofar as the instrumental
reasoning related to the pursuit of happiness [Glückseligkeit] or well-being [Woh-
lergehen] is apt. The rational maxims of love of benevolence for oneself are non-
moral; they subordinate reason to natural inclination. (R, 6:45.25–32) Rational
love of delight, on the other hand, has two senses, the first of which coincides
with love of benevolence: ‘we take delight in those maxims, already mentioned,
which have for the end the satisfaction of natural inclination […] and then it is
one and the same with love of benevolence toward oneself ’ (R, 6:45.35–38)³⁹.
The second sense of love of delight for oneself is distinctive and seems to
imply morality: ‘Only the maxim of self-love, of unconditional delight in oneself
(independent of gain or loss resulting from action), is however the inner princi-
ple of contentment only possible for us on condition that our maxims are sub-
ordinated to the moral law.’ (R, 6:45.40–46.18)⁴⁰
This passage supports point 1) above: there is some sort of rational self-love
in Kant that is distinct from the way animal mechanical self-love is described
(this point is corroborated by the existence of the ‘self-love of humanity’ dis-
cussed in the latter half of the previous section; see R, 6:27.4– 12). Hence, it
may be proposed that there are at least two ‘levels’ of self-love in Kant: a non-
 ‘Vom Ursprunge des Bösen in der menschlichen Natur.’
 ‘Wie Liebe überhaupt, so kann auch Selbstliebe in die des Wohlwollens und des Wohlgefall-
ens (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE) eingetheilt werden, und beide müssen (wie sich
von selbst versteht) vernünftig sein.’
 ‘wir uns in jenen schon genannten auf Befriedigung der Naturneigung abzweckenden Maxi-
men […] wohlgefallen; und da ist sie mit der Liebe des Wohlwollens gegen sich selbst einerlei’.
Translation modified.
 ‘Allein die Maxime der Selbstliebe des unbedingten (nicht von Gewinn oder Verlust als den
Folgen der Handlung abhängenden) Wohlgefallens an sich selbst würde das innere Princip einer
allein unter der Bedingung der Unterordnung unserer Maximen unter das moralische Gesetz uns
möglichen Zufriedenheit sein.’
1.2 The Middle Level of Self-Love 35
rational level and a rational level.What I wish to focus on next is claim 2), which
concerns the viability of the general division of love in this context. By showing
that the general division of love is indeed viable, I hope to provide the necessary
conceptual tools for establishing and clarifying the meaning of 3) – the claim
that self-love is acceptable under moral conditions while self-conceit is evil.
In the Groundwork, self-love is explicitly contrasted with respect for the
moral law. The latter represents a worth that ‘infringes’ [Abbruch thut] on self-
love (GW, 4:401.28–29fn.) in the sense that we are subject to the moral law ‘with-
out consulting self-love’ (GW, 4:401.33fn.)⁴¹.When explaining the proper motiva-
tional ground of moral action, Kant uses Selbstliebe as a general term to capture
those motivational grounds that are distinct from morally adequate motivation.
Pure morality abstracts from the presentation of ends, and by implication self-
love can be seen to refer generally to cases where an expected ‘effect’ [Wirkung]
of conduct is made the motivational ground of action. It seems to be self-love
that informs all our fears and inclinations. (GW, 4:401) In this sense, in the
Groundwork picture, self-love simply denotes all of our non-moral interests
(see also GW, 4:406) – a picture that is consistent with the second Critique.
Throughout his writings, Kant assumes that what human beings (as imperfect ra-
tional creatures) naturally desire is happiness, and hence self-love may be iden-
tified as the principle of subjective non-moral happiness. In fact, it is the name
given to the subjective interest in happiness.
But the Groundwork does not clearly distinguish between rational and non-
rational aspects of self-love. In Section I, ‘preservation’ [Erhaltung] and ‘prosper-
ity’ [Wohlergehen] are identified as the constituents of happiness, which accord-
ing to Kant is better pursued with instinct rather than reason. Here, self-preser-
vation (which Kant later calls ‘love of life’) is not distinguished from prosperity in
terms of reason, as is the case in the Religion (GW, 4:395.4– 12; R, 6:26.12– 18;
cf. 6:45fn.). However, happiness as the satisfaction of the sum of all one’s incli-
nations (GW, 4:394.17– 18; see Timmermann 2007, p. 20) in the Groundwork is a
purpose that is assumed to be naturally necessary in all imperfect rational crea-
tures (GW, 4:415.28–33). In other words, even though the distinction between an-
imal mechanical self-love and rationally comparative self-love is not clear in the
Groundwork, Kant says neither that self-love is non-rational or irrational nor that
it is impermissible as such. We must interpret his idea such that, in the light of
his basic division between nature and freedom/morality, self-love concerns our
natural inclinations (it flows from the side of nature, as it were) but is entangled
in our rational capacities.
 ‘ohne die Selbstliebe zu befragen’.
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In the Groundwork, the pursuit of happiness comes in the guise of ‘hypothet-
ical assertoric imperatives’⁴², which means that the pursuit involves principles or
quasi-commands (see GW, 4:414–415; cf. 4:418.28–32) stemming from means-
end reasoning concerning the purpose of ‘one’s own greatest well-being’ (GW,
4:416.2)⁴³. In this limited and qualified sense, Herbert Paton (1947, p. 91) is cor-
rect: self-love in the Groundwork is ‘an objective principle of practical reason’, for
it is assumed as actual in all finite rational beings. But the ‘objective’ here
should not be confused with ‘objectively necessary’ in the moral sense. Self-
love is not a duty, and as such it is not in the service of morality. Indeed,
what is at issue in Kant’s examples of the specific duties not to commit suicide
and not to make false promises is ‘the principle of self-love’ [Princip der Selbs-
tliebe] (GW, 4:422.7; 4:422.24), but the key point is that the self-love in question
may not be universalised (see Timmermann 2007, p. 81). In Kant’s examples of
how the principle of self-love functions in moral life, what we encounter are im-
moral instances of self-love. Suppose, for instance, that I borrow money and
falsely promise to repay it. This may well promote my ‘own benefit’ [eigenen Zu-
träglichkeit] and ‘future well-being’ [künftigen Wohlbefinden], but if universalised
the promise would contradict itself, for then no one would believe others’ prom-
ises (GW, 4:422.15–36).⁴⁴ Self-love may be objectively actual (its principle is ac-
tive in all humans), but it is by no means objectively good (good ‘as such’ or
‘in itself ’).
Can the natural but rational and principled self-love of the Groundwork be
interpreted in terms of the general division of love found in the Religion? Instan-
ces of self-love in the Groundwork seem to refer to one’s own happiness or well-
being, and in this sense self-love in the Groundwork may well be viewed along
the lines of love of benevolence in the Religion. In short, it consists in wishing
or willing that things will go well for oneself. There is no talk in the Groundwork
 According to Kant, a rational being is endowed with a will – that is, the capacity of acting
from principles, which are representations of laws. Objective principles are rational commands,
the formulae of which are imperatives. Imperatives are further divided into hypothetical and cat-
egorical; hypothetical imperatives concern means-end reasoning, whereas only categorical im-
peratives are moral and do not refer to other ends. Hypothetical imperatives are further divided
into problematic and assertoric practical principles, where the former concern possible purposes
and the latter actual purposes. Moral imperatives are apodictically practical principles. (GW,
4:412–415) However, hypothetical imperatives are not commands strictly speaking but rather
‘counsels’ [Anrathungen] (GW, 4:418.31). In the second Critique, the hypothetical imperatives of
self-love are, properly speaking, theoretical; they merely point out empirical causal connections
and do not necessitate universally in determining the will. (C2, 5:25–26)
 ‘seinem eigenen größten Wohlseyn’.
 I do not aim here to determine whether this argument is ultimately successful.
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of any specific pleasure or delight taken in the maxims of self-love, which would
seem to exclude the possibility of interpreting the self-love of the Groundwork di-
rectly in terms of love of delight. In the Groundwork, Kant writes that ‘skill in the
choice of the means to one’s own greatest well-being can be called prudence’
(GW, 4:416.1–3)⁴⁵, even though the subjective concept of happiness cannot be de-
termined with complete certainty (GW, 4:418). In the Religion, love of benevo-
lence is rational if it is ‘consistent with’ [zusammen bestehen] and ‘apt’ [tauglich]
with regards to happiness at the level of one’s choices (R, 6:45.27–30). These ra-
tionality criteria seem to match the Groundwork definition of prudence quite
closely. This supports the idea that while the non-rationality/rationality divide
in the Groundwork is occasionally fuzzy when it comes to self-love, the principle
of self-love discussed in the Groundwork is indeed love of benevolence. Hence,
while the general division of self-love is not explicitly operative in the Ground-
work, the principle of self-love may be plausibly interpreted in terms of it,
which lends support to claim 2) above.⁴⁶
I now move on to the second Critique. For explanatory purposes, we can
roughly divide Kant’s treatment of self-love in this work into two ‘phases’ accord-
ing to the function of self-love in the discussion. It seems to me that the function
of self-love in the first chapter of the ‘Analytic’ is more or less equivalent to how
self-love operates in the Groundwork: according to Kant’s dualistic conception of
possible determining grounds of the will, self-love functions as a general term for
the determining ground of a will not determined by the moral law (see fig. 1). In
the third chapter, on the other hand, Kant discusses how the moral law ought to
influence the will as regards self-love and the moral danger that ensues if this
 ‘kann man die Geschicklichkeit in der Wahl der Mittel zu seinem eigenen größten Wohlsein
Klugheit […] nennen.’ Note that in this passage Kant speaks of prudence ‘in the narrowest sense’
[im engsten Verstande]. It is unclear what the broader sense would be, but Kant explains in a
footnote that prudence divides into ‘worldly prudence’ [Weltklugheit] and ‘private prudence’ [Pri-
vatklugheit]. The former is the skill of using others for one’s purposes; the latter, the unification
of one’s purposes to one’s ‘enduring advantage’ [daurenden Vortheil] (GW, 4:416.30–33). I take it
that private prudence is the broader of the two, but this is in tension with the equally plausible
notion that skill or insight [Einsicht] to unite one’s purposes belongs to skill in choosing the
means to one’s ‘own greatest well-being’ (which is prudence in the narrowest sense). (Cf.
Kain 2003, pp. 247, 263fn.60)
 Note that even if my interpretation of self-love in the Groundwork is rejected, we might still
need to accept the general division interpretation of the middle level of self-love on the basis of
the relative harmony between the second Critique and the Religion. In this case,we would need a
weighty argument as to why the doctrine of self-love in the Groundwork overrides the combina-
tion of the second Critique and the Religion. However, it is difficult for me to see how this could
be charitable, and I don’t have such an argument in sight.
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does not take place properly (the problem of self-conceit). I will now consider
both of these ‘phases’ in the light of the general division.
The lion’s share of the first chapter of the second Critique is dedicated to es-
tablishing that the practical principles of self-love (which Kant calls ‘material’)
are not the principles generated by the moral law (which is ‘formal’).⁴⁷ The
basic idea is summarised in Kant’s famous statement: ‘All material practical
principles as such are, without exception, of one and the same kind and come
under the general principle of self-love or one’s own happiness.’ (C2,
5:22.6–8)⁴⁸ Equally telling is the following: ‘The direct opposite of the principle
of morality is the principle of one’s own happiness made the determining ground
of the will’ (C2, 5:35.7–8)⁴⁹.We learn that in the case of self-love, the determining
ground of the will always rests on expectations of pleasure or displeasure,
‘agreeableness’ [Annehmlichkeit] or ‘disagreeableness’ [Unannehmlichkeit]. The
fact that pleasure is involved makes it plausible to suppose that the self-love
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Figure 1. Determining Grounds of the Will
 As Jens Timmermann has pointed out to me, the discussion is also directed against rival eth-
ical schools, most notably the hedonism of Epicurus (see C2, 5:24.15–20).
 ‘Alle materiale praktische Principien sind, als solche, insgesammt von einer und derselben
Art und gehören unter das allgemeine Princip der Selbstliebe oder eigenen Glückseligkeit.’ It is
important to note that the broad formulation of self-love implies that even beneficent love of
neighbour, if based on inclination, is technically subsumed under self-love. However, this
does not mean that loving one’s neighbour out of inclination is selfish; it merely means that
in the choice of the objects of beneficent love from inclination we are prone to a ‘second
order self-partiality’ (see Wood 1999, p. 271). Note also that Kant occasionally distinguishes be-
tween sympathy [Sympathie] and self-love [Philautie] (C2, 5:85.12).
 ‘Das gerade Widerspiel des Princips der Sittlichkeit ist: wenn das der eigenen Glückseligkeit
zum Bestimmungsgrunde des Willens gemacht wird’.
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there are no instances of ‘benevolence’ [Wohlwollen] in the first chapter of the
‘Analytic’. With this said, is ‘delight’ [Wohlgefallen] mentioned in this context?
As Gregor notes, ‘Kant […] uses a variety of words for “pleasure”’ (C2,
p. 157fn.a), and words such as Lust, Vergnügen, Zufriedenheit and Wohlgefallen
are all quite close to each other. As determining grounds of the will, they belong
to the ‘lower faculty of desire’ [unteres Begehrungsvermögen], as opposed to the
‘higher faculty’ [oberes Begehrungsvermögen], which alone is moral and furnish-
ed by pure practical reason irrespective of sensibility. And indeed, under Remark
I of the basic theorem of self-love (Theorem II), we find a chain of signifiers that
goes from ‘satisfaction’ [Vergnügen], ‘joys’ [Freuden], ‘amusements’ [Ergötzun-
gen]⁵⁰, and ‘enjoyment’ [Genuß] back to ‘satisfaction’ [Vergnügen], and finally
the word Wohlgefallen appears (C2, 5:24.11– 12). The point is that even though
the pleasures we take in ‘overcoming obstacles opposed to our plans’ (C2,
5:24.4–5)⁵¹ are ‘more refined because they are more in our control than others’
(C2, 5:24.6–7)⁵², the determining ground of this delight is nevertheless our
own happiness, or the lower faculty of desire – i.e. self-love.⁵³ (C2, 5:24)
It thus seems plausible to identify the self-love at issue in Chapter I of the
‘Analytic’ as love of delight. But does this create an inconsistency with the
Groundwork, where I identified self-love as love of benevolence? In both cases,
the basic point is clearly that self-love and the moral law constitute two opposing
grounds of action or determination of the will. How is this apparent similarity
regarding the function of self-love to be explained if we are dealing with two dif-
ferent dimensions of the general division of love? Quite easily, I think, if we re-
call that Kant explains in the Religion that the first sense of love of delight is in
fact identical to love of benevolence (R, 6:45fn., see above). In this case, love of
delight simply denotes taking pleasure in the inclination-based maxims of love
of benevolence (insofar as these maxims yield successful results) ‘like a mer-
 I here follow Timmermann’s suggestion (private discussion) when it comes to translating
Ergötzungen. Gregor uses ‘delights’, but this would be confusing as I render Wohlgefallen ‘de-
light’. In this context, Gregor has Wohlgefallen as ‘pleasure’.
 ‘Überwindung der Hindernisse, die sich unserem Vorsatze entgegensetzen’.
 ‘feinere […], weil sie mehr wie andere in unserer Gewalt sind.’
 Cf. Christine Korsgaard (1997, p. 220), who argues, in a supposedly Kantian fashion, that the
instrumental reason related to pursuing our aims shares ‘a common normative source’ with
moral reason in the autonomy of the agent. Even though specifically moral aims also often re-
quire auxiliary instrumental reasoning, I think that Korsgaard’s account, at least from an exeget-
ical perspective, does not sufficiently appreciate Kant’s basic distinction between self-love and
the moral law as two opposing sources of motivation for action, which he so vehemently holds
in both the Groundwork and the second Critique. Korsgaard’s views have been forcefully criti-
cised by Camilla Kong (2012).
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chant whose business speculations turn out well and who, because of the max-
ims he adopted therein, rejoices in his good insight’ (R, 6:45fn.)⁵⁴. The fact that
Kant identifies this taking of pleasure with ‘wanting things to go well for oneself ’
implies that the notion of pleasure is implicitly included in the love of self-be-
nevolence as such. The general division therefore helps to make clear that, at
a general level, the self-love of the first chapter of the second Critique is not
only consistent with the self-love of the Groundwork but can also be viewed as
an elaboration of it.⁵⁵
However, in the ‘second phase’ of Kant’s discussion of self-love in the sec-
ond Critique, things become exegetically more complicated. In Chapter III, ‘On
the Incentives of Pure Practical Reason’ (C2, 5:72.27)⁵⁶, Kant discusses the effects
of the moral law on the mind as an incentive or ‘spring’ [Triebfeder] (see Eng-
strom 2010, pp. 91–93). Because Kant’s basic system of the mental structure of
the agent relies on the dualism of the moral law and sensibility, the effects of
the moral law must be felt as effects on sensibility. We know that allowing the
sensuous side of our nature to determine the will is equated with self-love in
a broad sense, and thus the effects of the moral law are necessarily effects on
self-love (inclinations, feeling). A will determined by the moral law must reject
all such self-love that is opposed to the law. In this context, Kant refines the con-
ceptual framework of self-love, introducing new systematic distinctions:
All the inclinations together (which can be brought into a tolerable system and the satisfac-
tion of which is then called one’s own happiness) constitute regard for oneself (SOLIPSIS-
MUS). This is either the self-regard of love for oneself, a predominant benevolence toward
oneself (PHILAUTIA), or that of delight in oneself (ARROGANTIA). The former is called,
in particular, self-love, the latter, self-conceit. Pure practical reason merely infringes upon
self-love, inasmuch as it only restricts it, as natural and active in us even prior to the
moral law, to the condition of agreement with this law, and then it is called rational self-
love. But it strikes down self-conceit altogether […]. (ibid., 5:73.9–18)⁵⁷
 ‘wie ein Kaufmann, dem seine Handlungsspeculationen gut einschlagen, und der sich wegen
der dabei genommenen Maximen seiner guten Einsicht erfreut.’ Pluhar’s translation.
 I am not claiming that the two accounts are technically identical. For instance, there are dif-
ferences in the way Kant construes his treatment of hypothetical imperatives, but I cannot dis-
cuss these differences in detail here.
 ‘Von den Triebfedern der reinen praktischen Vernunft’.
 ‘Alle Neigungen zusammen (die auch wohl in ein erträgliches System gebracht werden kön-
nen, und deren Befriedigung alsdann eigene Glückseligkeit heißt) machen die Selbstsucht (SOL-
IPSISMUS) aus. Diese ist entweder die der Selbstliebe, eines über alles gehenden Wohlwollens
gegen sich selbst (PHILAUTIA), oder die des Wohlgefallens an sich selbst (ARROGANTIA). Jene
heißt besonders Eigenliebe, diese Eigendünkel. Die reine praktische Vernunft thut der Eigenliebe
blos Abbruch, indem sie solche, als natürlich und noch vor dem moralischen Gesetze in uns
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Is the general division of love into love of benevolence and love of delight op-
erative in this passage? Yes and no.What Kant generally calls self-love in other
parts of the Groundwork and the second Critique is now called self-regard
[Selbstsucht]. Here, Kant seems to use the term ‘self-love’ [Selbstliebe, Eigenlie-
be] in a more restrictive sense: self-love ‘in particular’ [besonders] is benevo-
lence towards oneself, and it is distinguished from delight in oneself, which
is ‘self-conceit’ [Eigendünkel]⁵⁸. The basic notions of the general division of
love, benevolence and delight, are explicitly operative, but ‘self-love’ is here
connected only to benevolence. This suggests that love of benevolence is a
more paradigmatic form of self-love. But what should we make of the fact
that delight is discussed here not in terms of love but in terms of self-conceit,
which, as implied by the context, is obviously reprehensible? Does this cast
doubt on the ‘acceptability-thesis’ of claim 3) above, according to which
both benevolence for oneself and delight in oneself are somehow acceptable?
Or does it mean that the delight in oneself that is under discussion here is not
part of self-love? And if delight as self-conceit does not belong to self-love,
what are the implications for the success of the general division approach in
the particular context of self-love?
I will address from three different directions the problem of how self-love,
delight in oneself, and self-conceit interrelate, which will clarify the status of
the general division of love in this context and bring to a close my discussion
of the middle level of self-love. These three directions are 1) the generality of
self-love, 2) the problem of rationality in self-love, and 3) the Vigilantius notes.
1) Firstly, there is a sense internal to the second Critique in which both benevo-
lence and delight in Chapter III can be, or even must be, interpreted as belonging
to self-love in the broadest middle-level sense. Kant’s description of self-regard
as the sum of inclinations (as a tolerable system) necessarily falls under the
basic description of self-love in ‘Theorem II’, where self-love includes ‘all mate-
rial practical principles’ (C2, 5:22.6)⁵⁹. We can understand the relation between
self-regard and self-love (in the broad sense of the second Critique) either such
that they are equivalent, insofar as the system of self-love is ‘tolerable’ [erträg-
lich], or such that self-regard is a name used for self-love when everything that
rege, nur auf die Bedingung der Einstimmung mit diesem Gesetze einschränkt; da sie alsdann
vernünftige Selbstliebe genannt wird. Aber den Eigendünkel schlägt sie gar nieder’.
 For an earlier, pre-autonomy treatment of self-love and self-conceit, see the Collins notes on
ethics,where self-love or philautia is described as love of delight and contrasted with self-conceit
(LE, 27:357).
 ‘Alle materiale praktische Principien’.
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falls under self-love is taken together (see above, 5:73.8–19). In both cases, any
instance of benevolence for oneself or delight in oneself is subsumed under self-
love (irrespective of whether the system is ‘tolerable’). Further along in Chapter
III Kant explains that self-love is the propensity to turn ‘subjective determining
grounds of choice into the objective determining ground of the will in general’,
whereas ‘if self-love makes itself lawgiving, it can be called self-conceit.’ (C2,
5:74.15– 19)⁶⁰ The latter passage confirms that self-conceit belongs to self-love:
it is self-love that arrogantly takes the place of the moral law.⁶¹ Thus the fact
that Kant distinguishes between self-love and self-conceit cannot as such be
taken to warrant the interpretation that the latter does not belong to the former.
The viability of the general division approach is not threatened on the mere basis
of the existence of such a division.
2) In the light of the second Critique and the Religion, we now have at least three
different senses of ‘rational self-love’, which may or may not turn out to be equiv-
alent. In the Religion, love of benevolence as willing one’s own happiness is ‘ra-
tional to the extent that with respect to the end only what is consistent with the
greatest and most abiding well-being is chosen, and that also the most apt
means for each of these components of happiness are chosen.’ (R,
6:45.27–30)⁶² In the second Critique, love of benevolence is rational when it is
‘infringed’ by the moral law ‘to the condition of agreement with this law’ (C2,
5:73.15– 17)⁶³. If we interpret consistency ‘with the greatest and most abiding
well-being’ as implying that one does not act immorally, then the two senses
of rational love of benevolence in the Religion and the second Critique can in-
deed be viewed as equivalent. This would imply that they cohere with the pru-
dence discussed in the Groundwork and that Kantian prudence as such implies
 ‘den subjectiven Bestimmungsgründen seiner Willkür zum objectiven Bestimmungsgrunde
des Willens überhaupt’ / ‘welche [die Selbstliebe], wenn sie sich gesetzgebend und zum unbe-
dingten praktischen Princip macht, Eigendünkel heißen kann.’
 The self-love that serves as the ground of self-conceit can now be viewed as either love of
benevolence toward oneself (wanting things to go well for oneself) or love of delight as taking
pleasure in the maxims of the former (which would amount to the same thing as the former on
the basis of the Religion). For detailed discussions of self-conceit, see Reath (2006, pp. 14– 17,
23–25), Engstrom (2010), and Moran (2014).
 ‘vernünftig, als theils in Ansehung des Zwecks nur dasjenige, was mit dem größten und
dauerhaftesten Wohlergehen zusammen bestehen kann, theils zu jedem dieser Bestandstücke
der Glückseligkeit die tauglichsten Mittel gewählt werden.’
 ‘Abbruch thut’ / ‘auf die Bedingung der Einstimmung mit diesem Gesetze’.
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a moral side constraint: the prudent agent does not act immorally.⁶⁴ This inter-
pretation is charitable, for it renders the mature period consistent in this respect.
But the interpretation is not necessary, and the text remains ambiguous. It is
equally possible that there are two different rationality criteria for love of benev-
olence, such that rationality implies mere instrumentality irrespective of morali-
ty in the case of the Religion (and, supposedly, the Groundwork) and the ‘stron-
ger’, morally constrained instrumental rationality appears only in the second
Critique. Fortunately, my argument does not hinge on this point. The third type
of rational self-love concerns love of delight (as distinct from love of benevo-
lence). In the Religion, the condition of rationality for this self-love is quite sim-
ply morality in the sense in which morality was first opposed to self-love in the
Groundwork and the second Critique. For this reason, Kant has doubts about the
appropriateness of the term ‘rational self-love’ in this case:
We could call this love a rational love of oneself that prevents any adulteration of the in-
centives of the power of choice by other causes of contentment consequent upon one’s ac-
tions (under the name of happiness to be procured through them). But, since this denotes
unconditional respect for the law, why needlessly render more difficult the clear under-
standing of the principle with the expression rational self-love, when this self-love is how-
ever moral only under the latter condition, and we thus go around in a circle (for we can
love ourselves morally only to the extent that we are conscious of our maxim to make re-
spect for the law the highest incentive of our power of choice)? (R, 6:46.21–30)⁶⁵
Is this the same sense in which rational love of benevolence is described as ‘ra-
tional’ in the second Critique? Clearly not, since the rationality criterion for ra-
tional love of benevolence in the second Critique is morality merely in the neg-
ative sense: reason may still be used in the service of inclination, and it suffices
that the prudential maxim is not contra-moral. Yet the rational moral love of de-
light in the Religion implies a contentment [Zufriedenheit] that is only possible
through ‘unconditional respect for the law’. It is also worth noting that in the sec-
ond Critique passage quoted above (C2, 5:73.9– 18), ‘self-love’ is not mentioned in
 Note, however, that even in this case there is nothing moral about the self-love as such. It is
just negatively constrained by morality.
 ‘Man könnte diese die Vernunftliebe seiner selbst nennen, welche alle Vermischung anderer
Ursachen der Zufriedenheit aus den Folgen seiner Handlungen (unter dem Namen einer dadurch
sich zu verschaffenden Glückseligkeit) mit den Triebfedern der Willkür verhindert. Da nun das
letztere die unbedingte Achtung fürs Gesetz bezeichnet, warum will man durch den Ausdruck
einer vernünftigen, aber nur unter der letzteren Bedingung moralischen Selbstliebe sich das deut-
liche Verstehen des Princips unnöthigerweise erschweren, indem man sich im Zirkel herumdreht
(denn man kann sich nur auf moralische Art selbst lieben, sofern man sich seiner Maxime
bewußt ist, die Achtung fürs Gesetz zur höchsten Triebfeder seiner Willkür zu machen)?’
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the context of delight in oneself, which is defined as self-conceit. Does this mean
that the doctrines of self-love in the second Critique and the Religion are incom-
patible, or at least that they cannot be plausibly harmonised in terms of the gen-
eral division of love? No, for in the second Critique we do find a notion of accept-
able delight in oneself that is not self-conceit and that appears to coincide with
the description of moral rational love of delight in the Religion. In the section on
the ‘Critical Resolution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason’ (C2, 5:114)⁶⁶, Kant
introduces the notion of a satisfaction or delight [Wohlgefallen] in oneself that
is not based on material determining grounds and instead rests solely on the di-
rect determination of the will by the moral law. (C2, 5:116.25–33) This is ‘content-
ment with oneself ’ [Selbstzufriedenheit], which is ‘a negative delight in one’s ex-
istence, in which one is conscious of needing nothing.’ (C2, 5:117.28–31)⁶⁷ It
denotes ‘mastery over one’s inclinations’ [der Obermacht über seine Neigungen]
rather than ‘complete independence’ [gänzliche Unabhängigkeit] from them.
(C2, 5:118.26–33) I interpret its negativity to mean that it is a delight that is
not based on the positive satisfaction of any inclination (unlike the first sense
of love of delight in the Religion) and merely follows from consciousness of
being able to ‘negate’ inclinations through respect for the moral law. There are
therefore two kinds of delight in oneself in the second Critique: self-conceit [Ei-
gendünkel] and contentment with oneself [Selbstzufriedenheit]. The former (self-
love as the unconditional practical principle in C2, 5:74.17–19) is practically iden-
tical with the Religion’s idea of self-love as the spring of evil: ‘self-love […], when
adopted as the principle of all our maxims, is precisely the source of all evil.’ (R,
6:45.14– 15)⁶⁸ Self-contentment in the second Critique comes close to the second
sense of love of delight in the Religion, which is also contentment [Zufriedenheit]
with oneself through respect for the moral law. Hence, while the conceptual sys-
tems of self-love in the second Critique and the Religion seem different, these dif-
ferences can be considered superficial. The respective notions of self-love can be
harmonised, which provides support for claims 2) and 3) above concerning the
 ‘Kritische Aufhebung der Antinomie der praktischen Vernunft’.
 ‘ein negatives Wohlgefallen an seiner Existenz andeutet, in welchem man nichts zu bedürfen
sich bewußt ist.’
 ‘Selbstliebe […], als Princip aller unserer Maximen angenommen, gerade die Quelle alles
Bösen ist.’ It now seems to me that the reason self-conceit is not discussed in terms of rational
self-love either in the second Critique or in the Religion is that while the notion of self-conceit
implies the existence of the rational capacity (its possibility belongs to the predisposition to hu-
manity), it involves a morally improper use of reason, and in this sense it is irrational. Recall that
the ground of evil cannot be located in a natural impulse and that its rational origin remains
inscrutable (R, 6:32–43).
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middle level of self-love: the general division of love is in operation, and both
love of benevolence for oneself and love of delight in oneself are acceptable
under moral conditions.⁶⁹
3) The Vigilantius notes on ethics from 1793–94 corroborate the picture of the
middle level of self-love I have drawn thus far. They explicitly confirm that
Kant’s use of the general division is not simply an anomaly found only in the
Religion but is rather foundational to how Kant viewed self-love in the mature
period. They also explain the relation between the conceptual systems of the sec-
ond Critique and the Religion. In the Vigilantius notes, self-love is discussed as
philautia. Philautia is divided into love of benevolence and love of delight. It
is implied that love of benevolence means the inclination or the will to promote
one’s own ends, and there is no reason to view the account as differing signifi-
cantly from Kant’s previous discussions.⁷⁰ Love of benevolence is assumed to be
active in all human beings, and it is acceptable. If the duty of love towards oth-
ers⁷¹ is excluded from consideration, love of benevolence is ‘solipsism’ [Solipsis-
mus]⁷² or ‘egotism’ [Eigennutz], in which case it becomes a moral flaw. (LE,
27:620) Love of delight, on the other hand, is more complex, and as we would
assume on the basis of the combination of the second Critique and the Religion,
 In general, the Religion asserts that both love of benevolence and love of delight ‘must be
rational’. This should now be understood in both a descriptive and a normative sense: these
forms of self-love are rational on their own as a matter of definitional necessity (they imply
the level of reason), and they appear under a normative requirement to be harnessed by reason
or made rational. Even if love of benevolence is construed as being completely non-moral, the
demand of aptness in instrumental reasoning imposes quasi-normative constraints on the oper-
ation of self-love. Love of delight may be moral as a consequence of the operation of pure prac-
tical reason (see also Section III of my Introduction).
 In comparison with the second Critique and the Religion, the main shift of emphasis in Kant’s
discussion of self-love in the Vigilantius notes (and The Metaphysics of Morals) is that whereas
self-love (as love of benevolence) was previously mainly about the maxims of actions and want-
ing things to go well for oneself, in the latter two sources philautia is mainly about regarding
oneself as worthy of being loved by others [Liebenswürdig]. Arrogance, on the other hand, is
an unwarranted claim to respect, and I believe at least part of the explanation for this shift
of emphasis has to do with the fact that the distinction between love and respect has such a
prominent place in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. Since self-love (as willing that things go well for
me or that others love me) brings about self-conceit if made an unconditional law, it seems
that somehow the will to be happy and loved by others brings about unjustified claims to respect
from others if universalised absolutely (see LE, 27:621).
 See ch. 4.2.2.
 Note that the notion of Solipsismus seems more restrictive and negative in tone here than in
the second Critique (see C2, 5:73).
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three meanings of love of delight can be detected in Kant’s treatment. Even
though love of delight forms the other half of the division of philautia in these
notes, it seems that Kant reserves the paradigmatic meaning of philautia for
love of benevolence.⁷³ The first meaning, in which love of delight may be consid-
ered equivalent to love of benevolence, is skimmed over in passing in the very
first sentence, the latter part of which already implies the danger of irrational
self-conceitedness: 1) ‘This, too, is philautia, if it is exclusively entertained to-
wards oneself, but also becomes unreasonable’ (LE, 27:621.18– 19)⁷⁴. We then
learn that in comparison with others, love of delight becomes ‘self-estimation
of oneself ’ [Selbstschätzung seiner selbst], which has two possible outcomes: 2)
‘arrogance’ [Arroganz] and 3) ‘true self-esteem’ [wahre Selbstschätzung]. (LE,
27:621.26–622.5) The first is a faulty, unjustified claim to respect from others,
and given that in the second Critique Kant defined self-conceited delight precise-
ly as arrogance, we may take it that this is the same delight that was at issue in
Kant’s previous discussion of self-conceit. This arrogant delight is now discussed
explicitly in terms of love of delight. True self-esteem, on the other hand, is
based on ‘a close examination of oneself ’ (LE, 27:621.29)⁷⁵ and is only warranted
on the condition of performing imperfect meritorious duties. As a morally condi-
tioned and permissible delight in oneself, this corresponds roughly to the moral
love of delight in the Religion (which implies unconditional respect for the moral
law) and the negative moral delight of the second Critique (which implies moral
freedom or mastery over inclinations). In Vigilantius, however, the emphasis
shifts from negative to positive: ‘we thereby add a supplement to morality’
and ‘can thus acquire merit in relation to others’ (LE, 27:622.17–20)⁷⁶. There is
a positive moral delight in oneself in Vigilantius, which seems very close to
the concept of ‘ethical reward’ in the actual Metaphysics of Morals, a reward
which is similarly occasioned by the performance of wide duties and is ‘a
moral pleasure that goes beyond mere contentment with oneself (which can
 This was the case in the second Critique, where philautia was love of benevolence and dis-
tinct from self-conceited delight (C2, 5:73). This is also the case in The Metaphysics of Morals,
where philautia is contrasted with self-conceit (MM, 6:462.5– 10). The Vigilantius notes, however,
allow for the construal of false claims of moral merit inWohlgefällige Selbstliebe as philautia (LE,
27:624–625). The context would seem to imply that this love of delight for oneself is in fact the
self-conceit of the published works, but my argument does not hinge on this, and I do not wish
to force the interpretation.
 ‘Auch diese ist Philautie, wenn sie ausschließend gegen sich selbst ausgeübt wird, wird aber
auch vernunftwidrig.’
 ‘vorgängiger genauer Prüfung seiner selbst’.
 ‘wir geben dadurch der Moralität einen Zusatz’ / ‘Verdienste können wir indeß nur dadurch
gegen andere enlangen’.
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be merely negative)’ (MM, 6:391.12–13)⁷⁷. Based on the combination of these pas-
sages, the interpretation must be that there are actually two possible forms of
morally acceptable love of delight in oneself: negative self-contentment and pos-
itive moral pleasure from merit⁷⁸ (both of which, however, involve the danger of
self-conceit).
Let us take stock of what we’ve learned about the middle level of self-love
thus far. I hope to have shown: 1) that there is a self-love that involves reason
(one that is ‘higher’ than mere animal nature); 2) that even though the concep-
tual system of this level of self-love varies throughout the mature period, these
variations can be made sense of by using the general division of love in a way
that renders the outlines and main tenets of Kant’s discussion (relatively) consis-
tent; and 3) that self-love is, paradigmatically, an acceptable love of benevolence
for oneself common to all human beings, but it is also love of delight for oneself.
I have also shown that love of delight may be 1) simply equivalent to love of be-
nevolence, or 2) an acceptable moral self-contentment (negative) or self-esteem
in a feeling of merit (positive), but it may also be 3) self-love turned into morally
reprehensible self-conceit or arrogance. On this basis, the structural outline of
the middle level of self-love may be presented in the form of a diagram (see
fig. 2).
1.3 Self-Love and the Highest Good
We saw above that the only kind of self-love that Kant explicitly rejects is self-
conceit or arrogance. Self-love that is made an unconditional law is ‘the source
of all evil’, and the moral law ‘strikes down’ such self-conceit. But we have also
seen that self-love is scarcely reducible to self-conceit, and that there are various
 ‘einer moralischen Lust, die über die bloße Zufriedenheit mit sich selbst (die blos negativ
sein kann) hinaus geht’.
 In relation to others, the positive pleasure might actually be derived from a sympathetic re-
action to the recipient of the moral action whose happiness is promoted by the virtuous act (see
6:391.16–21). I thank Jens Timmermann for making me aware of this (in private discussion).
However, Timmermann’s line nevertheless leads to the question of why, then, Kant uses the
term ‘moral pleasure’ [moralische Lust], if this pleasure is based on sensuous sympathy. One
clue is that Kant is speaking of moral pleasure here in terms of ‘receptivity’ [Empfänglichkeit]
(MM, 6:391.11). Moral pleasure might therefore be connected to Kant’s discussion of ‘moral feel-
ing’ [das moralische Gefühl] in Section XII of the Introduction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, where
the natural predisposition of moral feeling is described as Empfänglichkeit to moral pleasure and
displeasure (MM, 6:399.19; 6:400.18). Perhaps the moral pleasure here is not a sympathetic reac-
tion but a positive dimension of ‘moral feeling’.
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kinds of self-love that Kant views as necessary elements of our animal nature
(animal mechanical self-love) and our humanity (love of benevolence). Arguably,
there are also forms of self-love that Kant accepts on the basis that they are pro-
duced by morality (negative and positive moral love of delight). It must therefore
be said that any strong interpretative claim made in direct opposition to self-
love, such as Wood’s assertion that ‘love is not an attitude that clear-sighted
and rational people could ever take toward themselves’ (Wood 1996, p. 157), is
very difficult to sustain.⁷⁹ It is only applicable to self-conceit, and then the pic-
ture of ‘an attitude of love’ becomes implausibly narrow.
But isn’t there a demand in Kant to the effect that we should aim to mitigate
or diminish our self-love? As a determining ground of the will, self-love is clearly
opposed to the moral law, and it is equally obvious that we should aim to further
and strengthen the position of the moral law as an incentive to our actions.
When speaking of ‘love for the law’⁸⁰ in the second Critique, Kant proposes
that we ought to strive for a moral disposition such that we have no inclinations
that are in tension with what morality commands. This would be a state of sub-
jective moral perfection, where one’s attitude towards the moral law would be
SELF-LOVE
Love of benevolence Love of delight
Benevolence towards oneself 1. Pleasure in love of benevolence
(philautia proper) (equivalence relation)
2. Moral pleasure
(negative & positive, will!determined
by self-love, but respect for the law)
self-benevolence as unconditional law 3. Self-conceit
(arrogance,!philautia)
Figure 2. The General Division of Self-Love
 Towards the end of his article, Wood also suggests that ‘Kant holds that people of virtuous
disposition will limit their claims on happiness to those of reasonable self-love.’ (Wood 1996,
p. 157) However, Wood does not explain why reasonable self-love should not be considered
an attitude of love towards oneself, and for this reason I admit to finding the main claim of
his argument ambiguous.
 I discuss love for the law in detail in ch. 3.1.
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not respect but actually love or liking [Zuneigung]. (C2, 5:83–84) Insofar as self-
love is a general name for inclinations and is opposed to the moral law as a de-
termining ground of the will, with love for the law self-love in this sense would
cease to exist, and love for the law seems to be something that is called for. Sim-
ilarly, the Religion asserts that what is required of us is a dispositional ‘revolu-
tion’ [Revolution] or a ‘change of heart’ [Änderung des Herzens], which consists
in adopting the moral law as our supreme maxim and a gradual and laborious
reworking of our conduct on this basis (R, 6:47–48).
But does this mean that we ought to get rid of self-love? Or in other words, is
there or ought there to be an endpoint of human moral progress in which self-
love is no longer a part of the constitution of our cognitive framework? I don’t
think so. The second Critique discussion of love for the law makes very clear
that because we are imperfect creatures, love for the law can never actually be
achieved. We ‘can never be altogether free from desires and inclinations’, and
love for the law remains a ‘constant though unattainable goal of […] striving’
(C2, 5:84.4– 15)⁸¹. It is of course the case that from a decidedly moral perspective
Kant expresses a strong dislike of inclinations. In the Groundwork, inclinations
‘are so far from having an absolute worth […] that to be entirely free from
them must rather be the universal wish of every rational being’ (GW,
4:428.16– 17)⁸². In the second Critique, inclinations ‘are always burdensome to
a rational being’ who wishes ‘to be rid of them’ (C2, 5:118.7–9)⁸³. These state-
ments are not surprising, since the basic business of pure practical reason is
to disregard inclinations altogether when determining the will (see e.g. C2,
5:118.16– 18). As already mentioned, however, even though inclinations can be
disregarded in moral decision-making, Kant holds that ridding ourselves of incli-
nations entirely is not possible.When he considers the human being more broad-
ly – as both a moral-rational and a natural-physical creature – his tone with re-
gard to inclinations is different. In the Religion, he holds not only that we cannot
rid ourselves of inclinations but also that we should not: ‘Considered in them-
selves natural inclinations are good, i.e. not reprehensible, and to want to extir-
pate them would not only be futile but harmful and blameworthy as well; we
must rather only curb them’ (R, 6:58.1–4)⁸⁴. He clearly does not reject inclina-
 ‘niemals von Begierden und Neigungen ganz frei sein’ / ‘beständigen, obgleich unerreichba-
ren Ziele […] Bestrebung’.
 ‘haben so wenig einen absoluten Werth […] daß vielmehr, gänzlich davon frey zu seyn, der
allgemeine Wunsch eines jeden vernünftigen Wesens seyn muß.’
 ‘sind sie einem vernünftigen Wesen jederzeit lästig’ / ‘ihrer entledigt zu sein’.
 ‘Natürliche Neigungen sind, an sich selbst betrachtet, gut, d.i. unverwerflich, und es ist nicht
allein vergeblich, sondern es wäre auch schädlich und tadelhaft, sie ausrotten zu wollen; man
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tions or self-love as such. Kant understands full well that although we have a
moral vocation, we are also natural creatures. Even though all inclinations
lack moral worth and any inclination can be contra-moral at the token level⁸⁵,
some inclinations, such as sexual inclination, can be viewed as predisposed
to the good at least in the sense of being necessary for the continued survival
of the species. Some inclinations can even be beautiful results of moral action
(such as the benevolent inclination of love towards others that arises from
being beneficent to others from duty) (C2, 5:82.18–20; MM, 6:402; see ch. 4
below). I therefore think that aiming for ‘love for the law’ does not constitute
a demand not to have inclinations at all; rather, it involves strengthening the
moral incentive within us so that inclinations have less power over us. This
moral striving also involves the cultivation of at least some inclinations (such
as the inclination of benevolence for others), to the end that our emotional dis-
positions harmonise with moral demands (see ch. 4.2.2.A). Striving for a morally
better character therefore means making the moral law the supreme incentive in
the sense that it is capable of overriding self-love.⁸⁶
There is thus no real demand in Kant’s moral philosophy to eradicate self-
love from our lives. The most precise formulations of the thought that self-love
should be limited or conditioned can be found in the second Critique and The
Metaphysics of Morals. The way in which it is permissible to make self-love or
love of benevolence lawlike for ourselves is by limiting the maxim of our own
happiness with the happiness of others. We can call this the universalisability
condition of the maxim of one’s own happiness. My own happiness ‘can become
an objective practical law only if I include in it the happiness of others.’ (C2,
5:34.31–32)⁸⁷ In this case, as we learn from the second Critique, self-love may ac-
quire ‘objective validity’ [objective Gültigkeit], as the determining ground of the
will is not self-love but the lawful form, through which self-love is limited and
the notion of happiness is applied to all finite beings. In The Metaphysics of Mo-
rals, we find a mirror image of the same idea, now concerning ‘practical love’, or
the grounding of the duty of active rational benevolence toward others [Liebe des
muß sie vielmehr nur bezähmen’. ‘Curbing’ or taming [bezähmen] our inclinations successfully
is once again called ‘prudence’ [Klugheit] (R, 6:58.7). Note also that the ‘goodness’ of inclinations
is not unqualified but merely negative: they are not ‘reprehensible’.
 I thank Jens Timmermann for reminding me of this. Consider, for example, a father who (out
of inclination-based benevolent love) rushes to buy a birthday present for his child and on his
way to the toy store neglects to help someone who is drowning in a nearby pond.
 This general view is inspired by Baron (1995).
 ‘kann nur alsdann ein objectives praktisches Gesetz werden, wenn ich anderer ihre in die-
selbe mit einschließe.’
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Wohlwollens]. Assuming that self-love is a universal aspect of humanity, it is now
the case that in order for there to be a duty to love others practically, one must
include oneself in the universalised maxim of love as an object of love:
I want everyone else to be benevolent toward me (BENEVOLENTIA); hence I ought also to
be benevolent toward everyone else. But since all others with the exception of myself would
not be all, so that the maxim would not have within it the universality of a law,which is still
necessary for imposing obligation, the law making benevolence a duty will include myself,
as an object of benevolence, in the command of practical reason. (MM, 6:451.4– 10)⁸⁸
Kant explains that the above does not make self-love a duty but merely ‘permits’
[erlaubt] self-love [Liebe des Wohlwollens] on the condition of one’s ‘being benev-
olent to every other as well’ (MM, 6:451.16– 17)⁸⁹. Thus the moral permissibility of
self-love as love of benevolence depends on adopting the maxim of practical
love of benevolence towards others (I discuss practical love in more detail in
ch. 4.2.2).⁹⁰
But still, the more virtuous we become, the less we will entertain self-regard-
ing inclinations, and the more we will be dedicated to pursuing our imperfect
duties of love towards others. Is there some sort of limiting value in our striving
to approximate the highest good as our own moral perfection⁹¹ – a limiting value
where the maxim of practical love towards others has taken over and the maxim
of self-love has been reduced to some absolute minimum, such that it only con-
tinues to exist as a part of the formal condition of our duty to love others?
In the second Critique, the highest good is defined from the perspective of
the agent. It contains the moral law as its determining ground or supreme con-
dition (C2, 5:109) and consists of two elements: virtue (morality) and happiness.
Virtue and happiness have to be combined in the concept of the highest good,
but as they rely on basically opposing principles (those of morality and self-
 ‘Ich will jedes Anderen Wohlwollen (BENEVOLENTIA) gegen mich; ich soll also auch gegen
jeden Anderen wohlwollend sein. Da aber alle Andere außer mir nicht Alle sein, mithin die Max-
ime nicht die Allgemeinheit eines Gesetzes an sich haben würde, welche doch zur Verpflichtung
nothwendig ist: so wird das Pflichtgesetz des Wohlwollens mich als Object desselben im Gebot
der praktischen Vernunft mit begreifen’.
 ‘unter der Bedingung, daß du auch jedem Anderen wohl willst’.
 For further discussion of the problem of self-benevolence in this context, see Schönecker
(2013, pp. 334–339).
 There are several aspects of the highest good, which I will discuss in more detail in chs. 3
and 5.
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love, respectively), their combination is very difficult to conceive.⁹² Kant thinks
that if a concept includes two determinations that are necessarily combined in
the concept (as must be the case with the concept of the highest good), the de-
terminations must be thought of in terms of ‘ground and consequent’ [Grund und
Folge]. According to Kant, this kind of connection is either a logical (analytic) or
a causal (synthetic) connection. (C2, 5:111.6– 10) Because the two principles in
question are heterogeneous, Kant holds that their combination cannot be
thought of analytically (in terms of identity) but must be a synthetic relation
of cause and effect. This implies that the purely intellectual moral law must
be conceived as a cause of sensible happiness. For this to be possible, it must
be assumed that one’s moral disposition belongs both to the ‘noumenal’
realm and to the empirical realm of appearances, for happiness as a sensible ef-
fect requires that its cause be empirical. (C2, 5:111– 115) The type of satisfaction,
or the ‘analogue of happiness’ [Analogon der Glückseligkeit] (C2, 5:117.27), that
may come about this way is precisely the delight that I previously identified
(drawing on the Religion) as negative moral love of delight in oneself. It is the
morally acceptable self-contentment felt upon being ‘free from inclinations’ in
the sense of being able to override them morally. This type of self-love would
therefore be a part of a world in which the highest good, as the subjective com-
bination of virtue and happiness, has been realised. It seems possible, however,
that a being that no longer had any inclinations that ran contrary to the moral
law would lose its ability to feel satisfaction in being able to override them
(but Kant does not address this issue). Recall, moreover, that the evidence I pro-
vided for the interpretation that the negative delight of the second Critique is in
fact self-love is indirect⁹³. In the Religion, Kant both defines moral delight in one-
self as self-love and expresses doubts about calling it self-love.
The above considerations to the side, insofar as the highest good involves
one’s own happiness and the happiness of others (which it must), it necessarily
involves self-love. If we conceive of a world (or better, an infinite approximation
towards a world) where our selfish inclinations have been reduced to an absolute
minimum, there must still be something that makes us happy. Where can this
happiness come from? Since happiness according to Kant’s paradigmatic defini-
tion is the sum total of satisfied inclinations, it seems to me that the first main
 Kant calls this the antinomy of practical reason. For a pessimistic view of his discussion, see
Beck (1960, pp. 245–247). Here, my intention is not to work with the details of the antinomy as
such but only to further articulate the role and structure of self-love in relation to it.
 The basis of the identification was that the second sense of love of delight in the Religionwas
Zufriedenheit in oneself based on respect for the moral law, and the second Critique spoke of a
Wohlgefallen that was also Zufriedenheit in oneself and also based on respect for the law.
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candidate for a possible source of happiness is animal mechanical self-love (en-
joyment of nutrition and sexuality, the preservation of offspring, and natural so-
ciality). The second option is that, since humans in such a world would be large-
ly unselfish, a source of happiness might be the benevolent practical love [Liebe
des Wohlwollens] that we would shower on and receive in abundance from others
around us. It seems possible that there is something intrinsic to loving others as
well as ourselves that makes us happy.⁹⁴ In Kant’s philosophy,we are receptive to
benevolent love because we wish to be happy or wish to be loved, which is pre-
cisely love of benevolence for ourselves. The third option is the moral delight dis-
cussed in the above paragraph, which, despite the doubts I have expressed, may
plausibly be interpreted in terms of love of delight.
Admittedly, Kant is ambiguous about the nature of the happiness involved in
the highest good. Because approximation to the subjective highest good is infin-
ite, it must involve the practical postulate of immortality. This is the only way to
conceive of the infinite ascent towards perfect happiness proportionate to perfect
virtue in terms of a single agent. But if immortality or the practically postulated
afterlife is an immaterial state of being (as we have good reason to assume), and
if we know that the ground of inclination is material, then how can the afterlife
contain satisfied inclinations? Kant does not seem to consider this problem, es-
pecially given the many passages in which there is no implication that the virtu-
ous life is devoid of inclinations.⁹⁵ Our approximation to the highest good may
eventually become completely devoid of all inclination-based happiness, but
this is unclear; it depends on our interpretation of the postulate of immortality
and involves bracketing actual intergenerational moral progress on the species
level, where inclinations will clearly continue to exist. Even if we decide to brack-
et the species level and conceive of approximation toward the highest good as
involving the abolition of inclinations, what is left is negative moral delight in
oneself, which may arguably be called love of delight for oneself.
 In ch. 4 we will learn that Kant holds that loving others from the incentive of the moral law
(with practical love of benevolence) will cause us to love them from inclination too. There is a
pleasure connected with beneficent love (LE, 27:419.4–7; cf. MM, 6:402.19–21), and in the high-
est good as an ultimate end ‘human beings seek something that they can love’ (R, 6:7.27–28) /
‘sucht der Mensch etwas, was er lieben kann’. Neighbourly love from inclination must be sub-
sumed under the basic theorem of self-love (C2, 5:22.6–8).
 However, Kant does problematise his conception in terms of the end of all time. Since the
final end of all things is a non-temporal, unchanging state, its possible qualities are beyond
our comprehension. In ‘The End of All Things’ [Das Ende aller Dinge], Kant, somewhat jokingly
in my opinion, envisions this kind of bliss as the universal congregation’s eternal repetition of
the same song (‘Alleluia!’ or monotonous wailing), which indicates a complete absence of
change (8:334.36–335.3).
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Perhaps the real source of morally deserved happiness lies in all three ele-
ments (animal desire, loving others and the need to be loved benevolently,
and one’s own virtue). All in all, I find it highly difficult to conceive of the pos-
sibility of happiness in the infinite approximation towards the comprehensive
highest good without reference to self-love. I call this general finding the persis-
tence of self-love.
1.4 Self-Love Persists on Three Levels
In the first chapter, I argued for a ‘three-level interpretation’ of self-love, accord-
ing to which self-love can be plausibly divided into three ‘levels’ utilising a ver-
tical metaphor to describe ascending levels of rationality.
I held firstly that there is a low, arational ‘ground level’ of self-love, which I
identified as ‘animal mechanical self-love’. Animal mechanical self-love includes
the strongest impulses of human nature and divides into love of life (self-preser-
vation), sexual love and parenting (preservation of the species), and sociality.
The existence of these terms shows that Kant discusses the strongest impulses
of human nature in terms of love. I pointed out how animal mechanical self-
love can be understood as desire and how it is generally a predisposition to
the good, at least in the sense that it is a necessary condition of species-level
moral progress. Further, I showed how the social impulse can be seen as the
ground of the unsociably sociable self-love of humanity, which belongs to the
history and teleology of moral progress. I also discussed the role of love of hon-
our in this context.
Second, I argued that there is a higher level of self-love that implies reason
and which I called the ‘the broad middle level of self-love’. I showed how this
level can be analysed in terms of the general division of love into love of benev-
olence and love of delight. Self-love is fundamentally the principle of one’s own
happiness: it is love of benevolence towards oneself, which consists in wanting
things to go well for oneself and being loved by others. This love of benevolence
is morally permissible on the condition that one includes the happiness of others
in one’s maxim. I identified three separate notions of love of delight in oneself: 1)
pleasure in love of benevolence towards oneself (in which case love of benevo-
lence and love of delight are equivalent); 2) a feeling of self-contentment (as
‘negative’ freedom over inclinations) or a feeling of positive moral merit due
to the performance of imperfect duties; and 3) morally reprehensible arrogance
or self-conceit, which is an unjustified claim to respect from others that arises
from making the maxim of love of benevolence towards oneself an uncondition-
al practical law.
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Third, I argued for the persistence of self-love by analysing the place of self-
love in what I call the third or highest level of self-love. Unlike the two lower lev-
els of self-love, which are actual, the third level is an idealised notion that in-
cludes close proximity to the moral-physical highest good (the virtue and happi-
ness of all rational creatures). Since happiness involves self-love by definition –
and since even negative moral self-contentment can plausibly be interpreted as
love of delight – I concluded that self-love is an irreducible aspect of even the
highest stages of moral happiness. This conclusion is in line with Kant’s view
that there is no reason to rid ourselves of inclinations as such. Further, benevo-
lence towards others [Liebe des Wohlwollens], which figures as a path towards
universal moral happiness, can only be viewed as conducive to happiness
under the supposition that human beings want things to go well for themselves
or want to be loved by others. In Kant, then, love can make us happy only if an
element of self-love persists.
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2 Sexual Love
While Kant’s views on sex differences and sexual morality have been under dis-
cussion for several decades, it seems that, somewhat surprisingly, there are no
previous exegetical analyses of sexuality in Kant specifically from the perspec-
tive of love. As we saw in Chapter 1, sexuality as a natural impulse of procreation
belongs at bottom to ‘animal mechanical self-love’. Hence, the sexual impulse is
basically a component of the broad conceptual cluster of self-love. We also
learned that, as a vehicle of (human) species-level sustenance, sexual love is a
‘predisposition [Anlage] to the good’. Yet even a brief glance at Kant’s discussions
of love in the context of sexuality reveals that several questions were left unan-
swered in the first chapter: 1) Are the sexual impulse and sexual love one and the
same – or what is their relationship? 2) Just how is sexual love predisposed to the
good – or how are teleology and morality related to sexual love? 3) What is the
relationship between sexual love and love of beauty? 4) Is the general division of
love operative in sexual love – and if so, what is its role? 5) How does the notion
of love illuminate the status of sex and gender differences in Kant as regards the
equality of human beings?
These issues form the underlying framework for the discussion of this chap-
ter. Two main exegetical claims emerge from my reading: 1) In Kant’s earlier
works, there is a strong connection between sexuality and love of beauty, but
this link wanes towards the 1790s. Beauty can be seen to mediate between sex-
uality and morality in terms of love, but the extent to which Kant holds on to this
picture during the mature period is unclear. 2) In general, sexual love may be
divided into narrow and broad sexual love, such that narrow sexual love is sim-
ply the natural impulse of procreation, whereas broad sexual love combines sex-
ual inclination with moral love in the context of heterosexual marriage. My in-
terpretative distinction between narrow and broad sexual love will also clarify
the status of the general division of love within this framework. Narrow sexual
love remains basically outside the grasp of the general division, but broad sexual
love proceeds from the narrow when the sexual impulse or sexual inclination
unites with moral love of benevolence for another human being.¹
 Note that Kant uses at least the words ‘impulse’ [der Antrieb], ‘inclination’ [die Neigung], and
‘instinct’ [der Instinkt] to describe the nature of sexuality. A distinction can be found between
inclination and instinct, so that inclination presupposes acquaintance with the object whereas
instinct is blind (LE, 27:417.26–27; cf. LA, 25:1114.18– 19; both cited in Tomasi 2015). Impulses
seem to generally imply the species level, whereas inclinations sometimes presuppose a given
agent. Often, however, Kant seems to use these terms interchangeably, and my argument does
not hinge on these distinctions. Therefore, I will not analyse them in further detail (see
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In accordance with the two main claims, the chapter is divided into two
parts. In the first part, I analyse the relationship between sexuality and love
of beauty. I begin by discussing love in the precritical ‘Observations on the Feel-
ing of the Beautiful and Sublime’ and then track the link between the notions of
sexual love and the beautiful through the contexts of Kant’s philosophy of his-
tory (in the ‘Conjectural Beginnings of Human History’²) and the third Critique.
This discussion will also serve as a preliminary for the interpretative distinction
between narrow and broad variants of sexual love. In the second part of the
chapter, I establish the division between narrow and broad sexual love in greater
detail by analysing how the word ‘love’ operates in an array of passages on sex-
uality in various works by Kant. When showing the existence of broad sexual
love, I focus especially on the perspectives of morality in marriage right on
the one hand and teleology on the other.
Unlike the other chapters, this one also contains an evaluative element. This
is because most of the previous research on sexuality in Kant is specifically fem-
inist in orientation. The existence of these secondary discussions is reflected in
the way I treat this particular topic. Many scholars hold that Kant’s views on
women are deplorable (see e.g. Schott 1997, esp. Schröder 1997; see also Wood
1999; Marwah 2013; cf. Herman 1993), and his insights were criticised even by
his contemporaries.³ Recent feminist debate on this issue mainly concerns the
question of just how deplorable Kant’s views are. From this perspective, Kant
is by no means a forerunner of feminism, and the more charitable interpretations
tend to assert that his opinions are not ‘quite so deplorable as critics make them
out to be’ (Baron 1997, p. 166; see Mikkola 2011, p. 92). The scholars who take the
more charitable route sometimes also hold that if we bracket Kant’s substantial
discussions on sexual difference as such, we may still use the universalistic, sup-
posedly gender-neutral groundings of Kant’s mature moral theory as emancipa-
tive conceptual tools for approaching contemporary problems of equality (gen-
der issues among others) – and in this ‘formal’ sense, Kant’s moral
philosophy can be beneficial to feminism (e.g. Nagl-Docekal 1997; Baron 1997;
cf. Mikkola 2011, p. 105). On the other hand, some draw on the connections be-
tween sexual love (or marriage) and friendship in Kant in approaching questions
of solipsism and objectification (Langton 2009, pp. 318–327, 362–365), reciproci-
ch. 1.1). As regards sexual love, the main concern for me is the distinction between nature (in-
stinct, impulse, inclination) and morality, and how this distinction is mediated.
 ‘Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte’.
 For instance, Goethe saw a remark of Kant’s as being befitting of ‘an old bachelor’ [Hagestolz]
(Goethe 1970 [1798], p. 518), and Schleiermacher accused Kant of treating the female sex ‘com-
pletely as a means’ [durchaus als Mittels] (Schleiermacher 1799, p. 306) (see Hull 1996, p. 313).
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ty and responsibility (Korsgaard 1996, pp. 194– 196), or with the specific intent of
revising Kant’s original positions (Denis 2001b). With all these discussions in
mind, I wish to show that while an interpretative endeavour such as mine cannot
bracket Kant’s sexual teleology and/or his anthropological opinions on sexual
difference, the notion of broad sexual love developed below nevertheless sup-
ports the idea that Kant was less misogynistic than is often assumed.
All in all, my analysis of sexual love in Kant shows that despite his seeming-
ly negative remarks on sexuality and his apparent conservatism in sexual philos-
ophy, there is no need to reject the basic idea that for Kant, (narrow) sexual love
is a strong and necessary natural impulse of procreation and a predisposition to
the good. Moral restrictions only allow the impulse to operate within heterosex-
ual marriage, where the rights of the sexes are nominally equal but the husband
is de facto the leader. In Kant’s early work, the union of the sexual impulse and
moral love in the husband may be viewed through the notion of love of beauty.
Promoting their wives’ happiness through the moral practical love of benevo-
lence remains the most important duty that husbands have towards their spous-
es, whereas wives are described as being generally more prone to love from in-
clination. Women serve an auxiliary purpose in the moral progress of human
kind, and while they ultimately (or at least arguably) share the same rational ca-
pacities as men, they are domestic creatures in Kant’s sexual teleology. The sta-
tus of women as legal and moral persons is ambivalent and limited, and in this
sense there is an inconsistency or an insoluble tension between Kant’s formal
moral egalitarianism and his philosophy of sex. In comparison with some of
the contemporary statements in the feminist debate around Kant, I hope my ar-
gument will also point toward a more balanced interpretation of the status of sex
difference in his philosophy.⁴
 By focusing on sexual love in heterosexual relationships, I do not wish to suggest that homo-
sexuality is irrelevant or devoid of love. My chosen focus follows from my Kant immanent exe-
getical method: Kant’s narrow basic notion of sexual love is the natural impulse of procreation,
and he does not discuss homosexuality in terms of love. As one who was not particularly pro-
gressive in this respect, still less a sexual libertine, Kant viewed homosexuality as a horrendous
moral flaw. I will also have to omit a detailed discussion of Kant’s condemnation of masturba-
tion, even though masturbation, too, relates to the sexual impulse, and hence to sexual love in
the narrow sense. For criticisms of Kant’s notorious views on these topics, see Denis (1999) and
Soble (2003). Here, I limit my treatment to the kind of sexuality that Kant explicitly discusses in
terms of love: sexuality between men and women.
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2.1 Sexual Love and Love of Beauty
‘Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime’ (1764) begins with a
distinction between two different kinds of pleasurable feelings an agent may
have. The first kind represents the simple satisfaction of inclinations. This
kind of pleasure is mere ‘gratification’ [Vergnügen] and may occur without any
special talents on the part of the agent, without a morally virtuous disposition,
and apparently even without the use of rational capacities: it ‘can occur in com-
plete thoughtlessness’ (2:208.14– 15)⁵, ‘without their having to envy others or
even being able to form any concept of others’ (2:208.7–9)⁶. As examples of
this type of pleasure Kant mentions things like food and drink, hunting, business
profits, and a kind of sexual pleasure. The sexual feeling is defined in terms of
love. It is the feeling of a man ‘who loves the opposite sex only insofar as he
counts it among the things that are to be enjoyed’ (2:208.3–5)⁷. If we compare
this kind of sexual love with what is said about ‘animal mechanical self-love’
in the Religion, we see that the terms attributed to sexuality in both cases
seem equivalent. The animal mechanical impulse of sexuality in the Religion
is arational and does not involve comparison – or, more precisely, does not in-
volve an evaluation of the happiness of others in comparison with one’s own
happiness. Similarly, the sexual love mentioned in the beginning of the ‘Obser-
vations’ need not involve thought, envy, or even the formation of a concept of
another human being.⁸ The similarity of these descriptions of sexuality in the
 ‘bei völliger Gedankenlosigkeit statt finden können.’
 ‘ohne daß sie andere beneiden dürfen oder auch von andern sich einen Begriff machen
können’.
 ‘derjenige, der das andre Geschlecht nur in so fern liebt, als er es zu den genießbaren Sachen
zählt’.
 Considering that the sexual impulse may hinder the use of one’s rational capacities, one
might like to think of the impulse in terms of ‘passion’ [Leidenschaft], for the hindering of reason
is constitutive of what a passion is for Kant. However, in the Anthropology Kant explains that
‘one cannot list any physical love as passion, because it does not contain a constant principle
with respect to its object.’ (AP, 7:266.12–13) / ‘keine physische Liebe als Leidenschaft aufführen
kann: weil sie in Ansehung des Objects nicht ein beharrliches Princip enthält.’ According to
Kant, sexual desire disappears (at least temporarily) once it is satisfied, and passions are
more like long-term obsessions. In the Anthropology, however, Kant also lists sexual inclination
(alongside the inclination to freedom) as a ‘passion of natural inclination’ (AP, 7:267.35–268.1;
see also MM, 6:426.26). As a natural passion, sexual inclination relates to affects, which are
rash, sudden, overwhelming feelings (see AP, 7:252). In the discussion that follows, though,
he again distinguishes between sexual inclination (of mere animals) and passion (AP,
7:269.13–14) and does not say anything about it in terms of passion (or affect) (cf. LA,
25:1361). Perhaps he means that obsessive (or simply long-term) sexual love for a person can
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general framework of the concept of love serves as preliminary evidence that
there might be such a thing as narrow sexual love in Kant, which consists merely
of the animal impulse to sex and the pleasurable satisfaction of this impulse.
Since this kind of sexual love seems to involve viewing the other as a ‘thing’
[eine Sache], it also suggests that there is a kind of solipsism related to sexuality
(see Langton 2009, 325–327) – that is, the objectification or depersonalisation of
the other human being in the context of the animal impulse.
What interests me most in the first section of this chapter is the relationship
between the sexual impulse and the notion of the beautiful. The question is: how
does love of beauty proceed from crude or narrowly construed sexuality? Kant’s
essay quickly moves on to distinguish the abovementioned ‘lower’ feelings from
feelings of a ‘finer’ [feinere] sort. The finer feelings are feelings for the beautiful
and the sublime.⁹ In general, Kant analyses the finer feelings by attributing them
to various topics, such as landscapes, morality, national characteristics, and sex-
ual difference. In the sphere of sexuality, Kant’s basic idea is that women are
marked out by the notion of the beautiful, men by the sublime. This basic dis-
tinction corresponds to a distinction Kant makes concerning morality: ‘Subduing
one’s passions by means of principles is sublime’, and ‘true virtue alone is sub-
lime’ (2:215.5–24)¹⁰, whereas ‘tenderheartedness that is easily led into a warm
feeling of sympathy is beautiful and loveworthy’ (2:215.33–35)¹¹. This latter, fem-
inine virtue is, however, ‘weak and always blind.’ (2:215.37–216.1)¹² As some
commentators (like Patrick Frierson (2011)) have noted, Kant’s idea is not that
women are not at all sublime and men not at all beautiful. It is rather that indi-
viduals of both sexes express these qualities in varying degrees, such that in
comparison with men women are for the most part more beautiful and less sub-
lime, and vice versa (Kant does not discuss whether the qualities might be re-
versed within a particular individual, or whether a given woman might be
be a ‘passion’ (see MM, 6:426.20–26). The distinctions around §82 and §83 of the Anthropology
appear particularly unclear (AP, 7:267–270).
 These concepts are seminal to the domain of aesthetics, and their history runs through Ed-
mund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful
(1757) down to Longinus’ treatise On the Sublime (around 100 AD). Both texts were widely read
and very influential in Kant’s time, even though they are not mentioned by Kant in the ‘Obser-
vations’ (for Kant’s later discussions of Burke, see C3, 5:277; 20:238).
 ‘Bezwingung seiner Leidenschaften durch Grundsätze ist erhaben.’ / ‘ist wahre Tugend allein
erhaben.’
 ‘Weichmüthigkeit, die leichtlich in ein warmes Gefühl des Mitleidens gesetzt wird, ist schön
und liebenswürdig’.
 ‘schwach und jederzeit blind.’ On the whole, the passage anticipates Kant’s mature discus-
sion of sympathetic participation, or Teilnehmung, in (MM, 6:456–457).
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more sublime than a given man, or a man more beautiful than a woman). Kant
asserts further that general education and societal relations pertaining to sexual
difference should be organised so that the defining characteristics of both sexes
are emphasised. As Frierson points out, Kant’s distinction between the beautiful
and the sublime as regards sex is both descriptive and normative. (Frierson 2011,
pp. xxix–xxx)¹³
Kant emphasises that the beauty of women, regarding both their looks and
their demeanour in a broader sense, is based on the sexual drive, which is de-
pendent on the aims or purposes of nature: ‘no matter how far one might try
to go around this secret, the sexual inclination is still in the end the ground
of all other charms’ (2:234.21–23)¹⁴. Further down he writes:
This whole enchantment is at bottom spread over the sexual drive. Nature pursues its great
aim, and all refinements that are associated with it, however remote from it they seem to
be, are only veils, and in the end derive their charm from the very same source.
(2:235.19–22)¹⁵
In the ‘Observations’, the great end of the beautiful and the sublime as regards
the character of the sexes is marital happiness. This is the proper object of re-
fined sexual love, and it is in this context that the broader notion of love of beau-
ty develops out of the crude and arational, narrowly conceived sexual impulse.
What is of importance here is that beauty occasions love, and sublimity esteem.
Hence, in the ‘Observations’ Kant holds that love in the broader sense does not
operate symmetrically between the sexes. The experience of sexual beauty is
aroused by nature’s procreative aim through the male sexual impulse.¹⁶ Even
 Kant’s notorious comments on women’s education, which was a hotly debated public issue
during his time, derive from his normative insistence on the supposedly natural characteristics
of the sexes (see Petschauer 1986). As Baron points out (1997, p. 167), Kant does not imply that
women are not capable of higher learning; he apparently opposes their education on the basis
that it would compromise their beauty. And as Peter Petschauer (1986, p. 285) correctly argues,
Kant’s views on women’s education ‘remain static’ between the ‘Observations’ and the published
Anthropology. In terms of Kant’s near contemporaries, gender-equal education was advocated by
the mayor of Königsberg, Theodor von Hippel (see Schröder 1997).
 ‘man mag nun um das Geheimniß so weit herumgehen, als man immer will, die Geschlech-
terneigung doch allen den übrigen Reizen endlich zum Grunde liegt’.
 ‘Diese ganze Bezauberung ist im Grunde über den Geschlechtertrieb verbreitet. Die Natur
verfolgt ihre große Absicht, und alle Feinigkeiten, die sich hinzugesellen, sie mögen nun so
weit davon abzustehen scheinen, wie sie wollen, sind nur Verbrämungen und entlehnen
ihren Reiz doch am Ende aus eben derselben Quelle.’
 It is, however, implicitly clear throughout Kant’s writings that the sexual impulse is active in
both sexes, and I know of no scholars who deny this.
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though it seems that women might perhaps be generally more prone than men to
experience a (non-sexual, neighbourly) feeling of love¹⁷, it is men who love
women rather than the other way around. The man appreciates the noble [das
Edle] in himself and the beautiful in the woman, whereas the woman’s feeling
is for the beautiful in herself and for the noble in the man (2:240.26–32). Trans-
ported into the sphere of love, this idea means that ‘the man […] can say: Even if
you do not love me I will force you to esteem me, and the woman, […]: Even if you
do not inwardly esteem us, we will still force you to love us.’ (2:242.5–9)¹⁸ However,
this should not be understood in terms of squabbling or a crude struggle for
power. The marital couple is ‘a single moral person, which is animated and
ruled by the understanding of the man and the taste of the wife.’
(2:242.14– 16)¹⁹ The end is mutual happiness, and it is moral love and beautiful
obligingness that yield the proper flavour of marital life: ‘the more sublime a cast
of mind is, the more inclined it also is to place the greatest goal of its efforts in
the satisfaction of a beloved object, and on the other side the more beautiful it is,
the more does it seek to respond to this effort with complaisance.’ (2.242.18–22)²⁰
In fact, Kant seems to propose that the man should ultimately come to love his
wife not because she is beautiful but because she is his wife. (2.220.30–221.7)
The love (of beauty) at issue in marriage in the ‘Observations’ is thus not
merely the crude sexual impulse, or the mere desire to derive pleasure from
the use of another person as a sexual object; at least from the man’s perspective,
it is a combination of sexual desire and what Kant later comes to call love of be-
 Kant states that women ‘do something only because they love to, and the art lies in making
sure that they love only what is good.’ (2:232.1–2) / ‘thun etwas nur darum, weil es ihnen so be-
liebt, und die Kunst besteht darin zu machen, daß ihnen nur dasjenige beliebe,was gut ist.’ And
later on: ‘the feeling of love of which she is capable and which she inspires in others is fickle but
beautiful’ (2:236.29–30) / ‘das Gefühl der Liebe, dessen sie fähig ist und welche sie anderen
einflößt, ist flatterhaft, aber schön’. The association of women with inclination and beauty
seems to parallel the ideas put forth later in the Groundwork, and especially in the second Cri-
tique, according to which beneficence from inclination or love lacks proper moral worth but is
nevertheless beautiful (C2, 5:82.18–20). Note, however, that the verb used in the first ‘Observa-
tions’ passage above is not lieben but belieben, which according to the Grimm and Adelung dic-
tionaries can be close to love but can also imply liking in a much more general sense.
 ‘der Mann […] sagen können:Wenn ihr mich gleich nicht liebt, so will ich euch zwingen mich
hochzuachten, und das Frauenzimmer […]: Wenn ihr uns gleich nicht innerlich hochschätzet, so
zwingen wir euch doch uns zu lieben.’
 ‘eine einzige moralische Person […], welche durch den Verstand des Mannes und den Gesch-
mack der Frauen belebt und regiert wird.’
 ‘so ist eine Gemüthsart, je erhabener sie ist, auch um desto geneigter die größte Absicht der
Bemühungen in der Zufriedenheit eines geliebten Gegenstandes zu setzen, und andererseits je
schöner sie ist, desto mehr sucht sie durch Gefälligkeit diese Bemühung zu erwiedern.’
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nevolence for another human being – that is, practical love or active rational be-
nevolence. In this context, love of beauty denotes a man’s sexual love for a
woman in the broad sense, and hence the ‘Observations’ supports the basic
claims of the chapter. There is a close connection between sexuality and beauty
in terms of love: the beauty of women is grounded in the sexual impulse, and the
love this beauty occasions is not merely animal mechanical self-love but a broad-
er kind of sexual love of beauty.
In ‘Conjectural Beginning of Human History’ of 1786, we find an even stron-
ger statement concerning the relationship between sexuality, love, and beauty.
In a rather playful manner, Kant here imagines a possible developmental history
for the human species, the beginning of which he models on the biblical account
of Genesis – starting with the first human couple (8:110.11). In this early state of
human existence, the impulses of animal mechanical self-love are in operation:
‘After the instinct of nourishment, by means of which nature preserves each in-
dividual, the instinct of sex is most prominent, by means of which nature pre-
serves each species.’ (8:112.27–29)²¹ Kant’s story then begins to unfold as an ac-
count of the effect of reason on the foundational natural impulses or instincts.
His description of the effect of reason on sexuality is particularly interesting.
Reason marks a separation between the human stimulus to sex and the mostly
periodic impulse found in animals. By means of reason and imagination, the
human being can uphold sexual desire, which is something animals are unable
to do. Kant appeals to the example of the use of fig leaves to cover genitalia to
illustrate this point.When the sexual object is concealed (that is, when the gen-
itals are covered with a fig leaf), imagination strengthens and prolongs sexual
desire (8:112.31– 113.3).²² Through concealing the sensory object and postponing
immediate desire satisfaction, imagination and reason lead sexuality from mere
animal mechanical sensibility to a level of rational ideality. Most importantly,
and more specifically, they inform the transition from animal sexuality to love,
and finally to the notion of beauty (even as detached from human objects):
Refusal was the first artifice for leading from the merely sensed stimulus over to ideal ones,
from merely animal desire gradually over to love, and with the latter from the feeling of the
 ‘Nächst dem Instinct zur Nahrung, durch welchen die Natur jedes Individuum erhält, ist der
Instinct zum Geschlecht, wodurch sie für die Erhaltung jeder Art sorgt, der vorzüglichste.’
 As Wood correctly notes, Kant’s slightly satirical position seems to imply ‘that Adam and Eve
first put on figleaves not out of shame but to excite one another’s sexual desires’ (Wood 2007,
p. 161).
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merely agreeable over to the taste for beauty, in the beginning only in human beings but
then, however, also in nature. (8:113.7– 11)²³
In the ‘Conjectural Beginning’, the sexual impulse is clearly distinguished from
love.What is implied is that when reason and imagination operate on the sexual
impulse, the resulting love must be differentiated from animal mechanical self-
love. The ‘Conjectural Beginning’ does not make clear what this higher love is
like, but we know it is occasioned by the working of reason on sexuality, and
the overall context of the essay suggests that it is moral and, as related to sex-
uality, predisposed toward general species-level progress, ‘gradually from the
worse toward the better’ (8:123.25)²⁴. The ‘Conjectural Beginning’ also supports
the idea that love of beauty is occasioned by sexual love. The trajectory above
is from an animal impulse to love and from love to a taste for beauty, which
in turn starts with human beauty but may then be somehow generalised to
the rest of nature.²⁵ The claim is obviously stronger than that made in the ‘Ob-
servations’, where sexuality is presented merely as the ground of female beauty;
here, it is presented as the ground of the taste for both human beauty and non-
human natural beauty. Based on the combination of the ‘Observations’ and the
‘Conjectural Beginning’, the naturalistic ground of beauty (that is, beauty in a
quite general sense) is animal sexuality, and the transition between the two is
mediated by reason and love. But there is an obstacle to this interpretation.
Kant’s most extensive discussion of beauty is located in the third Critique,
where it forms nearly half of the entire work. At first glance, there seems to be
a striking discontinuity between Kant’s discussion of beauty here and his earlier
works. Even though 1) the division between the beautiful and the sublime is still
in operation, 2) the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ [Analytik des Schönen] in the third
Critique relates the beautiful to aesthetic pleasure [Wohlgefallen]²⁶, and 3) Kant’s
general idea is to show how the notion of the beautiful mediates between nature
and morality, there is hardly any link between sexuality and beauty in the mature
 ‘Weigerung war das Kunststück, um von bloß empfundenen zu idealischen Reizen, von der
bloß thierischen Begierde allmählig zur Liebe und mit dieser vom Gefühl des bloß Angenehmen
zum Geschmack für Schönheit anfänglich nur an Menschen, dann aber auch an der Natur über-
zuführen.’
 ‘vom Schlechtern zum Besseren allmählig’.
 We hear echoes of Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium.
 Pluhar rightly warns that in the third Critique, Wohlgefallen simply means liking, and we
should not attach special meaning to the word as such and should instead attend to the context
(C3, 49fn.14). In particular, we should not assume that Wohlgefallen automatically denotes love
of delight. Insofar as there are links between love and Wohlgefallen in the third Critique, these
must be established via context-specific argument.
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work. The paradigmatic case of the beautiful is aesthetic reflection of beautiful
natural forms, and the notion of the beautiful is then secondarily applied to ar-
tistic works. We do find two statements that link aesthetic judgment concerning
the beautiful to love, but they do not seem to provide the necessary connection
with sexuality that we would expect, based on the earlier works.²⁷ How can we
reconcile this lack of sexual love of beauty in the third Critique with Kant’s pre-
critical position and the position he continued to hold in philosophy of history,
according to which beauty is based on sexual impulse?
There is one passage in the third Critique that concerns human feminine
beauty. When discussing the beauty related to fine art, Kant notes as an aside
that judgments of beauty regarding certain animate objects of nature take
their objective purposiveness into account. In such cases, the aesthetic judgment
is grounded in a teleological one, as with women’s beauty: ‘Thus if we say, e.g.,
That is a beautiful woman, we do in fact think nothing other than that nature
offers us in the woman’s figure a beautiful presentation of the purposes [inher-
 First: ‘The beautiful prepares us for loving something, even nature, without interest’ (C3,
5:267.35–36) / ‘Das Schöne bereitet uns vor, etwas, selbst die Natur ohne Interesse zu lieben’.
This is neither about sexual love (since sexual love has an interest) nor, perhaps, even about
loving the beautiful, and the love hinted at (but in no way elaborated) in this remark is probably
some kind of love of delight toward other beings that neither reduces to self-interest nor takes an
interest in the other’s well-being, but that acquires some sort of reflective quasi-moral status in
disinterested pleasure. It may be possible to interpret the notion of being ‘without interest’ in
terms of not involving an intention to use the love object (see MM, 6:443.2–9). Second, love of
natural beauty may denote a direct, non-selfish interest in the existence of the objects in ques-
tion, yet without assigning a purpose or an end to them. Someone ‘who contemplates the beau-
tiful shape of a wild flower, a bird, an insect, etc., out of admiration and love for them, and
would not want nature to be entirely without them […] is taking a direct interest in the beauty
of nature’ (C3, 5:299.8–14) / ‘welcher […] die schöne Gestalt einer wilden Blume, eines Vogels,
eines Insects u. s. w. betrachtet, um sie zu bewundern, zu lieben und sie nicht gerne in der Natur
überhaupt vermissen zu wollen, […] nimmt ein unmittelbares und zwar intellectuelles Interesse
an der Schönheit der Natur.’ According to Kant, this kind of directly interested love requires that
one have a prior interest in the moral good, or at least a predisposition to it (C3, 5:300.35–36).
Thus, in the third Critique, the experience of beauty in general does not necessarily imply love
but may serve as preparation for a quasi-moral love (which does not hinge on sexuality). More-
over, the love of beauty directly addressed in this work rests on explicitly moral presuppositions
about the agent. In her discussion of love of natural beauty in Kant, Baxley argues that natural
beauty may be valued ‘both for its own sake […] as well as for the sake of […] the moral message
we take from it’ (Baxley 2005, p. 42). I think this is correct, but Baxley does not problematise the
status of the two seemingly different types of love at play: love without interest and directly in-
terested love. This distinction is also not noted by Tomasi (2015). Unfortunately, I cannot provide
a highly detailed investigation of this issue here since my chosen perspective focuses on the par-
ticular relationship between sexual love and love of beauty.
66 2 Sexual Love
ent] in the female build.’ (C3, 5:312.1–4)²⁸ The purpose Kant has in mind here is
undoubtedly the preservation of the species through procreation. Hence, in the
case of women, their beauty remains grounded in the teleology of sexual desire,
and we can at least say that there isn’t an absolute discontinuity between the
earlier works and the third Critique.Unlike the ‘Conjectural Beginning’, however,
this passage cannot be taken to suggest that sexuality is the foundation from
which aesthetic judgments in general are ultimately derived. Furthermore, in a
comment on the moral proof of God’s existence in the ‘Critique of Teleological
Judgment’²⁹, Kant implies that historically, judging the beauty (of nature) was
grounded on the existence of morally practical reason: ‘Indeed, it was in all
probability through this moral interest that people first became attentive to
the beauty and the purposes of nature.’ (C3, 5:459.1–3)³⁰ There is no hint of beau-
ty’s being generally grounded in sexuality in the third Critique. Did Kant change
his mind on the issue in the late 1780s?
This is possible, and quite clearly the link between sexual love and love of
beauty wanes towards the 1790s, as does the association between women and
the beautiful. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, published in 1797,
does not discuss women in terms of beauty.³¹ Does this mean that Kant did
not think that beauty was grounded on sexuality in the end? It seems to me
that when Kant began his search for a priori foundations for judgments of beau-
ty, he was forced to shift the focus of beauty away from women, who remained
paradigmatically closer to empirical inclinations in comparison with men (even
though arguably equipped with rational capacities). On the other hand, the crit-
ical distinction between the aesthetic and the teleological forced Kant to ground
judgments of beauty on something other than the objective purposiveness of na-
ture. Objective purposiveness (as in the sexual impulse) was now a matter of tel-
eological judgment, not a matter of aesthetics. As noted above, in the third Cri-
tique the beauty of women is construed as an isolated special case of beauty that
 ‘In einem solchen Falle denkt man auch, wenn z.B. gesagt wird: das ist ein schönes Weib, in
der That nichts anders als: die Natur stellt in ihrer Gestalt die Zwecke im weiblichen Baue schön
vor’.
 ‘Kritik der teleologischen Urtheilskraft’.
 ‘Auch wurde aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach durch dieses moralische Interesse allererst die
Aufmerksamkeit auf die Schönheit und Zwecke der Natur rege gemacht’. Note that the German
is slightly ambivalent regarding whether die Schönheit refers to the beauty of nature or to beauty
in general. Pluhar opts for the first alternative, which does seem more likely.
 The anthropology lectures confirm this shift: the Friedländer notes from 1775–1776 treat
beauty equally as a property of men and women (LA, 25:665), and in the Mrongovius notes
from 1784–1785 we even find a startling Platonic claim, according to which beauty is essentially
masculine (LA, 25:1330.20–21).
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is grounded in teleology. Importantly, however, the third Critique simply does not
make specific conjectures about the possible arational foundation of beauty – a
topic which was dealt with in the ‘Conjectural Beginning’. All in all, I don’t think
it’s sufficiently clear whether Kant meant to renounce what he had previously
said about the connection between the sexual impulse and love of beauty. I
am forced to take the position that in the precritical phase and in the philosophy
of history, Kant views love of beauty as grounded in the sexual impulse, but this
picture is indeed blurred by the third Critique and the development of the anthro-
pology. All we can say is that men’s moral sexual love of beautiful women (which
I will call broad sexual love) is grounded in the objectively purposive sexual im-
pulse (which I will term narrow sexual love). This finding on sexual love of beau-
ty nevertheless supports the basic claims of the chapter: 1) Kant’s earlier works
show a strong connection between sexuality and beauty in terms of love, and 2)
sexual love can be plausibly said to divide into narrow and broad variants.
2.2 Narrow and Broad Sexual Love
In this section, I hope to illustrate in further detail how Kant’s notion of sexual
love indeed divides into narrow and broad sexual love. As we’ve seen, the basic
idea behind this interpretative distinction is that narrow sexual love consists
merely in the animal impulse of procreation, whereas broad sexual love com-
bines sexual inclination with moral love in the context of heterosexual marriage.
I will establish this claim by analysing how the word ‘love’ operates in Kant’s
discussions of sexuality, first from the perspective of nature, then from the per-
spective of morality and marriage right, and finally from the perspective of tele-
ology. If we look at the various passages in which Kant addresses this topic, we
see that the relationship between the two variants of sexual love is both additive
or accumulative and transformative. In other words, it seems to me that when
animal sexuality unites with morality in marriage, the rudimentary form of sex-
ual love both remains in place and is transformed into something more tender
and compassionate.When the operation of pure practical reason imposes restric-
tions on animal desire and other kinds of demands on how the agent acts within
the interpersonal relationship originally founded on the natural impulse, the re-
sultant love is reminiscent of both the original sexual instinct and the kind of
practical love of neighbour that one may also express towards strangers. But
the loves are different: broad sexual love is milder than sheer lust or animal crav-
ing for sex and more intimate, more caring, than beneficence simply from ration-
al benevolence.
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2.2.1 Narrow Sexual Love
Is there really such a thing as narrow sexual love in Kant? The literature in this
area is scarce. Of the few who have touched on the topic, Langton most clearly
perceives that Kant does use ‘sexual love’ for ‘sexual desire’ (Langton 2009,
p. 325)³², but on the other hand Wood holds that for ‘Kant, sexual desire is
not a form of love, because love seeks the good of its object whereas sexual de-
sire does not.’ (Wood 2008, p. 225) A position like Wood’s is certainly not an ab-
surd position to maintain, and we should carefully put together a more compre-
hensive picture of the evidence before deciding on the matter. In the Collins
notes on ethics, which Wood cites, Kant does state the following: ‘But if he
loves them merely from sexual inclination, it cannot be love; it is appetite.’
(LE, 27:384.22–23)³³ Indeed there is further evidence for his position in the Mron-
govius notes on anthropology, in the ‘Conjectural Beginning’, and in The Meta-
physics of Morals. In the Mrongovius notes, sexual inclination is distinguished
from ‘genuine love’ [eigentliche Liebe] (LA, 25:1361.6–7), and as we saw in the
previous section, the ‘Conjectural Beginning’ contrasts ‘animal desire’ with
love (8:113.7–11). Finally, from The Metaphysics of Morals we learn that sexual
inclination does not belong to love’s general division into love of benevolence
and love of delight: ‘it cannot be classed with either the love that is delight or
the love of benevolence’ (MM, 6:426.26–28)³⁴.
But even though this may seem like a lot, it is hardly the complete picture of
the evidence, and if we investigate further we find that there is more to be said
for the view that does include sexual inclination or the natural sexual impulse in
the general concept of love. Let me rehearse the evidence for the existence of
narrow sexual love discussed thus far, connect it with further evidence, and
then try to provide a balanced summary of the overall situation.
Recall the passage on animal mechanical self-love in the Religion:
 Interestingly, Langton speaks of an ‘optimistic’ and a ‘pessimistic’ Kant in the context of sex-
ual love (Langton 2009, pp. 320–321, cf. 325–326). It seems to me that Kant’s ‘pessimistic’ re-
marks on sexual love relate to moral problems in the context of what I would call ‘narrow sexual
love’, whereas the ‘optimism’ that Langton also sees in Kant is close to my ‘broad sexual love’
(the difference is that Langton emphasises the similarity between sexual love and friendship in
describing Kant’s ‘optimism’ (Langton 2009, pp. 320–321, 327, 363), whereas I emphasise love of
benevolence in my description of ‘broad sexual love’).
 ‘Allein wenn er sie bloß aus Geschlechts-Neygung liebt, so kann dies keine Liebe seyn, son-
dern Appetit.’
 ‘Sie kann […] weder zur Liebe des Wohlgefallens, noch der des Wohlwollens gezählt werden’
(cf. LE, 27:417.27–28).
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1. The predisposition to ANIMALITY in the human being may be brought under the general
title of physical and merely mechanical self-love, i.e. a love for which reason is not re-
quired. It is three-fold: first, for self-preservation; second, for the propagation of the spe-
cies, through the sexual drive, and for the preservation of the offspring thereby begotten
through breeding; third, for community with other human beings, i.e. the social drive.
(R, 6:26.12– 18)³⁵
In the Religion the sexual drive is clearly a form of love. It belongs to ‘animal me-
chanical self-love’ and is therefore part of love’s overall concept. Remember also
that in the ‘Observations’, Kant used the word ‘love’ to describe something felt
by a man who only wants to use women for his own pleasure (2:208.3–5). In
The Metaphysics of Morals, we encounter the claim: ‘Sexual inclination is also
called love (in the narrowest sense of the word)’ (MM, 6:426.20–21)³⁶. Against
this, one could argue that Kant’s use of the passive voice means that what he
is addressing is not in fact his own view but a view generally held by other peo-
ple. Yet the fact that he concedes that what is at issue is the ‘narrowest meaning
of the word’ seems to imply that it is a use that he accepts – for why else would
he use the word ‘narrowest’ [engsten]? Further evidence for narrow sexual love
can be found in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View: ‘The strongest im-
pulses of nature are love of life and sexual love, […] Love of life is to maintain the
individual; sexual love, the species.’ (AP, 7:276.28–33)³⁷ And finally, once more
from The Metaphysics of Morals: ‘Just as love of life is destined by nature to pre-
serve the person, so sexual love is destined by it to preserve the species; in other
words, each of these is a natural end’ (MM, 6:424.12– 14)³⁸.
If we now weigh the evidence, we see one published and two unpublished
instances that detach sexual inclination or animal desire from love or ‘genuine
love’, one published instance that detaches sexual inclination from love’s gener-
al division, and five published instances that explicitly connect the sexual drive,
sexual inclination, or the sexual impulse to love’s overall framework. It seems to
me that a balanced interpretation has no option but to hold that there is such a
 ‘1. Die Anlage für die THIERHEIT im Menschen kann man unter den allgemeinen Titel der
physischen und bloß mechanischen Selbstliebe, d.i. einer solchen bringen, wozu nicht Vernunft
erfordert wird. Sie ist dreifach: erstlich zur Erhaltung seiner selbst; zweitens zur Fortpflanzung
seiner Art durch den Trieb zum Geschlecht und zur Erhaltung dessen, was durch Vermischung
mit demselben erzeugt wird; drittens zur Gemeinschaft mit andern Menschen, d.i. der Trieb zur
Gesellschaft.’
 ‘Die Geschlechtsneigung wird auch Liebe (in der engsten Bedeutung des Wortes) genannt’.
 ‘Die stärksten Antriebe der Natur […] sind Liebe zum Leben und Liebe zum Geschlecht; die
erstere um das Individuum, die zweite um die Species zu erhalten’.
 ‘So wie die Liebe zum Leben von der Natur zur Erhaltung der Person, so ist die Liebe zum
Geschlecht von ihr zur Erhaltung der Art bestimmt; d.i. eine jede von beiden ist Naturzweck’.
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thing as narrow sexual love. It is also very important to see that, more generally,
the existence of narrow sexual love supports the view that even though the gen-
eral division of love into love of benevolence and love of delight is a powerful
key for understanding much of what Kant says about love, on the whole his con-
ception of love is irreducible to the general division. The sexual impulse belongs
to love but remains outside the grasp of the framework of love of benevolence
and love of delight. But to account for the contrasting evidence presented
above, it must be noted that narrow sexual love is love only in a highly restricted
sense; it is non-rational and sometimes distinguished from love. It denotes mere-
ly ‘the strongest possible sensible pleasure in an object.’ (MM, 6:426.21–22)³⁹
2.2.2 Broad Sexual Love
I will now move on to showing how the broader notion of sexual love accumu-
lates on top of the narrow. As noted above, broad sexual love is essentially the
non-rational sexual inclination united with moral love in the context of hetero-
sexual marriage. In the recent literature, Kant’s ‘philosophy of marriage’ has
been strongly criticised. Scholars often speak of things like Kant’s ‘steely cyni-
cism on the subject of marriage’ (La Vopa 2005, p. 1), or argue that even at its
best Kantian marriage is ‘a system of mutual exploitation’ (Wood 1999, p. 257),
or that it marks ‘the self-destruction of the categorical imperative’ (Schröder
1997, p. 282). I think these kinds of views are unnecessarily one-sided and are
largely due to lack of analysis of the concept of love within the context of mar-
riage. For instance, the view that Kant conceived of marriage as merely mutual
exploitation is, I think, a distorted position that results from placing improper
weight on his discussion of marriage right (the tone and vocabulary of which
is at least in part set by its necessarily legalistic context) and from neglecting
his discussions of the duties of the spouses and how love operates in relation
to those duties. I argue that if sexual love in marriage is analysed in terms of
the broader notion of love I call ‘broad sexual love’, many pessimistic readings
of Kantian marriage will thereby be mitigated.
Now it is true and generally well known that sexual desire or narrow sexual
love is morally problematic for Kant. For instance, Kant compares the satisfac-
tion of the sexual appetite to sucking the juice of a lemon and then throwing
it away: ‘As soon as the person is possessed, and the appetite sated, they are
thrown away, as one throws away a lemon after sucking the juice from it.’
 ‘die größte Sinnenlust, die an einem Gegenstande möglich ist’.
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(LE, 27:384.31–33)⁴⁰ He speaks of sex as being like eating roast pork (LE,
27:386.35–36) or even like cannibalism (MM, 6:359.33–360.7). Since we know
that the sexual impulse is, at bottom, a non-rational animal instinct, we may
say that sexual desire on Kant’s view, in its natural crudity, operates completely
irrespective of the humanity and the personhood of the other agent. The desire
may not even require the concept of another human being to yield enjoyment or
fulfil its purpose (see R, 6:26; cf. 2:208.1– 15). As such, the impulse does not take
into account that the other human being to which it is directed has a capacity to
set ends and make moral choices. However, as an inclination directed towards a
particular human other, the sexual inclination has a profound connection to the
person or the personhood of both parties. Kant emphasises that sexual desire it-
self is not directed to the humanity of the other; it is not a desire for a human
‘qua human’ [als Menschen] (LE, 27:385.16) but rather a physical or animal desire
for the other’s sex [Geschlecht] (LE, 27:385.15–22; 27:386.36–37; 27:387.28–29;
27:637.37–638.2; 27:638.10–20; see also MM, 6:277–278).⁴¹ However, Kant thinks
that it is precisely through this base mechanism that the humanity or the person
of the other is possessed, enjoyed, or used as a thing (LE, 27:384.30–31;
27:385.23–35; 27:386.30–39; 27:387.25–29; MM, 6:426.1–15). For Kant, sexual de-
sire is directed to a part of the human being, the use or enjoyment of which im-
plies the use of the whole human being: ‘a person is an absolute unity’ (MM,
6:278.4– 15)⁴², and ‘if someone concedes a part of himself to the other, he con-
cedes himself entirely’ (LE, 27:387.29–31⁴³; see also MM, 6:278.32–279.12; Herman
1993, p. 55). In this way, desiring a part comes to mark the enjoyment of the
whole. As Langton puts it, ‘the extensional object of sexual desire is in fact a per-
son […] but the desire is for that person qua body’ (Langton 2009, p. 368). Since
 ‘So bald sie nun die Person haben, und ihren Appetit gestillet so werfen sie dieselbe weg,
eben so, wie man eine Citrone wegwirft, wenn man den Saft aus ihr gezogen hat.’
 Pace Korsgaard, who asserts that for Kant the object of sexual desire is a person qua person,
even though she also sees Kant as ‘sometimes changing his ground’ (Korsgaard 1996, pp. 194,
214). In support of her claim, she quotes the Collins notes: ‘They themselves, and not their
work and services, are its [sexual desire’s] Objects of enjoyment’. (LE, 27:384.3–5; cited in Kors-
gaard 1996, p. 194; see also Langton 2009, p. 367) However, the construction ‘they themselves’ is
a peculiarity of the translation Korsgaard is using and is not at all contained in the original Ger-
man. The German speaks of man’s desire as immediately directed to ‘other human beings as ob-
jects of his enjoyment’. This phrasing of course requires interpretation. ‘Der Mensch hat eine
Neigung die gerichtet ist auf andre Menschen, nicht, so ferne er die Arbeit und die Umstände
anderer genießen kann, sondern unmittelbar auf andre Menschen als Objecte seines Genußes.’
(LE, 27:384.3–5)
 ‘Person […] eine absolute Einheit ist’.
 ‘wenn der Mensch einen Theil von sich dem andern überläßt, so überläßt er sich ganz.’
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the person is used as an object of enjoyment, and since this does not involve
consideration of the higher ends of humanity (since what is at issue is merely
the satisfaction of an animal impulse), the person becomes a thing. Because
‘each partner dishonors the humanity of the other’ (LE, 27:385.31–32)⁴⁴, the
same happens to both parties. In this way, sexual desire turns both the self
and the other into mere objects or things from which sensual pleasure is derived.
Kant therefore holds that sexuality is morally degrading. One both makes oneself
an object and fails to treat the humanity of the other as an end in itself, render-
ing that other a mere means. However, it must still be emphasised that, contra
certain interpreters, it does not follow that Kant thinks ‘that by its very nature
sexuality is bad’ (Singer 2009, p. 377). For Kant, the sexual impulse remains pre-
disposed to the good. In The Metaphysics of Morals, the proper natural end of the
sexual impulse is even more crucial than self-preservation. It is ‘an end even
more important than that of love of life itself, since it aims at the preservation
of the whole species and not only of the individual.’ (MM, 6:425.3–5)⁴⁵
From the perspective of love, however,what is most important in this context
is that throughout his writings Kant holds that the sexual impulse can unite with
neighbourly, other-regarding love: ‘The sexual inclination can admittedly be
combined with love of human beings, and then it also carries with it the aims
of the latter’ (LE, 27:384.34–36)⁴⁶. Interpreted in the light of Kant’s later discus-
sions of love of human beings [Menschenliebe], the love in the above quotation
from the Collins notes on ethics is most likely the rational love of benevolence as
found in the general division of love and developed as practical love in the ‘Doc-
trine of Virtue’. It is active rational benevolence by which one adopts the ends of
another as one’s own. The roots of this idea trace back to the precritical ‘Obser-
vations’, which I quoted at the beginning of this chapter: ‘the more sublime a
cast of mind is, the more inclined it also is to place the greatest goal of its efforts
in the satisfaction of a beloved object, and on the other side the more beautiful it
is, the more does it seek to respond to this effort with complaisance.’
(2:242.18–22)⁴⁷ It is not the case that Kant held a cynical view concerning the
possibility of moral sexuality. The sexual end of humanity is ‘to preserve the spe-
 ‘einer entehrt des andern seine Menschheit’.
 ‘Zweck der Natur […] noch wichtigern, als selbst der der Liebe zum Leben ist, weil dieser nur
auf Erhaltung des Individuum, jener aber auf die der ganzen Species abzielt.’
 ‘Die Geschlechts-Neigung kann zwar mit der Menschenliebe verbunden warden, und denn
führt sie auch die Absichten der Menschenliebe mit sich’. Translation modified.
 ‘so ist eine Gemüthsart, je erhabener sie ist, auch um desto geneigter die größte Absicht der
Bemühungen in der Zufriedenheit eines geliebten Gegenstandes zu setzen, und andererseits je
schöner sie ist, desto mehr sucht sie durch Gefälligkeit diese Bemühung zu erwiedern.’
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cies without forfeiture of the person’ (LE, 27:391.23–24)⁴⁸. The aim of this resul-
tant, broader notion of sexual love is thus not only procreation or sensible pleas-
ure but also the happiness of the other human being. This point is confirmed in
The Metaphysics of Morals, where sexual inclination is distinct from, but may
unite with, moral love: ‘this ardor has nothing in common with moral love prop-
erly speaking, though it can enter into close union with it under the limiting con-
ditions of practical reason’. (MM, 6:426.29–32)⁴⁹ The properly moral love of The
Metaphysics of Morals is at least the practical love of benevolence, but it might
also refer to intellectual love of delight, the attributes of which I will elaborate on
in the chapter on love of neighbour. For Kant, the way sexual inclination and
moral love can be united is through marriage. In other words, marriage occa-
sions the transition from narrow to broad sexual love.
It seems that the moral love Kant is speaking about is really a husband’s love
for his wife; Kant never explicitly considers wives as loving their husbands in the
moral-practical sense of active rational benevolence. Furthermore, as feminist
scholars like Hannelore Schröder (1997) have argued, there do seem to be restric-
tions to women’s moral personhood that become apparent in the context of mar-
riage. The most charitable recent interpretation of Kantian marriage in this re-
gard, by Mari Mikkola, asserts that Kant’s ‘entire account of marriage is aimed
at safeguarding women so that they are not reduced from persons to things.’
(Mikkola 2011, p. 106) There is much to be said for Mikkola’s view. As already
noted, as such, human heterosexuality is directed only at the use of the sexual
attributes or the sexual organs of the other human being, but since Kant views
persons as essentially indivisible wholes, he thinks that the use of the sexual or-
gans implies the use of the whole person (LE, 27:387–388). As constitutive, rudi-
mentary parts of one’s nature on the animal level, sexual organs are essential
components of one’s overall personhood. The justification of their use in mar-
riage relies on the condition that both parties acquire the lifelong possession
of (or right to use) the sexual attributes of the other. Because use of the sexual
attributes implies use of the whole person, a default consequence of marriage is
that all property rights that the spouses have prior to marriage become corre-
spondingly mutual (even though the spouses may decide otherwise with a sep-
arate contract) (LE, 27:639–640). In line with the egalitarian foundations of his
mature moral philosophy, Kant rejects polygamy, concubinage, and morganatic
marriage on the grounds that these arrangements place women in an inferior po-
 ‘die Erhaltung der Arten ohne Wegwerfung seiner Person’.
 ‘das Brünstigsein hat mit der moralischen Liebe eigentlich nichts gemein, wiewohl sie mit
der letzteren, wenn die praktische Vernunft mit ihren einschränkenden Bedingungen hinzu
kommt, in enge Verbindung treten kann.’
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sition: in polygamy, wives possess only a fraction of the husband; in concubin-
age, only the prostitute is possessed; and in morganatic marriage, property rights
remain unfairly on one side (generally that of the man). (MM, 6:278–279) These
moral and legal restrictions on the sexual contract clearly support Mikkola’s
view, or at least the view that Kant is not insensitive to the protection of the per-
sonhood of women and their rights (see also Korsgaard 1996, p. 195). It is the mu-
tuality of possession in marriage that supposedly secures the personhood of the
parties: ‘while one person is acquired by the other as if it were a thing, the one
who is acquired acquires the other in turn; for in this way each reclaims itself
and restores its personality.’ (MM, 6:278.10– 13)⁵⁰ The basic set-up of marriage
right thus clearly assumes the personhood of both sexes.
With this said, the status of women’s personhood in Kantian marriage is
more ambiguous than Mikkola’s proposition implies. A closer look at Kant’s doc-
trine supports a less charitable view.What we are dealing with is rather a nom-
inally equal arrangement that constitutes what Jane Kneller aptly calls an ‘illu-
sion of equality’ (Kneller 2006, p. 468). The relevant paragraphs in the
‘Doctrine of Right’ [Rechtslehre] suggest that even though possession is mutual
and equal in marriage, it is really the men who possess the women. First of
all, in the opening clause regarding this question, Kant unambiguously declares
that ‘a man acquires a wife’ (MM, 6:277.3–4)⁵¹. The point about possession’s
being mutual appears only later, as if justifying the first clause. Further, in re-
sponse to the immediate criticism launched against his views (see La Vopa
2005, pp. 8–9; Rauscher 2012, ch. 5), Kant objects that ‘if I say “my wife”, this
signifies a special, namely a rightful, relation of the possessor to an object as
a thing (even though the object is also a person).’ (MM, 6:358.31–33)⁵² The
‘wife’ is mentioned here just as an example, but it is telling that Kant does
not think of constructing the relationship the other way around. Most important-
ly, Kant does seem to hold that in marriage, natural equality is not in conflict
with the masterhood of the man:
If the question is therefore posed, whether it is also in conflict with the equality of the part-
ners for the law to say of the husband’s relation to the wife, he is to be your master (he is
 ‘indem die eine Person von der anderen gleich als Sache erworben wird, diese gegenseitig
wiederum jene erwerbe; denn so gewinnt sie wiederum sich selbst und stellt ihre Persönlichkeit
wieder her.’ Barbara Herman’s interpretation of this is eloquent: ‘Perhaps it goes this way: I give
myself (or rights over me) and you give yourself; but since you have me, in giving yourself to me
you give me back to me.’ (Herman 1993, p. 60)
 ‘Der Mann erwirbt ein Weib’.
 ‘Sage ich […]: mein Weib, so bedeutet dieses ein besonderes, nämlich rechtliches,Verhältniß
des Besitzers zu einem Gegenstande (wenn es auch eine Person wäre), als Sache.’
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the party to direct, she to obey): this cannot be regarded as conflicting with the natural
equality of a couple if this dominance is based only on the natural superiority of the hus-
band to the wife in his capacity to promote the common interest of the household […]. (MM,
6:279.16–25)⁵³
In the Anthropology, as to who has supreme command in the household Kant
writes: ‘there certainly can be only one who coordinates all transactions in ac-
cordance with their ends.’ (AP, 7:309.28–30)⁵⁴ Even though it seems possible
that Kant leaves room for cases where the husband is not naturally superior in
the sense required for legal dominance, Kant’s naturalistic vocabulary appears
to support the notion that he does not view the legally subordinate status of
women as merely contingent. This is corroborated by the essay on ‘Theory and
Practice’⁵⁵ (1793), where the natural requirement for being a citizen (or eligible
to vote) is not being a child or a woman (8:295.14– 15). By implication, women
are naturally not citizens (cf. Mikkola 2011, p. 101).⁵⁶ As Schröder puts it: ‘Men
are both the owners of women and yet their equal partners.’ (Schröder 1997,
p. 294) Kantian marriage is not just about safeguarding the personhood of
women; it also affirms the dominance of men. It is precisely this that has led
scholars to describe marriage as ‘a stress point’ (La Vopa 2005, p. 5) or as con-
stituting a ‘deep tension’ (Kneller 2006, p. 469) in Kant’s ethical system. I agree
with the critical voices that despite the nominal equality of the marital relation-
ship, there is an inconsistency or insoluble tension between the universalistic
notion of personal autonomy and Kant’s de facto doctrine of women. For
Kant, women are quasi-persons, subordinate to their husbands, and the publish-
 ‘Wenn daher die Frage ist: ob es auch der Gleichheit der Verehlichten als solcher wider-
streite, wenn das Gesetz von dem Manne in Verhältniß auf das Weib sagt: er soll dein Herr
(er der befehlende, sie der gehorchende Theil) sein, so kann dieses nicht als der natürlichen
Gleichheit eines Menschenpaares widerstreitend angesehen werden, wenn dieser Herrschaft
nur die natürliche Überlegenheit des Vermögens des Mannes über das weibliche in Bewirkung
des gemeinschaftlichen Interesse des Hauswesens […] zum Grunde liegt’.
 ‘denn nur Einer kann es doch sein, der alle Geschäfte in einen mit dieses seinen Zwecken
übereinstimmenden Zusammenhang bringt.’ Translation modified. The Louden translation
speaks of a single end, whereas the German is in the plural. The syntax implies that the ends
might be ‘his’ [Einer], but it’s also possible that the seinen refers back to the ‘household’
[Haus] mentioned in the previous sentence, and I’ve tried to preserve this ambiguity. It is unclear
to me what the function of the dieses in the construction is.
 ‘Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Prax-
is’.
 In the Vigilantius notes, however, the wife’s belonging to the husband in servitude ‘is due
merely to her lesser ability to provide for herself’ (LE 27:642.20–21) / ‘so rührt dies blos von
deren Schwäche, sich selbst zu erhalten, her’.
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ed evidence would seem to suggest that he viewed this not as a contingent fact
but as natural.
2.2.3 The Teleology of Sexual Love
To conclude the argument of this chapter, especially regarding the distinction be-
tween narrow and broad sexual love, I turn finally to the question of teleology.
As I noted in the beginning, in the Religion Kant holds that the non-rational an-
imal impulse of sex (narrow sexual love) is somehow predisposed to the good.
But what does this mean? How is sexual love predisposed to the good, and
what is the status of sex difference in this respect?
There are basically three ways to understand what Kant might mean by
‘good’ here. It might mean the moral good, it might mean the physical good
as sensible happiness, or both. With all its dangers in terms of sensible happi-
ness, sexuality can be viewed as being conducive to the physical good to the ex-
tent that it produces the strongest possible sensible pleasure in an object. The
context in the Religion, however, suggests that Kant is talking about the moral
good, or good in both senses (see ch. 1.1). But how can the crude physical im-
pulse of sexuality be a predisposition [Anlage] to moral goodness? I think
there are two possible answers to this question. First, we can take a weak notion
of Anlage and hold that the impulse is predisposed to the moral good merely in
the sense that it is a necessary condition of the continued existence of the spe-
cies. The sexual impulse works to preserve the species, and in this sense it en-
ables moral progress in the long term. On the other hand, we may take a stronger
notion and suggest that there is something in the sexual impulse that, despite its
non-moral character, is still somehow conducive to moral goodness, perhaps in
the sense that it serves to occasion moral love between the sexes. In other words,
narrow sexual love is predisposed to the good in the sense that we may judge
that it leads to broad sexual love.
Most likely, all of the above is the case, even though Kant does not elaborate
on the connection between sexuality and the good in much detail. In this re-
spect, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) is a key source.⁵⁷ In
 For scholars seeking a charitable interpretation of Kant’s views on sexuality or sexual differ-
ence, one method is to reject or ‘bracket’ the anthropological remarks altogether, as they do
seem to conflict with Kant’s mature moral universalism. This is the strategy taken, for instance,
by Mikkola (2011, p. 105). But most of what Kant says about sexual difference is actually con-
tained in the anthropological discussions, and if this evidence is ruled out there is not much
left to interpret. Kant did teach an anthropology course every winter for twenty years (so it is
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the chapter ‘On the Highest Physical Good’ in the Anthropology, sexual love is
associated with progress towards species-level happiness in the physical
sense. There, love of life (self-preservation) and sexual love represent God’s ‘rea-
son […] that provides generally for the highest physical good’ (AP, 7:279.29–30)⁵⁸,
irrespective of human reason. I believe the passage is a remnant of an earlier pe-
riod in Kant’s philosophy, where he had not yet worked out the critical notion of
teleological judgment. The statement regarding God’s role seems too strong in
the light of the third Critique (see C3, 5:447 ff.; see also my ch. 1.1), but the
point must at least be that love of life and sexual love provide the species
with sensuous happiness. In the same passage, however, Kant seems to go slight-
ly further, connecting sexual love and cultural progress:
For by means of the general mixing of the sexes, the life of our species endowed with rea-
son is progressively maintained, despite the fact that this species intentionally works to-
ward its own destruction (by war). Nevertheless, this does not prevent rational creatures,
who grow constantly in culture even in the midst of war, from representing unequivocally
the prospect of a state of happiness for the human race in future centuries, a state which
will never again regress. (AP, 7:276.33–277.4)⁵⁹
We know from Kant’s philosophy of history that the kind of progress described
above must involve a moral element and that, in fact, the proposition of cultural
progress cannot even be understood as a merely descriptive prediction of how
things will work out. ‘The prospect of a state of happiness’ is a regulative
ideal, approximation to which requires moral striving on the part of human
agents. Kant is not naïve about progress. It is of course possible to provide a
clearly a part of his thinking). He also authorised the publication of Anthropology from a Prag-
matic Point of View, which was put together from his own notes and for which he also wrote a
preface – even if his mental powers were already weakening at that time. Because of this, and
because we can follow the development of Kant’s anthropology through the lecture notes of the
1770s and 1780s, I take it that its published form is a real source and ought not to be bracketed
off, at least when one’s goals are exegetical. The Anthropology does of course contain a lot of
material that we would call precritical, but then the proper approach is to read it cautiously, to-
gether with other sources, when seeking an overall interpretation of Kant’s position on a given
question.
 ‘das physische Weltbeste allgemein besorgende Vernunft’.
 ‘da dann durch Vermischung der Geschlechter im Ganzen das Leben unserer mit Vernunft
begabten Gattung fortschreitend erhalten wird, unerachtet diese absichtlich an ihrer eigenen Zer-
störung (durch Kriege) arbeitet; welche doch die immer an Cultur wachsenden vernünftigen Ge-
schöpfe selbst mitten in Kriegen nicht hindert, dem Menschengeschlecht in kommenden Jahr-
hunderten einen Glückseligkeitszustand, der nicht mehr rückgängig sein wird, im Prospect
unzweideutig vorzustellen.’
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weak interpretation of the passage: sexual love is merely the necessary enabling
condition for any kind of future for the human species.We may, however, be re-
minded of the passage in ‘Conjectural Beginning’ (8:113.7– 11), where animal de-
sire gives rise to a higher kind of love, which in turn brings about a general ap-
preciation of beauty, which again (as we know from the third Critique), is closely
linked to morality or even functions as a bridge between nature and the moral
good. A thorough investigation of the Anthropology reveals that even though
we do not find an explicit link between sexuality and beauty, there is indeed
a kind of quasi-moral aspect involved in the way sexual teleology is discussed.
In the chapter on ‘The Character of the Sexes’ [Der Charakter des Ges-
chlechts], Kant assigns a specific teleological role to women, and only women,
in the moral progress of the species. Kant holds that if one wishes to characterise
women or their role in species-level progress, one must rely on considerations of
natural teleology rather than considerations of morality or virtue: ‘One can only
come to the characterization of this sex if one uses as one’s principle not what
we make our end, but what nature’s end was in establishing womankind’ (AP,
7:305.29–32)⁶⁰. Nature’s purpose or end [Zweck], which Kant also describes in
terms of nature’s wisdom [Weisheit] concerning womankind, is twofold: ‘(1) the
preservation of the species, [and] (2) the cultivation of society and its refinement
by womankind.’ (AP, 7:305.35–306.2)⁶¹ The first purpose is familiar from the con-
text of narrow sexual love. Given this purpose, nature instils in women a fear
that something will happen to the foetuses they carry in their wombs. Thus
the first purpose makes women seek male protection out of fear of physical in-
jury. The second purpose assigns women a place in the moral development of
men. Kant thinks that the sexual union generally requires that each partner be
in some way superior to the other – otherwise, the self-love of each would
bring about mere ‘squabbling’ [Zank] (AP, 7:303.14– 19).⁶² While men are superior
in physical strength and economic status, women rule men through controlling
male desire by demands of ‘gentle and courteous treatment’ (AP, 7:306.14)⁶³.
 ‘Man kann nur dadurch, daß man, nicht was wir uns zum Zweck machen, sondern was
Zweck der Natur bei Einrichtung der Weiblichkeit war, als Princip braucht, zu der Charakteristik
dieses Geschlechts gelangen’.
 ‘1. die Erhaltung der Art, 2. die Cultur der Gesellschaft und Verfeinerung derselben durch die
Weiblichkeit.’
 What this boils down to is characterised by Kant in terms of a distinction between dominat-
ing [herrschen] and governing [regieren]. According to Kant, ‘inclination dominates, and under-
standing governs’ (AP, 7:309.32–33) / ‘die Neigung herrscht, und der Verstand regiert.’ The wife
dominates the household, but only insofar as the governing husband approves.
 ‘sanfte, höfliche Begegnung’.
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Women therefore lead [bringen] men, ‘if not to morality itself, to that which is its
cloak, moral decency, which is the preparation for morality and its recommenda-
tion.’ (AP, 7:306.16– 18)⁶⁴ It is unclear what exactly this means, but the idea is
probably that because women are equipped with ‘finer feelings […] of sociability
and propriety’ and tend to express ‘modesty’ and ‘eloquence’ in comparison with
men (AP, 7:306.10– 11)⁶⁵, men are more prone to adopt behavioural patterns ap-
propriate to these kinds of ‘feminine’ traits when associating with women within
various social contexts.
In his recent criticism of Kant’s sexual teleology, Inder Marwah suggests that
Kant’s teleological view of sex difference ‘requires women to adopt an explicitly
non-moral character’ and that women are therefore reduced ‘to the status of
means’ in the moral development of humanity. (Marwah 2013, p. 559) The first
question to ask is of course: if women are reduced to means for the moral devel-
opment of the species, who or what is using them as means?⁶⁶ Possible answers
to this question include men as individuals, men as a group of individuals, and
nature itself. The context suggests that, since the natural purposes here are not
about what ‘we make our end’, the ‘agent’ responsible for using women as
means can only be ‘nature’. Regardless of the stance one takes toward this ques-
tion, I do think there is a sense in which Marwah is correct. First, the teleological
role of women is primarily a supportive function: by protecting and nurturing
children, women promote the physical existence of the species. Second, through
the procreative sexual bond, women serve to make men more moral. It is telling,
though, that the role seems to be only preparative: real morality is something
men must accomplish for themselves. There is no clear prescription or teleolog-
ical judgment in Kant to the effect that women should or will attain a proper
moral status, even though Kant does not seem to suggest that they in principle
lack the requisite rational structures.⁶⁷ In the teleology of sexual love, women’s
 ‘wenn gleich dadurch eben nicht zur Moralität selbst, doch zu dem, was ihr Kleid ist, dem
gesitteten Anstande, der zu jener die Vorbereitung und Empfehlung ist’. The Mrongovius notes
on anthropology make the same point more bluntly: ‘The female sex is for the cultivation of the
male sex’ (LA, 25:1394.12– 13) / ‘Das weibliche Geschlecht ist zur Cultur des männlichen’.
 ‘die feineren Empfindungen […] der Geselligkeit und Wohlanständigkeit’ / ‘Sittsamkeit’ / ‘Be-
redtheit’. Note how the word feinere carries with it an allusion to the ‘finer feelings’ of beauty
and sublimity in the early ‘Observations’.
 I thank Alix Cohen for posing this question to me.
 Admittedly, the evidence in this area is ambiguous and inconclusive. Kant doubts women’s
capacity for principles (2:232.2–3; LA, 25:722.23–25) but also views them as being capable of
morality (LA, 25:705.16–27) and recognising moral worth (C2, 5:153.19–23.). In the essay ‘An An-
swer to the Question: What is Enlightenment’ [Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung]
(1784), we can plausibly read Kant as saying that ‘the entire fair sex’ [das ganze schöne Ges-
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ends are subordinate to the moral progress of men. In this sense of sexual tele-
ology, women are means.
But are women mere means? Did Kant view them as ‘natural serfs or ani-
mals’, as Schröder suggests (1997, p. 296)? Or did he see them as belonging to hu-
manity’s moral development ‘in the worst sense of the word’, as Marwah propos-
es (2013, p. 564)? In this chapter, I have argued that if the notion of sexual love is
accounted for in the broad sense, the picture of Kantian sexual relations is much
less grim than commonly thought. From the precritical ‘Observations’ up until
the final published version of the Anthropology, Kant maintains that if there is
to be marital love in the broadest, proper meaning, it is the happiness of the
wife that the husband must make his principal aim. The earlier works make
the same point by making use of the concept of the ‘finer feeling’ of love of beau-
ty. From this perspective, to love the beautiful, be it in woman or non-human na-
ture, is to experience non-instrumental delight [Wohlgefallen], which prepares
one for virtue. The comprehensive notion of teleology,which includes the highest
good as the moral happiness of rational creatures, must also include the happi-
ness of both men and women. The highest good cannot involve the misery of ei-
ther sex. In the Mrongovius notes on anthropology, for instance, we encounter
the statement: ‘Nature wanted the happiness of both sexes.’ (LA, 25:1392.24)⁶⁸
And if women are to participate in happiness, they must also be capable of vir-
tue⁶⁹ (but Kant never directly addresses this point). The Anthropology confirms
that women’s happiness is principally achieved via their husbands’ making
their happiness their primary aim: ‘The husband’s behavior must show that to
him the welfare of his wife is closest to his heart.’ (AP, 7:309.33–310.1)⁷⁰ This
clearly includes the general principle of practical love [Liebe des Wohlwollens]
on the part of the husband: the husband must adopt his wife’s ends as his
own. Therein lies the teleological function of broad sexual love: it aims at the
happiness of women. Even though Kant does give women a subordinate role
in his sexual teleology, the broader notion of love that Kant consistently insists
on ensures that women are not mere means but also ends in themselves.
chlecht] is in a state of ‘self-incurred minority’ [selbst verschuldete Unmündigkeit], which implies
that in principle they might in the future mature and come to use their own understanding with-
out external direction (8:35). I thank Martin Sticker for convincing me of this last point over the
course of several informal discussions.
 ‘Die Natur hat die Gluckseeligkeit beydes Geschlechts gewollt.’
 I thank Jens Timmermann for bringing this to my attention.
 ‘Das Betragen des Ehemanns muß zeigen: daß ihm das Wohl seiner Frau vor allem anderen
am Herzen liege.’
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In this way, the transition from morally problematic narrow sexual love to
broad sexual love, which acknowledges and promotes the happiness of
women, can also be seen to provide what Langton calls ‘an escape from solip-
sism’ (Langton 2009, p. 321), even if, in this case, only from a male perspective.
Perhaps broad sexual love could be generalised so that it involves a reciprocal
and equal relationship of love and respect between the spouses (or lovers in gen-
eral), and the relationship based on sexual love would then actually be a rela-
tionship of friendship. Ideas along these lines have been presented in the liter-
ature, and writers like Korsgaard and Langton have rightly pointed out the
similarity between some of Kant’s discussions of sexual love and friendship in
the Collins notes, in terms of the reciprocity of ‘self-surrender and retrieval’
(Korsgaard 1996, p. 195; see Langton 2009, pp. 319, 363). In both marriage and
friendship, one yields oneself to the other and gets oneself back through the
other (LE, 27:388.23–37; cf. 27:423.37–424.6). As Langton shows (2009, p. 320),
in his correspondence Kant speaks of both marital love and love in friendship
as assuming ‘the same mutual respect’, writing that this virtuous love common
to both ‘wants to communicate itself completely’ (11:331.31–332.2)⁷¹.
On the other hand, Denis (2001b) has listed six ways in which marriage and
friendship differ from each other in Kant: 1) the basis of marriage is more sensu-
ous and less intellectual than that of (moral) friendship; 2) marriage requires a
relation of dominance in which husbands are ultimately superior to their
wives; 3) women are generally inferior to men; 4) because of this, reciprocity
in mutual disclosure is less likely between husband and wife than between
friends (and women can’t really keep secrets)⁷²; 5) the proper distance required
for respect is unlikely in marriage; and 6) friendship is more loving than mar-
riage. (Denis 2001b, pp. 13–16) Denis’s aim is to revise Kantian marriage into
a ‘moral marriage’ on the basis of a Kantian model of friendship, and for the
most part her characterisation of Kantian marriage is accurate. Yet her sixth
point, the point about love, paints a picture of Kantian marriage nearly exclu-
sively in terms of narrow sexual love, and while she acknowledges that ‘marriage
promises partners some measure of practical love’ (Denis 2001b, p. 16), she most-
ly neglects the passages on which my notion of broad sexual love is based.
Friendship is indeed not the same as sexual love or marriage, and my aim
here is not to venture beyond Kant but merely to do him justice. From this per-
 ‘gleiche gegenseitige Achtung’ / ‘will sich gänzlich mittheilen.’ For a dramatic story about
the correspondence between Kant and Maria von Herbert, which also illuminates the relation-
ship between various aspects of Kant’s life and his philosophy, see Langton’s ‘Duty and Deso-
lation’ (in Langton 2009, pp. 197–222).
 See AP, 7:304.1–2.
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spective, broad sexual love may provide us with further resources when it comes
to seeing the ‘optimistic’ Kant described by Langton (Langton 2009, p. 321). This
optimism is missing from Denis’s characterisation of Kant’s (non-revised) ac-
count of love in marriage. However, if we are to generalise the notion of broad
sexual love such that it operates symmetrically between the sexes, the basic
premise we would need to add to Kant’s framework (in a much more powerful
way than he does) is that women and men are equal. Only then would something
like ‘sexual friendship’ be possible in Kantian terms. But this is beyond the scope
of my present work.
It is true that Kant’s views on women are generally not very enlightened,
even by the standards of his day. It is particularly true that Kant was opposed
to women’s higher education, and that the role he saw for women was a domes-
tic one. The problem was, and is, that he could not see that women’s happiness
might reside outside the domestic sphere, in the public – in practicing science or
striving for moral self-perfection based on principles. The distinction I have
drawn between narrow and broad sexual love reveals a Kant who is by no
means a feminist but whose views on sexuality are not as cynical or negative
as is often thought, and who clearly reserves a place for loving morality and lov-
ing affection within the sexual sphere. The ascent of sexual love can thus be said
to mark a transition from narrow to broad sexual love, from the merely natural to
the natural-moral. The Mrongovius lectures on anthropology summarise this
idea:
as long as it [sexual inclination] is brutal and aims merely at enjoyment, it is only animal
instinct. – But as soon as it is connected to benevolence and aims at the happiness of the
other, it becomes genuine love. It must not be like love of roast beef, which one devours.
(LA, 25:1361.4–8)⁷³
 ‘sie ist nur thierischer Instinkt so lange sie brutal ist und bloß auf den Genuß geht – Sobald
sie aber mit Wohlwollen verbunden ist und auf die Gluckseeligkeit des andern geht; so wird sie
eigentliche Liebe. Sie muß nicht sein wie Liebe zum RinderBraten den man destruirt’.
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3 Love of God
In this chapter, my task is to locate the term ‘love’ in the context of Kant’s con-
siderations of God [Die Liebe Gottes, Gottesliebe] and to analyse the precise func-
tions that love is given within these contexts. Since Kant’s ‘rational religion’ is
based on a moral philosophical interpretation of Christian scripture, and since
love of God is a foundational notion in Christianity, it is fair to assume as a work-
ing hypothesis that love of God is a significant concept in Kant’s approach to re-
ligion, and hence in his overall project.
If one takes into account that Kant sometimes viewed religion as ‘rooted in
the love of God’ (LE, 27:720.25–26)¹, was sympathetic to the Christian idea that
God is love² (R, 6:145.21; LE, 27:721.2), and held in the concluding remark of his
late moral philosophical work The Metaphysics of Morals that the intention of the
world’s author ‘can have only love for its basis’ (MM, 6:491.2–3)³, it is almost sur-
prising that very little has been written about this topic in the literature.
As was the case with self-love and sexual love, there seem to be no system-
atic exegetical interpretations of love of God available. There are, however, dis-
cussions of Kant’s reading of Jesus’ basic commandment to love God above
all, and your neighbour as yourself ⁴. Ina Goy, for instance, observes that for hu-
mans, the commandment to love God results in an ‘unattainable ideal’⁵ (Goy
2014, p. 19), whereas Moors claims that ‘the love of God equals […] moral self-
love’ (Moors 2007, p. 256, see also 269). On the other hand, some interpreters
seem to view God’s love for human beings as equatable to the ideal of love
for the moral law (Palmquist 2000, p. 261; Axinn 1994, p. 119; Reardon 1988,
p. 143), while some posit generally that Kant’s God is loving (Wood 1970,
p. 248), and others that his God is not loving (Goy 2014, p. 23).
While I think that all the previous propositions in this area are interesting
and merit discussion, if taken as accounts of love of God they are ultimately
problematic. The problem is first of all methodological: the propositions are
not intended as systematic discussions of the issue but are rather brief com-
ments made in the midst of other interpretative concerns.⁶ Second, I think a sim-
 ‘in der Liebe Gottes beruhet.’
 As expressed in the Gospel of John in the New Testament of the Christian Bible: ‘The one who
does not love does not know God, because God is love.’ (1. John 4:8)
 ‘die nur Liebe zum Grunde haben kann.’
 Mark 12:28; similar in Matt. 22:34. See my ch. 4.1.
 ‘ein […] unerreichbares Ideal.’
 The case is different in Moors’s article, where he goes so far as to claim that he is formulating
‘a general evaluation of Kant’s philosophy of love’ (Moors 2007, p. 266). But Moors’s eclectic ap-
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ple yet essential structural feature of love of God has not been fully acknowl-
edged by the previous commentators: the fact that love of God works in two dif-
ferent directions. It can either mean the human being’s love for God, or it can
mean God’s love for human beings, so that there is an ‘upward’ direction from
human beings to God and a ‘downward’ direction from God to human beings
(see fig. 3).⁷
This chapter aims to determine more precisely the relationship between
these two directions and the extent to which they are distinguishable from
each other. Drawing in part from previous research in this area, I shall build
my discussion around the following questions: What is the relationship between
love of God and love for the moral law? Does love for the law relate to love for
God, to love by God, or to both – or do love of God and love for the law mean the
same thing? What is the place of the general division of love (as love of benev-
olence and love of delight) in love of God – does the general division even play a
proach has other problems, as noted by Goy: He is insensitive to the dynamic temporal structure
of the Kantian corpus and does not use source criticism when choosing the passages on which
he bases his interpretations (see Goy 2014, p. 6). I discuss Moors’s evaluation in my general in-
troduction to this study. On the other hand, Dennis Vanden Auweele’s (2014) ‘For the Love of
God: Kant on Grace’ focuses solely on grace and does not provide an interpretation of how
love functions in this context.
 Goy (2014, p. 16) appears to recognise this structure but does not make interpretative use of it,
whereas Moors fruitfully acknowledges that in the Vigilantius notes love for God is dependent
on God’s love. However, by claiming that the duty of love is there grounded on a ‘theologico-met-
aphysical idea’ of God’s love (Moors 2007, p. 258), Moors downplays the point that for Kant, du-
ties can only be grounded in pure practical reason. Moors is not entirely unaware of this moral
grounding of duty, but his notion of a ‘theologico-metaphysical basis’ of duty and love (Moors
2007, p. 259) seems overly religious from a moral perspective. The overall context of Kant’s writ-
ings on religion suggests that the idea of God’s love is moral-rational (something that reason
gives to itself) rather than ‘theologico-metaphysical’. I hope to show this more clearly toward





Figure 3. The Two-Directionality of Love of God
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role? Is love of God somehow reducible to rational or moral self-love? And final-
ly, is Kant’s God loving or not?
I will divide my treatment roughly into two exegetical parts. In the first, I will
investigate human love for God; in the second, God’s love for humans. The third
section analyses the relationship between love of God and self-love and makes
more general remarks concerning the place of God in Kant’s philosophy. Within
the two thematic sections, I will proceed chronologically with an eye to tracking
the possible evolution of Kant’s thought, focusing on the most relevant works
from the mature period: the second Critique, the Religion, and The Metaphysics
of Morals (as well as the Vigilantius notes on ethics). I will thus walk up the
same path twice, but using a different perspective each time so as to gain an ac-
curate overall picture.
I will show that love for the law is ideally related to love for God (rather than
love by God) and that love for God can be meaningfully discussed in terms of a
scale structure. I will also point out that the general division of love is operative
in love of God and that by using the general division God’s love can be divided
into an end account and a ground account. Love of God will be seen as irreduci-
ble to rational or moral self-love. On the whole, and in its perfection, love of God
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the complete highest good. Kant’s God
is ultimately a rational idea, or an ideal rational construction, and the evidence
suggests that this God is a loving God, even though Kant remains puzzled about
the relationship between God’s love and God’s justice. I will call the overall pic-
ture arrived at in this investigation the ascent model of love of God.
3.1 Love for God
For Kant, religion is very much about the cognition [Erkenntnis] of our duties as
divine commands (C2, 5:129.18– 19; R, 6:153.28–29; MM, 6:443.27–31). Morality is
the proper stuff of religion, but it is morality viewed or cognised from a partic-
ular perspective, mainly that of Christianity. This perspective includes assump-
tions or beliefs that have a practical significance but that are absent from mor-
ality considered merely in itself. It appears that Kant, at least from the Herder
lectures (1762– 1764) onwards, never accepts that morality is grounded in religion
and instead maintains that the concept of morality leads us to believe in God
(see LE, 27:73–74; 27:306–308; C2, 5:129; see also Timmermann 2016a, p. 1). Mor-
ality is the necessary condition of religion – that is, religion in the proper, moral
sense, and not as a mere cult (e.g. LE, 27:305; R, 6:51–52; see also 6:12–13). How-
ever, as Timmermann has shown, up until the ‘Canon’ [Kanon] of the Critique of
Pure Reason, Kant thinks that belief in God is necessary if we are to have a suf-
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ficient motive to moral action. Even though the source of moral laws can be
judged to lie in reason, an external lawgiver with threats and rewards is needed
as an incentive for compliance with those laws.Without God, moral laws would
be ‘idle chimeras’ [leere Hirngespinste] without reality (C1, A811/B839). This pic-
ture changes with the Groundwork, where moral motivation is connected with the
new notions of autonomy and respect for the moral law. From that point on, be-
lief in God is no longer necessary as a motive for moral action, but God and re-
ligion are still necessary conditions of our hoping for and aiming toward the
highest good (as the morally deserved happiness of rational creatures). (Timmer-
mann 2016a; see C3, 5:450–541; cf. MM, 6:443.35)
In the first section of this chapter, I investigate human love for God. As we
would assume, Kant’s treatments of this topic take place at the intersections of
morality and religion. What remains constant in his discussions is the idea that
human love for God is about viewing our duties as divine commands and about
striving to practice these duties gladly [gern]. In Kant’s mature period after the
Groundwork, this striving is developed in terms of a regulative ideal that Kant
calls ‘love for the law’, which is the unattainable goal of one’s striving for glad-
ness in fulfilling all of one’s duties. The exegetical problems I wish to address in
this section are as follows:What is the relationship between human love for God
and love’s general division? Is human love for God equatable with love for the
law, or do they remain somehow discernible from each other? I will answer
these questions toward the end of the section.
It seems that Kant does not write about love of God directly prior to the sec-
ond Critique. To be sure, he recognises from the early 1760s onwards that there
might be an obligation to love, but in its earliest formulations this obligation
is not explicitly associated with God and is apparently discussed more as an in-
terpersonal issue.⁸ By contrast, it is equally the case that the earlier Kant recog-
 See ‘Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy’ [Versuch den
Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen] (1763) (2:183.35–36) and ‘Inquiry
Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality’ [Untersuchung
über die Deutlichkeit der Grunsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral] (1764) (2:300.2), as
well as the Herder lectures on ethics (27:65–66). Goy (2014, pp. 15– 16) speculates interestingly
whether love of God might already be located in the aforementioned ‘Inquiry’, because the prin-
ciple of mutual love is discussed in the same paragraph as the proposition to do ‘what is in ac-
cordance with the will of God’ / ‘das, was dem Willen Gottes gemäß ist’ (2:300.17). Goy is correct
to note that the link between mutual love and love of God (and the commandment to love one’s
neighbour) is unclear, and I therefore think that she is stretching the rather vague evidence too
far when she claims that in the ‘Inquiry’ love of God (and love of neighbour) are ‘examples of the
“many simple feelings of the good”’ (Goy 2014, p. 16; see 2:299.33). It is not clear whether love of
God is even meant to be at issue in the ‘Inquiry’, and it certainly isn’t mentioned in that text.
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nises that we have traditional obligations to God (e.g. 2:300.16– 18), but these
are not explicitly discussed in terms of love. It is also noteworthy that the
later Kant of The Metaphysics of Morals specifically denies that there could be
duties to God [gegen Gott]. The duties we may have with regard to [in Ansehung]
a transcendent being (of which reason provides us an idea) are, properly speak-
ing, duties to ourselves. (MM, 6:443.27–444.8)
The first time that love for God actually comes up in the Kantian corpus is in
the Collins notes on ethics. Kant’s mature theory of moral motivation is not yet in
place, but his several remarks clearly anticipate the later works and indicate con-
tinuity in his treatment. In the Collins notes, Kant states, for instance, that ‘the
disposition to performance of duties is to be cultivated, and this is what the
teacher of the gospels says: that we should do everything from the love for
God. But to love God is to do His commands gladly.’ (LE, 27:274.13– 15⁹; similarly
at 27:300.6–9; 27:335.35–37; see also 27:322.23–25) An important interpretative
key is provided in the above passage: human love for God is closely connected
with the notion of ‘cultivating’¹⁰ one’s disposition to perform duties gladly. Later
on in the lectures, in Kant’s discussion of duties (and love) towards other people,
we learn that to do something gladly is connected with doing it willingly, from
one’s ‘own impulse’ [aus eignem Triebe] or from ‘inclination’ [aus Neygung]
(LE, 27:413.18– 19).
In terms of Kant’s mature moral philosophy from the Groundwork onwards,
the idea of a commandment to do something out of inclination or inclination-
based love may seem puzzling. In the foundational terminology of Kant’s mature
moral philosophy, duty and inclination are opposing terms: if an action is done
from duty, it is not done from inclination, and conversely, if something is done
from inclination, it is done from a sort of natural liking and therefore not from
duty. But as we shall learn next, it is not the case that the commandment to
love God in Kant’s mature period prescribes practicing duties from inclination;
instead, it prescribes practicing duties with a facilitating or corresponding incli-
nation, and hence gladly. What will remain impossible for humans is the com-
plete attainment of a love for the moral law (see ch. 1.3).We will always have in-
clinations that run contrary to what morality demands, which also means that
we can never love God perfectly.
 ‘ist die Gesinnung der Leistung der Pflichten zu cultiviren, und dieses ist das, was der Lehrer
des Evangelii sagt, daß man alles aus Liebe zu Gott thun soll. Gott lieben ist aber seine Gebothe
gerne thun.’ Translation modified.
 I discuss the notion of cultivation in ch. 4.2.2.A.
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Kant’s main discussion of love for God occurs in the second Critique. In the
chapter ‘On the Incentives of Pure Practical Reason’¹¹ Kant engages in philosoph-
ical interpretation of Jesus’ basic commandment to love God above all and one’s
neighbour as oneself. I will read this passage by first pointing out the implied
existence of the general division of love in this context, and then by looking
at the way the adverb ‘gladly’ functions, in order to analyse how Kant under-
stands the relationship between love for God and love for the law.
The starting point of Kant’s enquiry is the idea that the twofold religious
commandment is in agreement with the notion that while we are the lawgivers
of morality, we are also its subjects: ‘For, as a commandment it requires respect
for a law that commands love and does not leave it to one’s discretionary choice
to make this one’s principle. But love for God as inclination (pathological love) is
impossible, for he is not an object of the senses.’ (C2, 5:83.5–7)¹² Here, in the
context of love for God, Kant seems to rely implicitly on the same division be-
tween inclination-based love and reason-based love that he uses extensively
in the context of neighbourly love. In my chapter on love of neighbour, I will
show how this distinction can be understood in terms of love’s general division
into love of delight and love of benevolence (both of which can be either intel-
lectual/moral or pathological). Assuming these results, it seems that what is ex-
cluded in the passage quoted above is the possibility of loving God in the sense
of inclination-based love of benevolence or pathological love of delight (or, even
more obviously, the crude animal impulse of sex). We can hence plausibly say
that love for God at least makes implicit reference to love’s general division
and can be analysed in conjunction with that division.
Kant goes on to conclude that since inclinations (and love in particular) can-
not be directly commanded, the commandment to love can only concern practi-
cal love, i.e. love of neighbour as active rational benevolence (see ch. 4.2.2). But
it seems that from the side of natural inclination-based love (which for Kant is
the more paradigmatic type of love) we still get a residue or a supplement,
which informs the kind of emotional state we should aim to approximate
when acting from duty: ‘To love God means, in this sense, to do what He com-
mands gladly; to love one’s neighbor means to practice all duties toward him
gladly.’ (C2, 5:83.12– 14)¹³ The idea of gladness in love for God retains a reference
 ‘Von den Triebfedern der reinen praktischen Vernunft’.
 ‘Denn es fordert doch als Gebot Achtung für ein Gesetz, das Liebe befiehlt, und überläßt es
nicht der beliebigen Wahl, sich diese zum Princip zu machen. Aber Liebe zu Gott als Neigung
(pathologische Liebe) ist unmöglich; denn er ist kein Gegenstand der Sinne.’
 ‘Gott lieben, heißt in dieser Bedeutung, seine Gebote gerne thun; den Nächsten lieben, heißt,
alle Pflicht gegen ihn gerne ausüben.’
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to inclination-based love in moral action. As noted above, however, there cannot
be a direct duty to be glad; rather, gladness is something for which we must
strive [streben]. The commandment to love God (and one’s neighbour) ‘presents
the moral disposition in its complete perfection’ (C2, 5:83.23–24)¹⁴, and were this
to be attained, the moral agent would not have any inclinations that run contrary
to the moral law. She would be fully inclined to do what morality commands in
every situation: she would always be moral gladly. Kant calls this ideal end state,
which he stresses is not attainable (C2, 5:84.1–2; 5:84.15) for finite imperfect crea-
tures like us, love for the law [Liebe zum Gesetze] (C2, 5:84.12).¹⁵ Love for God, or
the commandment to love God, thus involves recognising all duties as divine
commands and striving to approximate love for the moral law by aiming for
gladness in the fulfilment of duties. Love for God concerns one’s own moral per-
fection, which includes a glad, cheerful disposition. It prescribes the rational
ideal of the highest subjective moral good. But can we say that love for God
and love for the moral law are therefore the same thing?
If it is the case that love for God and love for the law are simply the same,
and that love for the law is an unattainable ideal, then it would follow that love
for God is also unattainable, not only with regard to feeling or inclination-based
love but also with regard to moral practice. It might be more charitable to as-
sume that there is a difference between the two notions, such that while love
for the law remains unattainable we can still speak of some kind of love for
God, in any such case where we are able to practice some duty gladly – that
is, from respect for the moral law but with an accompanying inclination towards
the particular action (or its result)¹⁶. But to answer the question properly, it is
necessary to investigate how love for God and love for the law are linked in
Kant’s works after the second Critique. I will do this by investigating the relevant
remarks from the Religion and the roughly contemporaneous Vigilantius lectures
on ethics.
There are two particularly relevant passages in the Religion that shed light
on this connection. Firstly, in a ‘General Comment’ [Allgemeine Anmerkung] to
the third book of the Religion, we find a familiar statement: ‘The highest goal,
however, of the moral perfection of finite creatures – never completely attainable
 ‘stellt […] die sittliche Gesinnung in ihrer ganzen Vollkommenheit dar’.
 Goy (2014, p. 19) is thus correct to note that in the second Critique the love commandment
results in an unattainable ideal.
 I leave open here whether the inclination concerns the action itself, the effect of the action,
or both. I don’t see evidence to warrant any strong response to this question.
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for human beings – is love of the law.’ (R, 6:145.17– 19)¹⁷ The brief remark does
not address love for God directly, but it is important to note that Kant here
uses the word ‘completely’ [völlig]. Love for the law is not completely attainable,
and hence it seems possible that it is attainable to some extent. But this still does
not answer the question about the relationship between love for God and love for
the law. Kant moves on in the immediately following paragraph to discuss God’s
love for human beings: ‘In conformity with this idea, the following would be a
principle of faith in religion: “God is love”’ (R, 6:145.21–22)¹⁸. This implies that
the idea of love for the law is in harmony with the principle of God’s being
love, or perhaps that the idea of love for the law should be understood in con-
junction with the idea that God is love. In either case, this ‘conformity’ is a rel-
evant finding and will be discussed in the latter half of this chapter.
There are three very strong readings of the above conjunction in the litera-
ture. Firstly, Sidney Axinn states that in the above passages of the Religion,
‘Kant’s interpretation of “God is love” is developed in terms of love of the
moral law.’ (Axinn 1994, p. 119) However, Axinn does not elaborate on this. Tak-
ing a similar position to Axinn’s, Bernard Reardon seems to hold that Kant equa-
tes love of the law with the notion that God is love: ‘To express this idea [love of
the law] in religious terms is, he thinks, to affirm that “God is love”’ (Reardon
1988, p. 143). Reardon correctly points out that God’s love is at least partly a re-
sponse to ‘man’s efforts to fulfil the holy law’ (Reardon 1988, p. 143), but I fail to
see how this (at least partial) interdependence of love of the law and the idea
that God is love makes it the case that the latter is simply a ‘religious expression’
of the former. The same objection can be put to Palmquist, who holds that ‘the
religious equivalent of the idea of “love of the moral law” is the “article of faith,
 ‘Das höchste, für Menschen nie völlig erreichbare Ziel der moralischen Vollkommenheit end-
licher Geschöpfe ist aber die Liebe des Gesetzes.’ DiCenso’s reading of the passage is in striking
contrast with the second Critique. According to DiCenso: ‘Learning to love the moral law means
maturing ethically to the point where we do not require external coercion to offset our predilec-
tion for maxims based on self-love.’ (DiCenso 2012, p. 197) In the second Critique, however, lov-
ing the moral law is dependent on having a thorough liking for what the moral law commands.
The criterion for love of the law in DiCenso’s interpretation is significantly less demanding: it
suffices that we do not require ‘external coercion’ for ‘offsetting’ the maxims of self-love, i.e.
in DiCenso’s reading the moral agent loves the law if she is mature enough to autonomously
override her maxims of self-love (without being forced to do so by others). But in this case
she could, by means of her own will (i.e. without external coercion), offset the predilection to
self-love but do it grudgingly. In my view, following the moral law autonomously but grudgingly
would hardly be love for the law (which somehow requires liking), and I have not found textual
evidence that would support DiCenso’s interpretation.
 ‘Dieser Idee gemäß würde es in der Religion ein Glaubensprincip sein: “Gott ist die Liebe”’.
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‘God is love’”.’ (Palmquist 2000, p. 261)¹⁹ It seems to me that in their readings
(which are immanent to the Religion) Axinn, Reardon, and Palmquist do not an-
alyse these two notions of love of God, i.e. love for God and love by God. It seems
completely possible, and even probable, that further evidence will show that
there is something in human striving for love of the law (or in human love for
God) that is not as such contained in God’s love, and vice versa, that there is
some element in God’s love that goes beyond human striving for love of the
law. We should not equate the two directions of love without careful and thor-
ough analysis. It should also be remembered that in the second Critique, the reg-
ulative ideal of loving the law is itself occasioned by the command to love God,
and hence the notion of loving the law is grounded in religious vocabulary. It
would thus be somewhat odd, in my opinion, to call God’s love the ‘religious ex-
pression’ or ‘religious equivalent’ of love for the law, as love for the law, too,
seems very much connected to an interpretation of Christian scripture. While
the commentators are right to note that love for the law and God’s love are ob-
viously linked (through the notion of conformity), in the light of textual evidence
love for the law and love for God seem even more tightly connected, as they are
both loves where the human being is the subject of love. In love for God and love
for the law, the object of love is ideal or ‘higher’ than human nature, i.e. both of
these loves have an ‘upward’ direction.
The second passage in the Religion concerns human love for God, but it also
relates implicitly to love for the law. In discussing service to God, Kant distin-
guishes between two doctrines that can be taught in relation to religion: ‘the doc-
trine of godliness’ [Gottseligkeitslehre]²⁰ and ‘the pure doctrine of virtue’ [die reine
 Perhaps we could make Axinn’s, Reardon’s, and Palmquist’s interpretations plausible by ap-
pealing to a subtle distinction in Kant’s terminology. In the second Critique, Kant uses the term
‘Liebe zum Gesetze’, whereas in the Religion he speaks of ‘Liebe des Gesetzes’, which translate
roughly to love for the law and love of the law, respectively. In the latter case, we could try to
argue that while the law is (ideally) an object of love, it is also somehow the subject of love.
Then we might understand God’s love in terms of love of the law. This position would equate
God with the moral law, and love of God in general would be subsumed under love flowing
to and from the moral law. However, I am not convinced by this argument, as it neglects several
passages where God and the moral law seem distinct – the argument seems to uncritically syn-
thesise too many things. Moreover, Axinn, Reardon, and Palmquist do not argue anything of the
sort. Further, there would still be two directions of love to be accounted for, and their relation-
ship would then be quite unclear.
 Gottseligkeit is not a modern German word, and according to the Adelung Dictionary it
means an endeavour [Bemühung] or an aptitude [Fertigkeit] to place God at the ground of
one’s entire conduct and to direct one’s actions to God’s honour [Ehre]. I thank Jens Timmer-
mann for drawing my attention to this.
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Tugendlehre] (R, 6:182.21–22). The latter should be the starting point of moral
and religious instruction, whereas the former serves ‘only as a means to strength-
en […] the virtuous attitude’ (R, 6:183.15– 16)²¹. The doctrine of godliness consists
of two moral attitudes – fear of God and love of God: ‘Fear of God is this attitude
in compliance with his commands from obligated (a subject’s) duty, i.e., from re-
spect for the law, but love of God is this attitude from one’s own free choice and
liking [Wohlgefallen] for the law (from filial duty).’ (R, 6:182.27–30)²²
In this context, love of God [Liebe Gottes] is clearly the human being’s love
for God. It is again distinguished from mere respect for the law and implies (in
addition to involving free choice) a ‘liking for the law’, which is described in
terms of Wohlgefallen. Further, the passage strongly suggests that insofar as
this liking for the law may indeed be interpreted in terms of love for the law
(as the common context of love for God implies), this love is love of delight.
The doctrine of godliness therefore seems to provide further evidence for the vi-
ability of the general division of love in the context of love for God.What is par-
ticularly interesting here, moreover, is that there is no mention of the unattain-
ability of this kind of love for God. Rather, in this context it seems possible that
we can love God by liking the law. If we now read this passage together with the
earlier passage from the Religion and the first passage from the second Critique,
what reveals itself is a scaling structure for the conceptual framework of love for
God, where love for God comes in degrees and only its highest stage is properly
called love for the law (which remains unattainable). Let us call this the scale of
love for God.
Recall that in the second Critique the command to love God prescribed the
ideal of practicing all duties gladly, which was unattainable (but there was no
claim that no duties could be practiced gladly). In the first passage of the Reli-
gion, love of the law is described as being not completely attainable, whereas
in the second passage love for God seems quite possible. The scale of love for
God thus has two extreme endpoints, between which the actuality of love for
God falls. At one end we have fear of God (or mere respect for the law), which
is the zero-point of love for God (there is no love present). At the other end we
have perfect love for God (i.e. love for the law), where all duties are subjectively
accompanied by a corresponding inclination. The normative end of progress on
this scale is a state where ‘dread changes into liking and respect into love’ (C2,
 ‘nur zum Mittel dienen […] die Tugendgesinnung, zu stärken’.
 ‘Furcht Gottes ist diese Gesinnung in Befolgung seiner Gebote aus schuldiger (Unterthans‐)
Pflicht, d.i. aus Achtung fürs Gesetz; Liebe Gottes aber aus eigener freier Wahl und aus Wohlge-
fallen am Gesetze (aus Kindespflicht).’ Pluhar’s translation.
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5:84.17– 19)²³. The actuality of love for God lies between these endpoints.²⁴ We
hereby arrive at a subtle distinction between love for God and love for the
law: love for God is any instance of liking the law, i.e. of doing one’s duty gladly,
whereas love for the law is the ideal and unattainable perfection of this dispo-
sition. In this way, despite our imperfections, it is nevertheless possible for us
to love God practically.²⁵
The Vigilantius notes on ethics appear to corroborate this general picture,
even though the criterion for loving the law is described slightly differently:
§143. Love towards God is the foundation of all inner religion.
The maxim of gladly following a law is love for the law itself, which presupposes a liber-
ation from the inclinations that hinder us from following it; and hence we do that very un-
willingly, so long as such contrary impulses are still to be found in us, representing an ob-
stacle to be overcome. (LE, 27:720.1–7)²⁶
Here, it seems to be the adoption of the maxim (to follow the moral law gladly)
that we ought to strive for in our attempt to approximate love for the law. Since
the maxim presupposes ‘liberation from the inclinations’, it is relatively clear
that it cannot be adopted perfectly. This finding seems to be consistent with
the accounts given in the second Critique and the Religion. It is also implied a
little further down that love of the law will remain an ideal, whereas love for
God may be relatively attained by conjoining a corresponding inclination to
the representation of particular duties: ‘so in love of the law there is no com-
mand, and the so-called categorical: Love God tells us no more than to base
our observance of laws, not merely on obedience […] but on an inclination in
conformity with what the law prescribes.’ (LE, 27:721.10– 14)²⁷ The notion that
love of the law is not associated with any command confirms that this ideal
 ‘verwandelt sich […] die […] Scheu in Zuneigung und Achtung in die Liebe’.
 This is not to suggest that there is a calculus for love for God in Kant; the idea is merely that
we have two idealised ends and a notion of progress that is being prescribed through an inter-
pretation of the love commandment, such that we are able to speak of less and more within this
context.
 I am grateful to Jens Timmermann for discussions that led me to arrive at this interpretation.
 ‘§143. Die Liebe gegen Gott ist das Fundament der ganzen innern Religion. Die Maxime, ein
Gesetz gern zu befolgen, ist Liebe fürs Gesetz selbst, welches eine Befreiung von den Neigungen
voraussetzt, die die Befolgung des Gesetzes behindern: und daher thut man es so lange überaus
ungern, als noch dergleichen Antriebe zum Gegentheil in uns sich finden, die ein zu überwin-
dendes Hinderniß sind.’
 ‘es liegt also in der Liebe des Gesetzes kein Gebot: und die sogenannte Categorie / liebe Gott
heißt nichts weiter als: die Befolgung der Gesetze nicht blos auf Gehorsam, […] sondern auf eine
mit der Vorschrift des Gesetzes übereinstimmende Neigung gründen.’
94 3 Love of God
end state involves the absence of inclinations contrary to morality. It is also im-
portant to note that in actual love for God there is no reversal of, or threat to, the
ground of morality: respect for the moral law remains the actual determining
ground of doing one’s duty, but in love for God moral action is also supported²⁸
by an inclination to execute the prescribed action (or achieve its outcome). For
example, we love God when we help others from duty while also feeling love for
them (‘love’ here meaning the inclination to benefit others or to derive sensible
pleasure from their happiness or their existence). But our love here, or our glad-
ness, is merely subjective and not the objective ground of our duty, and the pri-
mary function of this love, from a moral philosophical perspective, is to promote
the happiness of others and aid humanity with respect to moral progress.
In sum, love for God is the glad practice of duty (in a religious context where
duties are viewed as divine commands). Love for God is closely linked (but not
identical) to the ideal of love of the law, which is love of delight for all of one’s
duties (implying the complete absence of contra-moral inclinations). Ideal love
for the law is also the equivalent of perfect love for God. The actuality of love
for God thus falls between two endpoints: a state with no love and a state of per-
fect love. Reason demands that the agent strive to make progress on this contin-
uum toward perfect love for God or for the law. The picture of such an ascent can
therefore be called the scale of love for God.
3.2 God’s Love
I now turn to God’s love for human beings. My main aim will be to clarify the role
of the general division of love in this context. Once this is clarified, it will be eas-
ier to assess the relationship between God’s love for human beings and human
beings’ love for God. There are two distinct accounts of God’s love in the Kantian
corpus, one in the Religion and another in The Metaphysics of Morals (the latter is
corroborated by the Vigilantius notes on ethics). At the outset, it may seem that
these accounts have little in common (and Kant does not discuss them in direct
conjunction with each other). I will show, however, that these two accounts may
in fact be harmonised by using the general division of love as an interpretative
tool. In other words, I will show how the accounts are distinct from each other in
terms of the general division and that they may therefore be seen to complement
 Based on the Groundwork and the second Critique, we know that our observance of or com-
pliance with our duties should not be based on inclinations. In this light, the word ‘gründen’ (to
‘ground’ or to ‘base’) in the Vigilantius passage above (LE, 27:721.10–14) seems simply too
strong, even if we think that this grounding is to be understood merely in a subjective sense.
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each other, thus yielding an overall picture of God’s love in Kant. I shall term the
accounts the end account of God’s love and the ground account of God’s love.
The rather striking dynamic structure that emerges from this analysis reveals
God’s love of benevolence as the ground of human love for God (and human love
for one’s neighbour), such that human love for God is dependent on God’s love
and aims to reciprocate it by means of the glad fulfilment of duties. At its highest
stage, this human striving connects seamlessly with the other aspect of God’s
love, moral delight, which is something we can only hope for in our morally im-
perfect state of existence. God’s love is therefore both the ground of and a re-
sponse to human love for God, in accordance with the general division of
love. In other words, with God’s love the beginning and the end of an ascending
structure of love are marked in terms of the general division of love.
3.2.1 The End Account
The Religion is filled with statements asserting or implying that a key element of
religion is to aim to become pleasing to God [Gott wohlgefällig zu werden] by
means of morally good life conduct (see R, 6:47.19; 6:66.21–22; 6:67.15;
6:71.28–29fn.; 6:73.14– 15; 6:75.5–6; 6:105.1; 6:116.11– 12; 6:117; 6:120.10– 12;
6:133.6; 6.159.14; 6:170– 175; 6:177– 178; 6:193.19; 6:195.35fn.; 6:198.9– 10). Kant re-
peatedly affirms that the primary example or archetype of a human being who is
pleasing to God is God’s son, Jesus Christ, in whom we encounter a rational
model of humanity in its perfection (see R, 6:60.14; 6:61.25; 6:62.3; 6:62.29–30;
6:63.24–25; 6:64.7; 6:119.7; 6:128.18– 129.1; see also GW, 408.28–409.9). Given
the features of human love for God discussed above, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that from a religious perspective the good life conduct we ought to aim for
is precisely love for God. But the real question is whether the pleasure or delight
[Wohlgefallen] of God to which good conduct hopefully or ideally leads can be
cashed out in terms of love. If it can – if good conduct leads to God’s loving
us with delight – is that the whole picture when it comes to God’s love, or is
there more to it?
The evidence directly connecting God’s delight with the notion of God’s love
can be found at the end of the third book of the Religion, immediately following
Kant’s assertion that love of the law is the highest (but never completely attain-
able) goal of human moral striving. God’s love is said to be in conformity with
what was said about love for the law, and it is discussed in terms of the Trinity:
In conformity with this idea, the following would be a principle of faith in religion: ‘God is
Love’; in him one can venerate the loving one (with his love of moral delight for human
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beings insofar as they are adequate to his holy law), the Father; in him, furthermore, insofar
as he exhibits himself in his all-preserving idea, humanity’s archetype begotten and be-
loved by him, one can venerate his Son; finally also, insofar as he limits this delight to
the condition that human beings harmonize with the condition of that love of delight,
and thereby proves it to be a love based on wisdom, one can venerate the Holy Spirit (R,
145.20– 146.1)²⁹.
This passage clearly confirms the connection between God’s love and God’s de-
light. In other words, in conformity with the regulative ideal of love of the law,
God’s love is to be understood in terms of love of delight. In his analysis, Kant
utilises a tripartite structure for God, which at bottom is standard Christian
dogma and which he had already briefly mentioned in his own mature frame-
work in the second Critique.³⁰ In the Religion, Kant views the three main attrib-
utes of God as expressing God’s ‘moral conduct’ [das moralische Verhalten] (R,
6:140.2) towards humankind. First, as ‘holy lawgiver’, God gives humanity the
moral laws. Second, as a ‘benign ruler’, he accounts for the moral constitution
of humans and compensates for their moral inabilities. Third, as ‘just judge’,
he limits his compensation with the condition that humans have tried their
best to be moral. (R, 6:141.9–25)
In the long passage quoted above, this tripartite structure is mapped onto
the names ‘Father’, ‘Son’, and ‘Holy Spirit’. In harmony with the notion that
‘God is love’, Kant’s discussion assumes that love somehow encompasses all
three attributes. First, insofar as human beings are adequate to the holy law/
moral law, God is morally pleased with them, i.e. he loves human beings with
the love of moral delight. Second, he loves the archetype or the rational ideal
of human moral perfection as his ‘Son’. Third, as the ‘Holy Spirit’, he limits
his love of moral delight so that human beings must ‘harmonize with the condi-
tion of that love’. On the face of it, it seems especially difficult to draw a mean-
 ‘Dieser Idee gemäß würde es in der Religion ein Glaubensprincip sein: “Gott ist die Liebe”;
in ihm kann man den Liebenden (mit der Liebe des moralischen Wohlgefallens an Menschen, so
fern sie seinem heiligen Gesetze adäquat sind), den Vater; ferner in ihm, so fern er sich in seiner
alles erhaltenden Idee, dem von ihm selbst gezeugten und geliebten Urbilde der Menschheit dar-
stellt, seinen Sohn; endlich auch, so fern er dieses Wohlgefallen auf die Bedingung der Überein-
stimmung der Menschen mit der Bedingung jener Liebe des Wohlgefallens einschränkt und da-
durch als auf Weisheit gegründete Liebe beweist, den heiligen Geist verehren’. Pluhar’s
translation, but rendering Wohlgefallen as ‘delight’ instead of ‘pleasure’.
 In the second Critique, Kant mentions in passing the three main attributes of God, which are
all moral. He is holy [heilig], blessed [selig], and wise [weise]. In acting from the first attribute,
God creates the world and gives the moral law; in acting from the second, he governs and pre-
serves the world with goodness or benignity [gütigkeit]; and in acting from the third, he judges
human beings (C2, 5:131.32–38; cf. R, 6:139.22–27; see also LE, 27:306).
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ingful distinction between the first and the third attributes, but in a long and ob-
scure footnote Kant explains that the judgment of the ‘Holy Spirit’ is connected
to one’s conscience (R, 6:146.5–20). As noted by Palmquist, the ‘Holy Spirit’
brings with it a first-person perspective on measuring up to the condition of
God’s love (see Palmquist 2000, p. 262). But in the footnote the ‘Son’ also judges:
he judges between people, based on their being capable of morality or being re-
ceptive to the possibility of acquiring moral merit (R, 6:145.29– 146.4). The details
of Kant’s account of the Trinity as love are elusive, but fortunately, the success of
my argument does not depend on the correct exegetical interpretation concern-
ing these relationships.³¹
What is essential here is that in the Religion, the idea that ‘God is love’ is
discussed in terms of love of delight, and this love by God for human beings
is somehow dependent on the moral striving of humans. This is how ‘God is
love’ is in ‘conformity’ with love for the law. But God’s love for us is not guaran-
teed. If we interpret God’s conditional response of love in the general context of
the delight he takes in us, it seems that the condition of this morally approving
love, a love we may at best hope for, is our sincere attempt to become morally
better: ‘everyone must do as much as is in his powers in order to become a better
human being’ (R, 6:52.2–3³²; see also e.g. 6:66.21–67.12). If we adopt a moral at-
titude, the adoption of which Kant also describes as a ‘change of heart’ [Änder-
ung des Herzens] (R, 6:47.28), and strive to approximate love for the law, we will
be entitled to the hope that this striving will eventually be met with God’s mo-
rally approving love for us. In other words, God’s love for humans, as love of de-
light, is a conditioned response to the human moral endeavour to approximate
love for the law – that is, it is a response to the human attempt to gladly fulfil
moral duties (viewed as divine commands).
I therefore call this account of God’s love the end account, since it is a love
that we may hope for in the end, provided we do our best to love God in the
 In The Conflict of the Faculties [Der Streit der Fakultäten], written slightly after the Religion
and published in 1798, Kant himself complains in passing that reason cannot keep up with
the text of the Bible when it comes to the Trinity (7:23.25–28). He now holds that, as such,
the doctrine of the Trinity is devoid of practical significance (7:38.33–34), but it may (or even
must) be interpreted through practical reason (7:38.28–32). However, contrary to Samuel Powell
(who makes his claim without any textual evidence), the Religion makes clear that Kant does not
‘dismiss’ the doctrine of the Trinity ‘as idle’ (see Powell 2011, p. 268). It is equally not the case
that Kant viewed the Trinity as being ‘outside the scope of Christian faith’ (O’Regan 2011, p. 254).
Rather, Kant is attempting a moral-rational interpretation of the Trinity. For a more optimistic/
affirmative discussion on Kant’s relationship with the Trinity, see Palmquist (2000, pp. 466–
467).
 ‘ein jeder so viel, als in seinen Kräften ist, thun müsse, um ein besserer Mensch zu werden’.
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meantime. Admittedly, the English word ‘end’ is ambiguous between a purpose
and the last point of a temporal series.³³ For Kant, the relevant terms in this re-
spect are Zweck and Ende, the first referring to a purpose and the second to a
temporal end (see also Pluhar, fn.c, in R, 6:35). I intend the end account of
God’s love to be taken in both senses. By this I mean that the ‘end’ under discus-
sion in the context of God’s love is his love of moral delight for human beings.
This love is both the religious purpose of our moral striving and the (quasi‐)tem-
poral end of the temporal series (hopefully) connected to this striving. In gener-
al, we know that in Kant morality leads to religion, and the idea of God’s love is
required for us to hope that the end of the highest good (in the sense of purpose
or Zweck) will be realised. Insofar as God’s love of moral delight is lacking, we
clearly have yet to attain the highest good. In religious terms, our end, i.e. our
purpose, is that God will love us with the love of moral delight. But this picture
is tightly connected to a further meaning of God’s love of delight as the (quasi‐)
temporal end of human moral striving. Despite any possible ‘change of heart’, in
this life our moral striving will remain deficient.We are imperfect by nature and
can only gradually approximate moral perfection, which means that at any given
point in time we will not have reached the moral ideal of humanity that would
be pleasing [wohlgefällig] to God (R, 6:66–67). According to Kant, however, God
judges the ‘heart’ (R, 6:48.4– 16), or the fundamental ‘attitude’ [Gesinnung] of the
human being, as a ‘unity of time’ [Zeiteinheit] that is not divided into time seg-
ments (R, 6:70.fn) but is rather a ‘perfected whole’ [vollendet Ganze] (R,
6:67.13). This kind of perspective of eternity is not easy to understand, and
Kant acknowledges that the (religious) notion of a temporal ‘end of all things’
is theoretically incomprehensible (see Kant’s essay by the same name in
8:327–339; see also my Conclusion). We can only hope that our moral striving
will be met with God’s delighted love at the incomprehensible completion of
the temporal series, where God will hopefully compensate for our lack of perfec-
tion by means of grace (see e.g. R, 6:118– 120)³⁴. By this I mean that while God’s
love of moral delight is the purpose of our moral striving from a particular reli-
gious perspective, this same love is also the hoped-for (temporal) end of the tem-
 I thank Rae Langton for reminding me of this.
 A very interesting question, but one that cannot be pursued here any more explicitly, is
whether Kant’s account of grace should actually be analysed in terms of God’s love. My findings
certainly seem to point in that direction, or at least in the direction that in the light of textual
evidence, it is plausible to assume such a link between God’s grace and God’s love. However,
as Kant is not explicit about this link and does not elaborate on it more than I have shown,
it is understandable that the previous commentators on grace don’t discuss this connection
(see e.g. Vanden Auweele 2014 and Stevenson 2014).
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poral series related to moral striving. The reason for this is that in the religious
picture, nothing comes after God’s perfect love of moral delight for human be-
ings. In this way, God’s love of delight can be seen to mark a transition from
time to eternity (see 8:327), signifying salvation and eternal bliss. Of course,
nothing of this can be known theoretically, but in ‘The End of All Things’ Kant
playfully envisions the heavenly congregation ‘as striking up always the same
song, their “Alleluia!” […] by which is indicated the total lack of all change in
their state.’ (8:335.1–3)³⁵ According to Kant, at the end of temporal alteration
‘the last thought, the last feeling in the thinking subject will then remain forever
the same without any change.’ (8:334.29–30)³⁶ If God is love (as the Religion sug-
gests), and if the purpose of God’s love as moral delight is achieved, the last
thought or the last feeling (be it in God or in the human being) can only be
the very same love that is achieved. To put it simply, if we sincerely strive to be-
come more moral, we may hope for God’s love of delight in the sense that ‘all’s
well that ends well’ [Ende gut, alles gut] (see R, 6:70fn.; 6:77.36).
3.2.2 The Ground Account
In The Metaphysics of Morals, we find a distinctly different account of God’s love.
The main point of the concluding remark of the entire work is that religion lies
beyond ethics. Since the idea of God is man-made, our duty toward God is, ethi-
cally speaking, ‘a duty of a human being to himself […], for the sake of strength-
ening the moral incentive in our own lawgiving reason.’ (MM, 6.487.22–25)³⁷ In
this context Kant continues his discussion of the moral attributes of God (includ-
ing God’s love):
The divine end with regard to the human race (in creating and guiding it) can be thought
only as proceeding from love, that is, as the happiness of human beings. […] To express this
in human terms, God has created rational beings from the need, as it were, to have some-
thing outside himself which he could love or by which he could also be loved. (MM,
6.488.26–35)³⁸
 ‘immer dasselbe Lied, ihr Hallelujah, […] anstimmen […] wodurch der gänzliche Mangel alles
Wechsels in ihrem Zustande angezeigt werden soll.’
 ‘der letzte Gedanke, das letzte Gefühl bleiben alsdann in dem denkenden Subject stehend
und ohne Wechsel immer dieselben.’
 ‘Pflicht des Menschen gegen sich selbst, […] zur Stärkung der moralischen Triebfeder in uns-
erer eigenen gesetzgebenden Vernunft.’
 ‘Den göttlichen Zweck in Ansehung des menschlichen Geschlechts (dessen Schöpfung und
Leitung) kann man sich nicht anders denken, als nur aus Liebe, d.i. daß er die Glückseligkeit der
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Here, God’s love is presented as the ground of the existence of the human race.
The divine end related to this love is the happiness of human beings. The con-
nection between God’s love and human happiness in this context seems strongly
to imply that this love is the love of benevolence, as we know from the cases of
self-love and love of neighbour that love of benevolence has precisely the hap-
piness of the object of love as its end. In other words, if we view the ground of
creation through the notion that God is love, it makes sense to assume that it is
God’s love of benevolence that yields the moral commandments, through which
God wants us to be happy and wants us to love him back. But the problem with
this interpretation is that love of benevolence is not mentioned in this context. It
is unclear what kind of love Kant is talking about.
There is another passage at the end of the conclusion that sheds light on this
issue. Kant’s problem is now how to harmonise God’s justice (or right) with his
love with regard to the end or purpose of the human race. Basically, if God is
omnipotent and the ground of creation is God’s love, then in the end all
human beings will be happy. But Kant sees this as contradicting some of the
deepest commitments of his moral philosophy, namely that happiness can
only be morally proportioned according to virtue. There are, Kant thinks, crimi-
nals who do not deserve to be happy, in which case God’s love and God’s justice
seem to conflict:³⁹
punitive justice would make the end of creation consist not in the creator’s love (as one
must yet think it to be) but rather in the strict observance of his right […]. But since the lat-
ter (justice) is only the condition limiting the former (kindness), this seems to contradict
principles of practical reason, by which the creation of a world must have been omitted
if it would have produced a result so contrary to the intention of its author, which can
have only love for its basis. (MM, 6.490.21–491.4)⁴⁰
Menschen sei. […] Mann könnte sich (nach Menschenart) auch so ausdrücken: Gott hat vernünf-
tige Wesen erschaffen, gleichsam aus dem Bedürfnisse etwas außer sich zu haben, was er lieben
könne, oder auch von dem er geliebt werde.’
 This is of course one of the classical problems of Christian theology: how can an omnipotent
and omnibenevolent God send certain people to hell for eternal damnation and suffering?
 ‘würde die Strafgerechtigkeit den Zweck der Schöpfung nicht in der Liebe des Welturhebers
(wie man sich doch denken muß), sondern in der strengen Befolgung des Rechts setzen […],
welches, da das Letztere (die Gerechtigkeit) nur die einschränkende Bedingung des Ersteren
(der Gütigkeit) ist, den Principien der praktischen Vernunft zu widersprechen scheint, nach wel-
chen eine Weltschöpfung hätte unterbleiben müssen, die ein der Absicht ihres Urhebers, die nur
Liebe zum Grunde haben kann, so widerstreitendes Product geliefert haben würde.’ Translation
modified.
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From this Kant concludes that in ethics, the moral relation between God and
human beings is incomprehensible, and therefore ethics can only concern rela-
tions between human beings. (MM, 6:491) There are no duties toward God (see
also MM, 6:443–444). This does not mean, however, that Kant renounces the
postulate of God. He merely delineates the sphere of ethics so as to keep it clear-
ly separate from religion. God remains a practical postulate that entitles us to
hope for the complete highest good, even though just how God can or will
help to bring about the highest good cannot be rationally made sense of in eth-
ics.With this said, from my interpretative perspective it now seems clear that in
the concluding argument of The Metaphysics of Morals Kant does indeed appeal
to what can be called the ground account of God’s love. In the latter passage
quoted above, the contradiction between God’s punitive justice and his love re-
lies precisely on the idea that God’s original intention in creating the world ‘can
have only love for its basis’. These two passages in The Metaphysics of Morals,
compared with the discussion in the Religion, are enough to warrant the claim
that there are two distinct accounts of God’s love in Kant’s works: the ground
account and the end account. But even though they are discernible from each
other with respect to the quasi-temporal structure of God’s creation, it is still un-
clear whether they can be distinguished in terms of the general division of love.
The end account of God’s love in the Religion clearly concerns love of delight, but
the ground account in The Metaphysics of Morals merely implies that the love at
issue is perhaps love of benevolence. However, a strong case for this interpreta-
tion can be made by using the Vigilantius lecture notes as an auxiliary source.
In the Vigilantius notes, God’s love is discussed not in terms of delight (as in
the Religion) but explicitly in terms of benevolence. Kant’s treatment is again in-
timately connected with love for God and the notion of loving the law. However,
unlike in the Religion, God’s love is presented here not as a response to our moral
striving but as a ‘necessary presupposition’ of our love for God. In the Vigilantius
notes, the picture is that by loving God we return or give back our love in re-
sponse to God’s original love for us: ‘If we are to think, morally, that we love
God, then it is necessary for us to presuppose His love for us, and His will for
our well-being, or His loving-kindness. For no return of love can be elicited
there, if the command to that effect does not itself arise from moral love.’ (LE
27.720.18–22)⁴¹
 ‘Sollen wir uns moralisch denken, daß wir Gott lieben, so ist notwendig, daß wir seine Liebe
gegen uns und seinen Willen für unser Wohl oder seine Güte voraussetzen. Denn es läßt sich da
nicht Gegenliebe erzwingen, wenn das Gebot dazu nicht aus der moralischen Liebe selbst en-
tspringt.’
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This looks very much like an elaboration of the idea in The Metaphysics of
Morals, according to which God created us to have something to love or ‘by
which he could also be loved’ (MM, 6:488.35). In the Vigilantius notes, the
idea is that in order for it to be possible for us to love God, the source of the di-
vine command must itself be ‘moral love’ [moralische Liebe]. In other words, the
commandment that we love God is here portrayed as being grounded in God’s
moral love.⁴² What is this moral love? Given that God’s love for us is described
in the Religion as love of moral delight, it is safe to say that this love is moral. But
there is no mention of Wohlgefallen in this context in the Vigilantius lectures,
and the source of the moral love now at issue is linked to God’s will [Wille]
for our well-being [Wohl]⁴³ and his loving kindness [Güte]. The fact that God’s
moral love is here discussed in terms of God’s wanting things to go well for
us (implying our happiness as the end of that love) suggests that the love at
issue might instead be the love of benevolence. This suspicion is confirmed
only a few lines down:
God’s love for us (also expressed by the words: God is love) is thus the divine benevolence
and kindness toward us, which constitutes the foundation of the potestas legislatoria div-
ina. Now to return that love is the corresponding duty of all His subjects, and constitutes
the prime source of any disposition to religion. But this love of God can be known only
through our reason (LE, 27:721.1–6)⁴⁴.
This both differentiates the account from the one given in the Religion and sup-
ports the interpretation according to which God’s love in The Metaphysics of Mo-
rals can be viewed as love of benevolence (see also 28:1114). It also shows the
two-directionality of love of God: here, love of God is God’s love. There is no
 This point is well noted by Moors (2007, pp. 257–259), but he goes so far as to claim that the
duty of love is thereby grounded in an ‘originating theologico-metaphysical basis’ (Moors 2007,
p. 259). Moors may not fully appreciate the basic point that for Kant, religion is very much about
viewing our duties as divine commands, and the notion of God is a rational idea derived from
moral reason. I would thus be wary of talking about a ‘theologico-metaphysical basis’ of any-
thing in Kant. In the Vigilantius notes, for instance, just before the passage in question, Kant
states that ‘[i]t is easy to see that for man there is no way left, but that of fashioning his own
God on the basis of morality.’ (LE, 27:719.37–38) / ‘Man sieht leicht, daß für den Menschen
kein Weg überbleibt, als sich auf dem Grunde der Moral seinen eigenen Gott zu machen.’
 This must mean our overall moral-physical well-being.
 ‘Die Liebe Gottes gegen uns (oder welches man auch ausdrückt: Gott ist die Liebe) ist also
das göttliche Wohlwollen und Güte gegen uns, die das Fundament der potestatis legislatoriae
divinae ausmacht. Die Gegenliebe ist nun die correspondirende Pflicht aller Untergebenen
und macht die erste Quelle aller Religionsgesinnung aus. Diese Liebe Gottes kann aber nur
durch unsere Vernunft erkannt […] werden.’
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question as to the apparent difference in terminology between how God’s love is
discussed in the Religion and in the Vigilantius notes on ethics. In the former, it
is love of delight; in the latter, love of benevolence. Indeed, the Vigilantius notes
are highly consistent with The Metaphysics of Morals. In both texts, God’s love for
us is viewed as logically prior to our love for God: God’s love is seen as the
ground of our love for God. As noted above, I don’t see any reason for therefore
viewing the ground account and the end account as contradictory. Rather, the
existence of these accounts suggests that even though Kant didn’t analyse the re-
lationship between the two aspects of the general division of love in the context
of God, he in fact made use of the division. In the Religion, God’s love of delight
is viewed as a response to our love for God, whereas in the Vigilantius notes
God’s love of benevolence is viewed as prior to the commandment to love
God. In the Vigilantius notes, our love for God is a response to God’s love of be-
nevolence. The existence of the end account and the ground account of God’s
love further corroborates the plausibility of the general division approach to
Kant on love.
Thus, the general picture of God’s love is that God’s love of benevolence is
the ground of creation and the ground of the duty to love God by practicing
moral duties gladly. God’s love of moral delight is the loving response we may
hope for in the end if we do our best to be moral gladly, i.e. if we love God
and strive to love the law. We may call this general picture the ascent model of
love of God (see fig. 4). God’s benevolent love lies at the basis of the existence
of the world, and God’s delighted love is hoped for at the end of human
moral progress. Actual human love for God takes place between these two as-
pects of God’s love, with the implied prescription to ascend higher through
moral striving. Even though questions remain about the relationship between
God’s love and God’s justice, the evidence thus suggests that an unqualified neg-
ative claim such as Goy’s, that Kant’s God ‘is not a loving god’ (Goy 2014, p. 23),
is implausible. Kant’s God is indeed a loving God (in harmony with Wood 1970,
p. 248).⁴⁵
 Timmermann has expressed (in private discussion) an interesting worry with respect to love
of God: If, as I have shown, love of God includes two-directionality, then maybe there is no such
thing as love of God, as it includes two subjects (God and the human being) and two objects (the
same two) that are not on par with each other. In one sense God is an object of love, and in an-
other sense he is the subject of love, and the same holds for the human being. Perhaps this
means that we should put love of God in scare quotes: ‘love of God’. Maybe so, but only if
we think that an aspect of love (without scare quotes, that is) cannot be fundamentally ambig-
uous, and of this point I’m not convinced.We may accept that in a given linguistic community or
research framework the ambiguities related to an aspect of love are sufficiently standard or nor-
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3.3 Is Love of God Self-Love?
Before concluding this chapter, I would like to address a further question, which
has until now been lurking in the background of my discussion. This question
concerns the relationship between love of God and the self.
If one takes a panoptic view of the various statements about God in Kant’s
major writings from the critical period (mainly in the three Critiques, the Religion,
h i g h e s t g o o d
God’s love (love of delight)
love for the law (regulative ideal)
m o r a l i t y n a t u r e
love for God (glad practice of duty) gladness
(inclination
corresponding with duty)
God’s love (love of benevolence)
s u p e r s e n s i b l e g r o u n d o f b e i n g
Figure 4. The Ascent Model of Love of God
mal to warrant talk of that aspect without inverted commas.We may clarify ambiguities without
irony or scepticism with respect to the way a culturally acknowledged aspect of love appears in
the writings of a historical philosopher. The dynamic Kantian picture of love of God begins with
God’s benevolent love creating human beings (and giving them duties), who then return God’s
love via the glad practice of duties.When God has received his own love back, he loves his cre-
ation with delight. Of course, the whole business of love of God becomes morally reduced to
ideas that reason gives to itself. But the picture is structurally similar to the reciprocal self-sur-
render we see in sexual love and love in friendship, where one gives oneself to the other and
then gets oneself back through the other’s love (see LE, 27:388.23–37; cf. 27:423.37–424.6).
Sure, love of God is a special case because it refers to a transcendent being. But we could
not see this interesting similarity (with regards to giving oneself or one’s love and then being
loved back in return) between these aspects of love if we didn’t accept love of God as an aspect
of love in all its ambiguity.
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and The Metaphysics of Morals), one gets the impression that there is a certain
amount of ambiguity as to the place of God in the logical structure of the Kantian
universe. It is clear from the first Critique that we may have no theoretical knowl-
edge of God, but that God is nevertheless a morally necessary assumption de-
rived from the practical necessity of the efficacy of moral laws in the world.
(C1, A811/B839–A819/B847) In other words, if the moral law is to ultimately
have its final effect (virtue accompanied by proportionate happiness) necessarily,
then we must assume the existence of God as the first cause of the world.⁴⁶ For
Kant, a perfect effect requires a perfect cause.⁴⁷ It is also relatively clear from the
second Critique and The Metaphysics of Morals that the concept of God in Kant is
derived from or based on moral reason. Or, in the terminology of the third
Critique: on the basis of the final purpose of the highest good (visible even to
‘the commonest reason’ [die gemeinste Menschenvernunft] (C3, 5:448.30)), God
is judged to be the moral cause of the world (C3, 5:450). Again, this argument
does not provide us with any theoretical insight into God and ultimately rests
on our prior awareness of morality.⁴⁸ All in all, Kant clearly holds that if all ra-
tional creatures are to become morally happy (as reason dictates), God must be
postulated.
What is less clear, however, is whether we are to assume, with the practical
postulate of God, that God is something external to our reason or merely a prod-
uct of our reason. It seems that in order for us to have faith or even hope that God
will eventually supplement our imperfections, and thus occasion the complete
highest good, we must believe that God is irreducible to our own being, which
by definition consists of moral imperfection. On the other hand, toward the
 In the first Critique, Kant thinks that without the assumption of God, moral laws would be
‘idle chimeras’ [leere Hirngespinste] (C1, A811/B839). In the third Critique, however, it seems that
the moral law is still binding even if God is not assumed to exist – the drawback to not postu-
lating his existence being that we then cannot aim for the complete highest good as the moral
happiness of all rational creatures (C3, 5:451).
 See e.g. C2, 5:124. This sort of position, I believe, was widely shared among generations of
Scholastic philosophers and is clearly visible in Kant’s close predecessors, e.g. Descartes (see
Russell 1945, p. 567) and Berkeley.
 In more elaborate terms, this is close to what Kant means when he speaks of God, or love of
God for that matter, in terms of the notion of a schematism of analogy. For instance, when we
discuss God’s love in terms of his sacrifice of his son,we are not expanding theoretical cognition
but merely elucidating a concept that is otherwise incomprehensible to our reason. This kind of
endeavour takes place for purposes that are ultimately moral. (See R, 6:65fn.) In the technical
jargon of the third Critique, such a procedure is called ‘symbolic hypotyposis’ (C3, 5:351),
which serves what Kant in that work terms ‘ethicotheology’ (C3, 5:484–485). I thank Dieter
Schönecker for reminding me of the notion of analogy in the context of love of God.
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end of Kant’s philosophical career we find increasingly strong statements con-
cerning the mind-dependence of God. According to the Vigilantius notes on eth-
ics, human beings can but ‘fashion’ or make [machen] their ‘own God on the
basis of morality’ (LE, 27:719.37–38)⁴⁹. In The Metaphysics of Morals the idea
of God is something that reason ‘makes for itself ’ (MM, 6:487.11)⁵⁰. And in the
Opus Postumum, where Kant explicitly asks whether the idea of God ‘has reality
or whether it is a mere thought-object’ (22:117.8)⁵¹, he consistently holds that God
is not a substance or a being outside of man (22:52.11– 12; 22:55.10– 11;
22:60.15–16; 22:123.1) but rather an idea of pure reason (22:53.1–2).⁵²
Now I do not wish to make any conclusive interpretative claim as to what
Kant thought about the existence of God, but I do think that insofar as God is
an idea of reason based on what he must be like in order for the highest good
to be possible, we must think that our conceptions of the relations of love be-
tween God and human beings are given to us by our reason. There is a sense
in which love of God is essentially dependent on and derived from the workings
of the human mind. It is this point, I think, that occasions Moors’s claim that
love of God is actually self-love. I find this idea highly intriguing and wish to con-
sider it carefully.
Moors argues that since love for God involves ‘the moral command of glad-
ness’, love of God is turned into a love ‘one has to have for one’s own purified
heart’ (Moors 2007, p. 256). Moors then picks up the definition of love of delight
for oneself from the Religion and claims (I take it) that since this love for oneself
denotes a contentment following the subordination of one’s maxims to the moral
law, ‘love of God is indeed nothing but this egocentric, rationally sublimated var-
iation of amor complacentiae (a morally sublimated Liebe des Wohlgefallens an
sich selbst).’ (Moors 2007, p. 257) I think we ought to begin by noting that by love
of God Moors means love for God (his argument doesn’t seem to be meant to
apply to love of God as two-directional). From this perspective Moors is moving
in the right direction but only to the extent that love for God is mainly about our
own moral perfection.
 ‘auf dem Grunde der Moral seinen eigenen Gott zu Machen.’
 ‘sie sich selber macht.’
 ‘Realität habe oder blos ein Gedankending […] sey’.
 It is of course possible to contest the relevance of the Opus Postumum as a source. These are
posthumously published fragmentary notes from a period when Kant’s mental capacity was al-
ready waning. Depending on the context, I would argue that we should give the Opus Postumum
roughly similar weight as the lecture notes. In this case, the Vigilantius notes and the Opus Post-
umum support each other.
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Strictly speaking, love for God cannot be equated to moral self-love. The rea-
son for this is that Kant’s adverb ‘gladly’ and the notion of ‘contentment’ [Zufrie-
denheit], the latter of which is characteristic of moral self-love, do not denote the
same thing, which technically excludes the possibility of equating these two
loves. The indirect imperative to strive for gladness in the practice of duty
seems to imply a liking for the actions or the effects of the actions, whereas Zu-
friedenheit is, I would argue, a state of (negative) self-satisfaction that stems from
consciousness of one’s ability to override maxims of self-love (maxims of love of
benevolence for oneself). It is true that love for God may bring about moral love
of delight for oneself (even though Kant himself doubts the relevance of the term
‘self-love’ in this context in the Religion). There is, however, a basic difference
between love for God and love of delight for oneself: love for God is very
much about striving (for gladness in the fulfilment of duties), whereas love of de-
light for oneself is very much about contentment (in respect for the moral law).
They are not exactly the same thing, and it is also very important to note that
neither notion is ‘egocentric’, at least in the sense of ‘caring too much about
yourself and not about other people’⁵³. On the contrary, love for God depends
on the laborious cultivation of other-regarding attitudes, and moral self-love re-
lies on our capacity to override selfish maxims through respect for the moral law.
3.4 The Ascent of Love of God
In this chapter, I have argued for a two-directionality thesis of love of God accord-
ing to which love of God consists of human beings’ love for God on the one hand
and God’s love for human beings on the other. I pointed out that love for God can
be analysed in terms of a scale, where fear of God (or mere respect for the moral
law) denotes the zero-point of love for God, and love for the moral law is an un-
attainable endpoint of love for God, prescribed to us via a moral philosophical
interpretation of the Christian commandment. The actuality of love for God
lies between these endpoints and consists in practicing moral duties (viewed
as divine commands) gladly.
I also showed that God’s love can be analysed in terms of the general divi-
sion of love. That is, it can be divided into a ground account and an end account,
such that from a religious perspective the ground of creation and moral duties is
God’s love of benevolence (which also grounds the moral duty to love God). In
the end, the sincere agent can hope that her moral striving to love God (and the
 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
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moral law), understood in terms of a moral ascent, will be met with God’s love of
moral delight.
While the place of God (and its relation to the self) in the Kantian universe
remains somewhat ambiguous, it is clear that the idea of God is a product of
human reason for the purposes of securing hope for the highest good. It does
not follow from this, however, that love of God is to be equated with moral
self-love. In sum, the overall analysis yields an ascent model of love of God.
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4 Love of Neighbour
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the notion of love of neighbour [Nächsten-
liebe] in Kant’s moral philosophy, focusing on the published works from the ma-
ture period. As was the case with the earlier chapters, although the literature
does contain discussions related to this topic, there has not been a detailed ex-
amination of what Kant means when he speaks of loving one’s neighbour and
what kind of role the notion plays in his ethical thought.
Based on the work of previous commentators, we now know that even
though the duties of love we have to others may be less fundamental than duties
of respect, they are vital for Kantian ethics (Baron & Fahmy 2009, p. 226). Fur-
ther, it has been shown that Kantian practical love is not reducible to benefi-
cence but involves the cultivation of benevolent attitudes (Fahmy 2010). We
are also aware that love in Kant’s virtue ethics is (at least in part) a kind of
moral emotion that plays a secondary role (Horn 2008, p. 173), and that Kant’s
account of this moral emotion is developed in conjunction with the biblical com-
mandments (Goy 2014). A part of love of neighbour is a natural predisposition
necessary for one’s subjective receptivity to duty, and this predisposition is
love of delight (Schönecker 2010). Now I think all these accounts are in impor-
tant ways correct and can well be said to illuminate love of neighbour in
Kant. I do not take issue with them, but I think they are incomplete.
What I think is missing from the analyses mentioned above is attention to
the underlying general structure of love that is at work behind the various sec-
tions and passages that the existing interpretations rely on. This underlying
structure can only be grasped through a chronological and fairly detailed exeget-
ical investigation of the notion of love of neighbour per se. Perhaps not all will
agree with me that there is an underlying general structure, but I aim to show
that there is, and to clarify it. This enquiry should also work more generally to
draw further attention to the complex relationship between the emotive and
moral-rational aspects of human existence in Kant.
Several interpretative problems are particularly tricky in the context of love
of neighbour. To begin with: what is the role of the general division of love – to
what extent can it be used to capture Kant’s idea of love of neighbour? What ex-
actly is practical love, and how does it relate to the feeling of love? Is there a dis-
continuity between Kant’s accounts of love of neighbour in the Groundwork and
the second Critique in comparison with the one presented in The Metaphysics of
Morals? Why does Kant use a distinction between pathological love and practical
love in the two former works – and why does he distinguish between love of de-
light and love of benevolence only in the latter? Are these two pairs of distinc-
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tions parallel? In other words, how are pathological love/the feeling of love
(these may or may not be the same), practical love, love of delight, and love
of benevolence all related to each other?
In what follows, I shall argue for two main positions. First, that love of
neighbour is most comprehensively understood in the light of what I have
throughout this work called the general division approach to Kant on love. In
the context of love of neighbour, the principal feature of the general division ap-
proach is its emphasis on the co-existence and interrelatedness of sensory-emo-
tive and rational-moral components in love, captured by Kant’s use of the terms
love of delight and love of benevolence. Second, I hope to show that the general
division approach yields what may be called the feeling-action-cultivation ac-
count, which can be defended as a viable interpretation of love of neighbour
in Kant. Essentially, this account involves the claims that 1) love of neighbour in-
cludes feeling or sensation, rationally willed action, and the cultivation of a
moral disposition, and that 2) love of neighbour is irreducible to any of its com-
ponents taken in isolation. I also argue that while the details are sometimes elu-
sive, there is an intricate continuity in Kant’s conception of love of neighbour be-
tween 1785 and 1797, and the broad outlines of the concept remain consistent
throughout the mature period. I therefore take it that the general division ap-
proach is indeed robust in outline and supports the feeling-action-cultivation ac-
count. My aim here is not to engage in casuistry or debates in normative ethics,
but rather to make sense of the broadest conceptual divisions that love of neigh-
bour in Kant entails.
To make my case, I will track down the history and evolution of the concept
of love of neighbour in Kant’s moral thinking from the 1762– 1764 Herder notes
onwards. I will also have to recap some evidence already presented in the
study to make the argument as transparent as possible. The kind of chronolog-
ical, dynamic, and cumulative reading I’m about to offer will make it easier to
see the changes in Kant’s thought between the different works. The concept of
love of neighbour indeed varies throughout Kant’s writings, but it does not
vary randomly, and foundational invariances and subtle evolution can be detect-
ed. The conceptual framework becomes more and more complex, more refined,
as Kant’s thought matures. The task of the interpreter is to understand the differ-
ences between the relevant instances and to preserve overall continuity and con-
sistency as far as is rationally possible.
This chapter is divided into two major sections, followed by a concluding
summary. In the first section, I discuss love of neighbour prior to The Metaphy-
sics of Morals, and in the second section I analyse the notion within The Meta-
physics of Morals (also using the Vigilantius notes). I will begin by grounding my
interpretation in the Herder and the Collins notes on ethics and will then move
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on to discuss the conceptual divisions of love of neighbour in the Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, by means of a
close comparison of two relevant passages. I then analyse the main distinctions
that are relevant to love of neighbour in The Metaphysics of Morals, with the aim
of harmonising the conception presented in Kant’s final moral philosophical
treatise with those from the Groundwork and the second Critique, giving special
emphasis to the general division of love and the notion of cultivation. I conclude
by outlining the feeling-action-cultivation account of love of neighbour.
4.1 The General Division Prior to The Metaphysics of Morals
Recall the basic published evidence for the existence of a general division of love
in Kant: ‘Like love in general, self-love too can be divided into love of benevo-
lence and love of delight (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE), and both
(as is self-evident) must be rational.’ (R, 6:45.22–25)¹ Does this apply to the con-
text of love of neighbour? In other words, can love of neighbour also be divided
into the loves of benevolence and delight? As we shall see, the general division
of love is operative in this context, but to understand just how, and to see the
exegetical difficulties that remain, requires a thorough analysis that utilises var-
ious moral philosophical resources within Kant’s corpus.
The first piece of evidence to note comes from the Herder lectures on ethics
from 1762–1764². These early notes refer to ‘a system of love of human beings’
[System der Menschenliebe], the concept of which is divided into two kinds of
love of benevolence: ‘love of benevolence (of the other’s greater welfare) is either
active or wishful.’ (LE, 27:64.13– 14)³ The wishful love of benevolence is here
weak, fanciful, or idle, whereas active love of benevolence is ‘practical love’
[Praktische Liebe]. Practical love relates mainly to helping others, such as
when a man of nature, his love uncorrupted by society, saves someone in danger
on the basis of instinct (LE, 27:64.20–65.7).⁴ From the perspective of the general
division of love, what is important to note in the context of the Herder notes is
 ‘Wie Liebe überhaupt, so kann auch Selbstliebe in die des Wohlwollens und des Wohlgefallens
(BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE) eingetheilt werden, und beide müssen (wie sich von
selbst versteht) vernünftig sein.’
 Note that the reliability of the Herder notes in particular has been questioned by Kant’s editors
(see Schneewind 1997, p. xiv, esp. n.5).
 ‘die Liebe des Wohlwollens (anderer großerer Wohlfart) ist entweder thatig oder wünschend.’
 Kant’s discussion reminds one of Rousseau’s admiration of the simple, ‘natural’ state of
human existence (see also Grenberg 2015, pp. 239–244).
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that one of the two basic components of the general division is already in place:
love of benevolence. But love of delight is not mentioned. Also significant is the
fact that active love of benevolence is associated with practical love.
The general division of love is explicitly presented for the first time in the
Collins notes on ethics from the late 1770s. These notes are an invaluable re-
source for interpreting love of neighbour in Kant’s later works. I will thus
pause here to quote the Collins notes at length. As we now know that the Collins
notes in fact predate the Groundwork, there is, however, also the danger of read-
ing too much into the notes, or making overly strong interpretations of Kant’s
later views on their basis. I wish to avoid these dangers, and that’s why I find
it very important to stress that, at least when it comes to love of neighbour or
love of other human beings, the Collins notes should never be used uncritically
or on their own, but always only in conjunction with the authoritative published
works from the mature period. The distinctions Kant draws in these notes in re-
lation to love seem tentative, like a work in progress, and it is not always clear
how what he has said last relates to, or could be harmonised with, what he stat-
ed in the preceding paragraph. This said, the foundational components of love of
neighbour that Kant continues to use up to The Metaphysics of Morals are found
here.
At the outset of Kant’s discussion of duties to others⁵, love is again (as in the
Herder notes) defined in terms of benevolence:
Love is benevolence from inclination. But there can also be kindness on principle. Hence
our pleasure and delight in doing good to others may be either an immediate or a mediate
pleasure. The immediate pleasure in well-doing towards others is love, the mediate pleas-
ure of beneficence,where we are simultaneously conscious of having done our duty, is well-
doing by reason or obligation. (LE, 27:413.18–25)⁶
 In the Collins notes, duties to others are divided into duties of benevolence [Wohlwollen] and
duties of indebtedness [Schuldigkeit], which distinction corresponds roughly with the mature dis-
tinction between imperfect and perfect duties to others.
 ‘Liebe ist Wohlwollen aus Neygung. Es kann aber auch Gütigkeit statt finden aus Grundsät-
zen. Demnach ist unser Vergnügen und Wohlgefallen am Wohlthun anderer entweder ein unmit-
telbares oder ein mittelbares Vergnügen. Das unmittelbare Vergnügen am Wohlthun anderer ist
die Liebe, das mittelbare Vergnügen des Wohlthuns, wo wir uns zugleich bewußtsein, unsre
Pflicht erfüllet zu haben, ist das Wohlthun nach Verbindlichkeit.’ Retaining Heath’s translation.
The German construction ‘Wohlthun anderer’ implies that it is the others who are being benefi-
cent. This is, however, in contrast with how Kant usually speaks of these issues: elsewhere he
seems to have in mind the beneficence of the agent. Rendering ‘Wohlthun anderer’ as ‘benefi-
cence of others’ would also introduce a weird shift of perspective at the end of the passage,
where the mediate pleasure is clearly about our consciousness of having done our duty. Timmer-
mann has suggested (in private conversation) that we are probably dealing with a usage of the
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The elements of the general division of love are visible, but the division itself is
not yet clearly in place.What is implied above is that love is 1) benevolence from
inclination or 2) the immediate delight taken in beneficence, which beneficence
is apparently based on benevolence from inclination. Here, both benevolence
and delight are on the side of inclination, and this inclination-based love is dis-
tinguished from kindness [Gütigkeit], or beneficence from rational principles. But
as Kant’s discussion continues for a page or two, the terminology changes, and
this change leads up to a new definition of love. First, Kant makes room for two
different kinds of benevolence – one from love, and one from obligation: ‘Benev-
olence from love cannot be commanded, though benevolence from obligation
can.’ (LE, 27:417.10– 11)⁷ Kant explains that practicing beneficence from duty
will eventually, through habituation, lead to our being beneficent also from
love (LE, 27:417.11– 19). Immediately after this we get a new definition of love,
now a strong statement affirming the general division:
All love is either love of benevolence or love of delight. Love of benevolence consists in the
wish and inclination to promote the happiness of others. Love of delight is the pleasure we
take in showing approval of another’s perfections. This delight may be either sensuous or
intellectual. All such delight, if it is love, must first of all be inclination. The love that is
sensuous delight is a delight in the sensuous intuition, due to sensuous inclination […].
The love based on intellectual delight is already harder to conceive. (LE, 27:417.19–30)⁸
This statement explicitly divides ‘all love’ into the variants of the general division
of love found later in the Religion. I will return to the distinction between the two
kinds of delight (sensuous and intellectual) in the latter part of this chapter.⁹
genitive peculiar to 18th-century German, and I thank him for making me aware of this obscure
feature of the passage.
 ‘Das Wohlwollen aus Liebe kann nicht geboten werden, wohl aber das Wohlwollen aus Ver-
bindlichkeit.’
 ‘Alle Liebe ist entweder Liebe des Wohlwollens oder Liebe des Wohlgefallens. Die Liebe des
Wohlwollens besteht im Wunsch und in der Neigung das Glück anderer zu befördern. Die Liebe
des Wohlgefallens ist das Vergnügen, welches wir haben, den Vollkommenheiten des andern
Beyfall zu beweisen. Dieses Wohlgefallen kann sinnlich und intellectual seyn. Alles Wohlgefall-
en, wenn es Liebe ist, muß doch vorher Neygung seyn. Die Liebe des sinnlichen Wohlgefallens
ist ein Gefallen an der sinnlichen Anschauung, aus sinnlicher Neigung […]. Die Liebe des intel-
lectualen Wohlgefallens ist schon schwerer zu concipiren.’ Note that in the Collins notes sexual
inclination is classed with sensuous love of delight (LE, 27:417.19–30), whereas The Metaphysics
of Morals rejects this classification (MM, 6:426.26–28). This serves as indirect evidence that love
of delight in the published work could be intellectual love of delight.
 As such, the framework in the Collins notes is not my main target, and I will discuss these
ideas and elaborate on them further to the extent required by my analysis of the mature pub-
lished works.
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After defining ‘all love’ in the above terms, Kant goes on to make yet another
major change to his conception of love for others in the Collins notes. Towards
the end of his discussion, Kant begins to allow for talk of love from obligation,
whereas at the beginning of the discussion love is defined exclusively in terms of
inclination. In this last manoeuvre, he provides an interpretation of Jesus’ com-
mandment to love one’s neighbour, and now he equates love of benevolence
with love from obligation, while love of delight seems to remain closer to incli-
nation: ‘If we are told: Thou shalt love thy neighbour, how is this to be under-
stood? It is not with love of delight that I am to love him, for with that I can
also love the worst of villains; it is with love of benevolence.’ (LE, 27:417.34–37)¹⁰
Again, Kant is clearly appealing to the general division of love in the context
of love of neighbour.When it comes to understanding the development of Kant’s
thinking about this aspect of love from the Groundwork onwards, this last pas-
sage is particularly important. In the mature period, Kant continually draws a
distinction between two kinds of neighbourly love: one that is not commanded,
and one that is. This distinction roughly parallels the nature-freedom distinction
that lies at the heart of Kant’s mature moral theory. The question is: can the ma-
ture distinction between different kinds of love for others be interpreted in terms
of the distinction between love of benevolence and love of delight? If so, then
love of benevolence should most likely be identified with the love that is com-
manded, and love of delight with the love that is not commanded. These latter
passages from the Collins notes, when combined with the Religion, certainly sug-
gest that something along these lines might be the case.
I now proceed to the Groundwork, where love of neighbour will again be dis-
cussed via philosophical interpretation of Jesus’ commandment.¹¹ One of the
 ‘Wenn es nun heißt: du sollst deinen nächsten lieben, wie ist das zu verstehen? Nicht mit der
Liebe des Wohlgefallens soll ich ihn lieben, mit solcher kann ich auch den größten Bösewicht
lieben, sondern mit der Liebe des Wohlwollens.’ Kant explains that this kind of love of benev-
olence for the villain will contain the wish that he actually become worthy of happiness (LE
27:417.37–418.4), and apparently it is this that separates the moral love of benevolence here
from sensuous delight or from the mere benevolent inclination to promote the material well-
being of the villain in question. Note also that in the Collins notes Kant ends up maintaining
that even though love of delight cannot be commanded, to love the humanity of the villain
with (intellectual) love of delight is still a duty (LE, 27:418).
 As with love of God, the cultural context is decisively Christian here, and the classical con-
cept of love as Agape looms in the background. It is worth mentioning Kant’s key references
from the New Testament. Jesus articulates his basic idea of love of neighbour when preaching
in Jerusalem, in response to a scribe’s question about God’s first commandment: ‘The first is,
“Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord your God
with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength.”
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most basic distinctions of Groundwork I is between a good will [der gute Wille]
and inclinations: these two are profoundly different. A good will must be pro-
duced by reason, and in humans it is closely connected to the concept of
duty. Inclinations, on the other hand, are based on natural impulses, are not mo-
rally commanded, and are often in tension with duty. Inclinations relate to sen-
sations or feelings such as satisfaction, sympathy [Sympathie], compassion
[Theilnehmung], and love (GW, 4:397.28–398.36; see Timmermann 2011, p. xiii).
It must also be emphasised that in Groundwork I, when Kant speaks of love with-
out further qualification (GW, 4:397.28–30), he is relating love to inclinations.
This is in line with the earlier lecture notes on ethics, where love is often dis-
cussed through the notion of inclination. The finding warrants the hypothesis
that the love proximal to inclinations is somehow a more paradigmatic type of
love.
With this in mind, let us move to the passage concerning love of neighbour.
It appears in the context of Kant’s famous proposition that beneficent action only
has true moral worth if carried out from duty rather than inclination. Kant ex-
plains that while beneficence [Wohltätigkeit] is a duty, there are compassionate
[theilnehmend gestimmte] philanthropists [Menschenfreunde] who are such that
‘even without another motivating ground of vanity, or self-interest, they find
an inner gratification in spreading joy around them, and can relish the content-
ment of others, in so far as it is their work.’ (GW, 4:398.9– 12)¹² Properly speaking,
the actions of these philanthropists, which are guided by inclinations, have no
moral worth, even though the actions conform with duty and may be considered
amiable or worthy of love¹³ [liebenswürdig].¹⁴ However, if a philanthropist of the
The second is this, “You shall love your neighbour as yourself.” There is no other commandment
greater than these.’ (Mark 12:28; similar in Matt. 22:34) In his Sermon on the Mount, Jesus im-
plies that the concept of one’s neighbour may even include one’s enemies: ‘But I say to you,
Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you’ (Matt. 5:43; see also Luke 6:27, cf.
the Old Testament, Leviticus 19:18, where the concept of one’s neighbour does not include
one’s enemies).
 ‘sie auch ohne einen andern Bewegungsgrund der Eitelkeit oder des Eigennutzes ein inneres
Vergnügen daran finden, Freude um sich zu verbreiten, und die sich an der Zufriedenheit ander-
er, so fern sie ihr Werk ist, ergötzen können.’
 According to the Grimm dictionary, liebenswürdig literally means ‘worthy of love’ but is nor-
mally used in a more external sense. Adelung, however, stresses the worthiness aspect: ‘der
Liebe würdig, würdig geliebt zu werden’.
 Any reading that affords Kant the view that it would be bad or wrong to be beneficent from
inclination is hence clearly incorrect. In the second Critique, doing good from the feeling of love
is described as being beautiful. (C2, 5:82.18–20) Note also how the feeling of love as a motiva-
tional force conditions Kant’s widest formulations of self-love in the second Critique: all material
practical principles belong to self-love/one’s own happiness (C2, 5:22.6–8). In the widest sense,
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above sort is overtaken by sorrow and hence loses ‘all compassion for the fate of
others’ (4:398.21–22)¹⁵ and yet still acts beneficently from duty without inclina-
tion, the action is morally worthy. According to Kant, the case is similar when a
beneficent agent has little sympathy [wenig Sympathie] to begin with: only ac-
tions done from duty have moral worth. These considerations form the moral
philosophical context of the passage on love of neighbour. Kant writes:
It is in this way, no doubt, that we are to understand the passages from Scripture that con-
tain the command to love one’s neighbor, even our enemy. For love as an inclination cannot
be commanded, but beneficence from duty itself – even if no inclination whatsoever impels
us to it, indeed if natural and unconquerable aversion resists – is practical and not patho-
logical love, which lies in the will and not in the propensity of sensation, in principles of
action and not in melting compassion; and only the former can be commanded. (GW,
4:399.27–34)¹⁶
This looks a lot like the previous passage on the same topic from the Collins
notes: love from inclination cannot be commanded, but beneficence from duty
can. What is clearly different is that in the Groundwork neither love of benevo-
lence nor love of delight is explicitly mentioned. The basic distinction is now be-
tween pathological love and practical love. In Groundwork I, practical love relates
to the good will, to principles of action, and to duty, whereas pathological love
relates to sensation or feeling [Empfindung] and to compassion [Theilnehmung]
and cannot be commanded. While both pathological and practical love can
have the happiness of others as their ends, in practical love the motive of
duty is primary, whereas in pathological love the agent’s interest in the happi-
ness of others is determined by inclination (see Timmermann 2009, p. 55).
If we now tentatively interpret the distinction between pathological love and
practical love in the light of the earlier lecture notes, keeping in mind the termi-
nology of the general division of love, we are led to the following observations.
First, the Herder notes explicitly appeal to the notion of practical love, and there
self-love need not be directly self-interested and may in fact appear as inclination-based benef-
icent love of neighbour. As Wood puts it, while the self imposes limits on love, an inclination
toward the happiness of others is not a mere means to my happiness: ‘Love exhibits a kind
of second-order self-partiality’ (Wood 1999, p. 271).
 ‘alle Theilnehmung an anderer Schicksal’.
 ‘So sind ohne Zweifel auch die Schriftstellen zu verstehen, darin geboten wird, seinen Nächs-
ten, selbst unsern Feind zu lieben. Denn Liebe als Neigung kann nicht geboten werden, aber
Wohlthun aus Pflicht selbst, wenn dazu gleich gar keine Neigung treibt, ja gar natürliche und
unbezwingliche Abneigung widersteht, ist praktische und nicht pathologische Liebe, die im Wil-
len liegt und nicht im Hange der Empfindung, in Grundsätzen der Handlung und nicht schmel-
zender Theilnehmung; jene aber allein kann geboten werden.’
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practical love is active love of benevolence. The Collins notes do not explicitly
mention practical love, but they do refer to a love to which there is obligation,
and the context there is identical to that in Groundwork I (both interpret Jesus’
commandment). The love that is obligatory in the Collins notes (in the immediate
vicinity of the discussion of Jesus’ commandment) is love of benevolence. These
findings strongly suggest a tentative identification of practical love with love of
benevolence. Also significant is the fact that the identification of pathological (or
inclination-based love) in terms of the general division is more difficult. In Herd-
er, love of benevolence is based on inclination or instinct, and in Collins, the
love based on inclination can be either love of benevolence or love of delight.
But in the particular passage in Collins, the context of which is identical with
the context in the Groundwork, it is explicitly love of delight that is not com-
manded (even though just a bit further in Collins Kant says that there is also
an obligation to love the humanity of others with love of delight). Furthermore,
we have thus far established a relatively clear tentative identification between
practical love and love of benevolence. It is therefore plausible to assume
that, insofar as we take seriously the statements from the Collins notes and
the Religion to the effect that all love is either love of benevolence or love of de-
light, or that love in general is divided into those two, the love that is not com-
manded in the Groundwork (i.e. pathological love) might very well be love of de-
light. But we do not know this.
However, the above conceptual analysis can already be used to make better
exegetical sense of the previously mentioned famous example of the sorrowful
philanthropist in Groundwork I, who is beneficent without inclination. Wood ar-
gues that the way Kant construes the example is due to his aim of setting ‘up a
derivation of the most formal version of the categorical imperative’, and that
Kant fails to notice that help given to others ‘is not the result of sticking to a prin-
ciple’¹⁷ (Wood 2008, p. 35). Rather, Wood argues, the philanthropist acts out of
the love of human beings [Menschenliebe] that Kant describes in ‘Introduction
XII’ in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ as feeling.Wood thinks that this love is a ‘feeling
produced directly by reason’ (Wood 2008, p. 35) – not to be confused with prac-
tical love, which Wood reduces to action. Here, I think,Wood misconstrues love’s
general structure. The love produced directly by reason is itself an obligation; it
is love of benevolence or practical love. It is not the same as the feeling of love,
which even in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ resides on the side of nature (as we will see
later in this chapter). I don’t think Kant says or implies anywhere that the feeling
 Cf. Timmermann (2009, pp. 46, 50), who holds that actions always imply laws, or maxims as
subjective principles of action.
118 4 Love of Neighbour
of love is produced directly by reason. It is of course possible that the sorrowful
philanthropist has neglected the indirect duty of cultivation and that he ought to
have more loving feeling, but this is not discussed in the example. If we wish to
interpret Kant charitably and respect the premises of his example, acknowledg-
ing what we know about the general structure of love while still appealing to the
notion of love of human beings, we ought to say that the sorrowful man is acting
from the love that is benevolence; that is, he is acting from practical love.¹⁸
In the second Critique, the passage on love of neighbour is found in the third
chapter of the analytic of practical reason, where Kant discusses the incentives
[die Triebfedern] of pure practical reason. While both Groundwork I and this
chapter deal with the proper motivational ground of moral action, in Groundwork
I the question concerns the moral worth of actions, whereas here the discussion
revolves around how to make respect for the law a reliable determining ground
of the will. The closer we get to the passage, the more Kant seems to apply the
specific ideas of Groundwork I, repeating the basic notion that actions only have
moral worth (see C2, 5:81.17–19) when done ‘from duty and from respect for the
law, not from love and liking for what the actions are to produce.’ (C2,
5:81.23–24)¹⁹ As in Groundwork I, the feeling of love in the second Critique is
not moral as such and does not constitute a proper basis for moral conduct:
‘It is very beautiful to do good to human beings from love for them and from
sympathetic benevolence; or to be just from love of order; but this is not yet
the genuine moral maxim of our conduct’ (C2, 5:82.18–20)²⁰. Now this remark,
which appears just before the principal passage on love of neighbour in the sec-
ond Critique, confirms the division between some sort of love and morality that
was clear in the Groundwork. Obviously, the love mentioned above cannot be the
practical love of the Groundwork, because that practical love would have to be
related to our duty or to a ‘genuinely moral maxim’. If we think of the context
of beauty, and the idea that doing good to others from love is beautiful, we
 This will become even clearer as we progress to The Metaphysics of Morals. There, love of
human beings is discussed in two different places and is given two different principal meanings.
In the Introduction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, love of human beings is equated with love of
neighbour (MM, 6:399; cf. 6:401) and discussed as a natural aesthetic predisposition to morality,
or even as a ‘feeling’, as Wood notes. In the doctrine of the elements, however, love of human
beings is discussed as practical love (MM, 6:450). In his analysis of the sorrowful philanthropist,
Wood is not sensitive to this distinction within the concept of Menschenliebe (or Nächstenliebe).
 ‘aus Pflicht und aus Achtung fürs Gesetz, nicht aus Liebe und Zuneigung zu dem, was die
Handlungen hervorbringen sollen’.
 ‘Es ist sehr schön, aus Liebe zu Menschen und theilnehmendem Wohlwollen ihnen Gutes zu
thun, oder aus Liebe zur Ordnung gerecht zu sein, aber das ist noch nicht die ächte moralische
Maxime unsers Verhaltens’.
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are closer to love of delight than practical love of benevolence. However, the pas-
sage also refers to ‘sympathetic benevolence’ [theilnehmendes Wohlwollen],
which is not properly moral. I think this must now be understood in the light
of the earlier lecture notes, where it was possible to have benevolence for others
either from inclination or from obligation.
Quite clearly, in the second Critique Kant continues to rely on the distinction
between pathological love and practical love familiar from Groundwork I. The
issue is now how to make respect for the law the incentive of action. As in the
Groundwork, Kant sees our relation to the moral law as analogous to – or
more precisely, as agreeing with [stimmt Hiemit] – Jesus’ commandment to
love God above all and one’s neighbour as oneself (C2, 5:83.3). Kant explains
first that, as a transcendent being, God cannot be loved pathologically, and
while pathological love towards other humans is possible, it cannot be com-
manded. Jesus’ dictum therefore concerns only practical love:
It is, therefore, only practical love, that is understood in that kernel of all laws. To love God
means, in this sense, to do what he commands gladly; to love one’s neighbor means to
practice all duties toward him gladly. But the command that makes this a rule cannot com-
mand us to have this disposition in dutiful actions but only to strive for it. (C2, 5:83.11– 16)²¹
The idea is familiar from Groundwork I, but Kant’s conception of love of neigh-
bour does indeed vary from the Groundwork to the second Critique. In the
Groundwork, Kant argues that Jesus’ commandment concerns practical love
and not the feeling of love, period. Here he argues that while Jesus’ command-
ment concerns practical love and pathological love cannot be commanded, what
is commanded is nevertheless love, and so the commandment brings with it a
duty to strive for a glad disposition in practical love.²² How is this obvious differ-
ence between the passages of the Groundwork and the second Critique to be ex-
plained?
 ‘Also ist es bloß die praktische Liebe, die in jenem Kern aller Gesetze verstanden wird. Gott
lieben, heißt in dieser Bedeutung, seine Gebote gerne thun; den Nächsten lieben, heißt: alle
Pflicht gegen ihn gerne ausüben. Das Gebot aber, das dieses zur Regel macht, kann auch
nicht diese Gesinnung in pflichtmäßigen Handlungen zu haben, sondern bloß darnach zu stre-
ben gebieten.’
 The idea of doing what God commands gladly can already be found in Kant’s lectures on
ethics. It appears all over the Collins notes (LE, 27:274.15; 27:300.8–9; 27:322.32–33;
27:335.35–36), and given that these notes are morally precritical, it is not the case that Kant
came up with this idea somewhere between the Groundwork and the second Critique. For
more discussion, see ch. 3.1 above.
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It has been noted that what is at stake in the Groundwork is the establish-
ment of the supreme principle of morality, and what Kant most wants to steer
clear of is the naturalist empiricism of Hutcheson and Hume, which grounds
morality in natural passions (e.g. Baron 1995, p. 204). This explains, at least
in part, why Kant excludes feelings from the sphere of duty in the Groundwork,
but I think there is more to be said about the apparent shift between the concep-
tions presented in these two works. It is significant that in the second Critique,
Kant considers not only the ground of morality but also its ends. The second Cri-
tique passage appears in the middle of a discussion that pertains to the impos-
sibility of achieving holiness (a perfectly moral disposition), the attainment of
which would mean that we no longer had any inclinations against morality
and could speak of a love for the law (C2, 5:84).²³ Love for the law remains im-
possible for imperfect creatures, but it seems that one way to approach it is by
striving for gladness in loving one’s neighbour practically. This interpretation re-
lies on an idea according to which increasing the amount of glad practical love
from duty in our lives will consequently diminish the power that (contra-moral)
inclinations generally have over us (see ch. 1.3). It can at least be said that when-
ever we practice love for our neighbours gladly – that is, with an accompanying
inclination for the moral action or its end – we do not at the same time struggle
with contra-moral inclinations. Optimistically, approaching love for the law
through glad practical neighbourly love corresponds with Kant’s assertion that
love from duty will actually lead to love from inclination (MM, 6:402.14–21;
LE, 27:419.4–7). In any case, the Groundwork passage discusses the ground of
moral action in the good will, whereas the second Critique passage prescribes
the end of subjective moral perfection.
Another way of making a nearly equivalent point is to note a basic difference
in how the Groundwork and the second Critique present the notion of the highest
good. In the Groundwork, the highest good is used in the sense of the good will
 With regard to love of God, Kant’s treatment of the command to love God shifts the object of
love from God to the moral law, such that love for the law becomes the unattainable object of
one’s moral striving. I discuss this point in ch. 3.1. What is interesting here, however, is that
while the notion of cultivation is already present in Collins (LE, 27:317.35–38), there would ap-
pear to be no mention of the ideal of loving the law in the context of loving God prior to the
second Critique, even though the term comes up in Mrongovius II (but there in the context of
rewards) (see LE, 29:639.39). I think this can be explained simply by the fact that only after
the Groundwork had established and solidified the status of the moral law was Kant able to
view loving the moral law as analogous or parallel to loving God, as the second Critique
shows. This hypothesis is consistent with the later Vigilantius notes, where love towards God
is discussed in terms of loving the law (LE, 27:720.1 ff.).
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(GW, 4:396.25) or God²⁴ (GW, 4:408.37–409.1), so that in the latter case, the con-
cept of the highest good is derived ‘from the idea of moral perfection’ (GW,
4:409.1–3)²⁵. Unlike in the second Critique, in the Groundwork the notion of
the highest good is not developed in terms of a subjective process of striving
to approach it. Further, the component of happiness is not mentioned in connec-
tion with the highest good in the Groundwork, which again implies simply that
the focus there is on the ground of morality. In the second Critique, however,
the highest good has morality as its supreme condition (C2, 5:119) and the hap-
piness of the rational moral agent as its end; only the perfectly virtuous agent is
worthy of perfect happiness. Following my interpretation of the relation between
love for the law and glad practical love of neighbour presented above, we may
take it that as love for the law denotes a subjectively perfect virtuous condition,
it is a partial description or an element of the complete highest good. Hence,
glad practical love of neighbour can be plausibly viewed as a regulative guide-
line for striving to approach the highest good in the subjective sense. By marking
this difference regarding the usage of the highest good in the two works, I’m not
implying any kind of worry about contradiction or inconsistency. I’m merely not-
ing that in the Groundwork passage on love of neighbour this sort of ‘end-notion’
of the highest good is not at issue, and thus the contexts of the two passages are
clearly different: the one concerns the ground of morality, the other its end.
With respect to their ground, the conceptions of love of neighbour in the
Groundwork and the second Critique are therefore similar and consistent since
both divide love of neighbour into practical and pathological love and hold
that only practical love can be commanded. Unlike the passage in the Ground-
work, the passage in the second Critique includes a duty to strive for a glad dis-
position in practical love for the end of one’s moral perfection, and in this re-
spect the two conceptions are different. As the following will show, the second
account anticipates The Metaphysics of Morals, where the duty of love and the
sensible side of love will still be seen as distinct, but even more intertwined.
It should also be kept in mind that in both the Groundwork (GW, 4:421.31–33)
and the second Critique (C2, 5:8.15–23), Kant explicitly reserves the systematic
division or classification of duties for a future work, which, as implied in the sec-
ond Critique, might further include a special reference to human nature.
But the problem concerning the relationship between love of neighbour and
the general division of love still remains. In the Collins notes on ethics and in the
Religion, Kant claims that all love, or love in general, can be divided into love of
 As such, associating God with the highest good is of course traditional for Christianity.
 ‘aus der Idee […] von sittlicher Vollkommenheit’.
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benevolence and love of delight. The Collins notes explicitly rely on this distinc-
tion in the context of love of neighbour or love of other human beings. In the
Groundwork and in the second Critique, however, the terms of the general divi-
sion are not applied to the context of neighbourly love. Instead, both works dis-
tinguish between practical love and pathological love. In light of Herder and Col-
lins, it is plausible to interpret practical love as love of benevolence, but the
status of pathological love in terms of the general division remains unclear.
Even though indirect evidence indicates that pathological love for others is
most likely love of delight, this is by no means certain, and pathological love
might actually refer to both pathological love of delight and love of benevolence
from inclination. I will now move on to analyse love of neighbour in The Meta-
physics of Morals, which will corroborate my tentative identifications concerning
the general division of love in this context. However, the picture will again be-
come different and even more complex than one might have assumed based
on the previous works.
4.2 Love of Neighbour in The Metaphysics of Morals
I have now established that despite their obvious differences, Kant’s discussions
on love of neighbour in both the Groundwork and the second Critique contain a
distinction between pathological love and practical love – a distinction that it
makes sense tentatively to interpret in terms of love’s general division. In The
Metaphysics of Morals we find love of neighbour addressed in two specific places
within the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. It first appears in ‘Introduction XII’ and then in
the ‘Elements’. I will now analyse the basic divisions of the concept of love in
these contexts to demonstrate that the way Kant organises his discussion explic-
itly relies on the general division of love found in his earlier works. This analysis
will show that the broad outline of Kant’s conception of love of neighbour re-
mains consistent throughout the mature period, even though its treatment in
the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is much more nuanced and detailed, and hence exegeti-
cally more cumbersome, than the passages found in the Groundwork and the sec-
ond Critique. Compared to the Groundwork in particular, which focuses on the
ground of morality, the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ proposes a more or less systematic
division of duties from the perspective of the ends of morality, while placing
more emphasis on the fact that besides reason, the human being is also endow-
ed with specific natural qualities or dispositions that may not just be morally in-
different or work against morality, but may also serve the realisation of moral
ends, or even lie at the subjective bases of becoming moral. We will see an ob-
vious distinction between a feeling or sensation of love (love of delight) and
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practical love (love of benevolence), but the feeling or the aesthetic predisposi-
tion of neighbourly love as described in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is not necessarily
merely pathological but may in fact be closer to what Kant in the Collins notes
termed intellectual love of delight (as Schönecker (2010, pp. 155– 157) has
shown). Lastly, I take a look at the conceptual distinctions related to the more
specific duties of practical love in order to establish the basic system of the feel-
ing-action-cultivation-account of love of neighbour.
4.2.1 On the Feeling²⁶ of Love
In Section XII of the Introduction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, Kant distinguishes
between four ‘[a]esthetic preconditions of the mind’s receptivity to concepts of
duty as such’ (MM, 6:399.2–3; Guyer 2010)²⁷. These are ‘natural predispositions
of the mind’ (MM, 6:399.11)²⁸ or ‘subjective conditions of receptiveness to the con-
cept of duty’ (MM, 6:399.8– 10)²⁹. According to Kant, ‘[t]o have these predisposi-
tions cannot be considered a duty; rather, every human being has them, and it is
by virtue of them that he can be put under obligation.’ (MM, 6:399.12– 14)³⁰ Sub-
jectively, they ‘lie at the basis of morality’, but they are not morality’s ‘objective
conditions’ (MM, 6:399.9–10)³¹. As such, the predispositions seem to have re-
ceived little attention in the literature (see Guyer 2010; Schönecker 2010), and
their function is somewhat unclear. At face value, they might seem to suggest
some sort of departure from Kant’s previous premises in the a priori groundings
 I use the English word ‘feeling’ here broadly, somewhat like Gregor does in her translation of
‘Introduction XII’ in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. This is not implausible as I’m trying to cover with it
those variants of love of neighbour that are not presented as a duty in Kant’s mature published
works. The English word ‘feeling’ can refer to bodily sensations, emotional states, and thoughts
of wanting to help others (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). These aspects of ‘feeling’ correspond
roughly to Kant’s usage of Empfindungen, Gefühle, and (wohlwollende) Neigungen. These are
all close to each other in Kant, and generally on the side of nature in contrast with pure practical
reason. The technical term for specific emotional ‘feelings’ in Kant is Gefühle, and I indicate
these more subtle distinctions in my discussion whenever necessary.
 ‘Ästhetische Vorbegriffe der Empfänglichkeit des Gemüths für Pflichtbegriffe überhaupt.’
Following Guyer’s translation in ‘Moral feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals’. Note also the mis-
take in footnote ‘f ’ of Gregor’s translation (MM, p. 528fn.f). The German should read as above,
not ‘Ästhetische Vorbegriffe der Empfänglichkeit des Gemüts Achtung’.
 ‘natürliche Gemüthsanlagen’.
 ‘subjective Bedingungen der Empfänglichkeit für den Pflichtbegriff ’.
 ‘welche Anlagen zu haben nicht als Pflicht angesehen werden kann, sondern die jeder
Mensch hat und kraft deren er verpflichtet werden kann.’
 ‘der Moralität zum Grunde liegen’ / ‘objective Bedingungen’.
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of moral philosophy, as he now holds that there are some sorts of specific nat-
ural sensory conditions which make duty subjectively possible. My aim here is
not to provide a detailed interpretation of the function or meaning of these pre-
dispositions in general, nor to make any strong claim as regards their overall sta-
tus, but merely to analyse the conceptual outlines of love of neighbour from the
perspective of love’s general division in this context. I do take it that, against the
backdrop of the previous works I’ve discussed in this chapter, we are slowly ar-
riving at a more nuanced, more comprehensive picture of the relationship be-
tween human nature and morality, just as Kant indicates in the second Critique
(C2, 5:8.15–23). By making further assumptions about the natural side of the cog-
nitive make-up of the agent, the moral grounding of the concept of duty is not
thereby inverted. I think that Kant’s basic moral philosophical positions stand,
and we are just witnessing a further step in the gradual unfolding of his attempt
to make sense of human existence. Even if I am mistaken about this more gen-
eral point, my specific exegetical analysis of the conceptual outline of love can
still be viable.
The four aesthetic predispositions that Kant lists are moral feeling, con-
science, love of neighbour or love of human beings, and self-respect. There is
one previous exegetical account of the aesthetic predisposition of love for
one’s neighbour. Schönecker (2010) argues that this predisposition, as presented
in ‘Introduction XII’, cannot be practical love and must instead be understood as
love of delight. I believe Schönecker is correct, and I adopt the main results of
his reading and will merely make a very similar systematic point from the per-
spective of love’s general division. I do think that as Schönecker is not ultimately
grounding his analysis in the distinction between love of delight and love of be-
nevolence, the overall results my reading yields regarding love of neighbour are
more general (even if less detailed) than the ones arrived at by Schönecker.
Before looking at the passages on love of neighbour in more detail, I would
like to say something about the conceptual relationship between love of neigh-
bour [Nächstenliebe, die Liebe des Nächsten] and love of human beings [Men-
schenliebe] in The Metaphysics of Morals.³² Based on the division of ‘Introduction
 From a strictly historical and etymological perspective, Dagobert de Levie (1963) shows, in-
terestingly, that the German wordMenschenliebe only emerged during the 18th century. It was de-
rived from the Christian principle of love, and could even be identified with Nächstenliebe (de
Levie 1963, p. 301). Menschenliebe was used both in religious contexts and as a secularised En-
lightenment version of the Christian principle (de Levie 1963, pp. 301 ff.). Even though Nächsten-
liebe and Menschenliebe are nearly equivalent in Kant, I am emphasising Nächstenliebe to ac-
knowledge the importance of the cultural context of Christianity, in which Kant’s discussions
of love take place, as well as to highlight the interrelatedness of love of neighbour, self-love,
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XII’, love of neighbour and love of human beings would seem to be the same. In
the first preliminary instance, Kant lists die Liebe des Nächsten as one of the four
natural predispositions (MM, 6:399.6–7) and then groups his discussion under
the title ‘On the Love of Human Beings’ [Von der Menschenliebe] (MM,
6:399.22). In the ‘Elements’, where love of neighbour is discussed from the
point of view of duty or practical love, Kant uses the general heading ‘On the
Duty of Love to Other Human Beings’ [Von der Liebespflicht gegen andere Men-
schen] (MM, 6:448.7). In both ‘Introduction XII’ and the ‘Elements’, a large
part of Kant’s treatment revolves around interpretation of the biblical command-
ment to love one’s neighbour, and in this sense there is clear continuity from the
Groundwork and the second Critique to The Metaphysics of Morals. There is a gen-
eral sense in which Kant seems to equate love of human beings or love of other
human beings with love of neighbour (see MM, 6:402.17; cf. 6:448.16– 17;
cf. 6:450.3; cf. 6:450.16; cf. 6:450.33–34). He also speaks of universal love of
human beings [allgemeine Menschenliebe] in terms of love of neighbour [Näch-
stenliebe] (MM, 6:451.21; cf. 6:451.29), but from this perspective a distinction in
the extensions of love of neighbour and love of human beings can be drawn.
Kant’s conceptual work on love of neighbour (or love of other human beings) in-
volves an account of morally conditioned self-benevolence in the love of all
human beings towards one another. If the maxim of benevolence is to hold uni-
versally as a duty, I must include myself in the set of ‘all others’ as an object of
benevolence, which inclusion makes self-benevolence permitted on the condi-
tion that one is benevolent towards others as well (MM, 6:450.30–451.19; see
ch. 1.3 above). So there seems to be a sense in which love of human beings in
general can be interpreted to be extensionally a slightly broader concept than
love of neighbour. While love of human beings might be thought to include a
type of morally conditioned self-love, in the second Critique Kant clearly rejects
any interpretation of the biblical commandment that would reduce love of God
or love of neighbour to self-love (C2, 5:83fn.33–36; pace Moors 2007, pp. 256,
269). Love of neighbour therefore equates to love of human beings in the Intro-
duction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ (see also MM, 6:458.1– 19), and generally to
love of other human beings.
The Introduction account of love of neighbour is reminiscent of the Ground-
work and the second Critique:
Love is a matter of sensation, not of willing, and I cannot love because I will to, still less
because I ought to (I cannot be constrained to love); so a duty to love is an absurdity.
and love of God, which interrelatedness is essential both for Christianity and for the ‘enlight-
ened’ Kantian concept of love.
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But benevolence (AMOR BENEVOLENTIAE), as conduct, can be subject to a law of duty.
(MM, 6:401.24–28)³³
This passage aligns especially nicely with the Groundwork, and the general divi-
sion terminology is clearly in operation (benevolence is termed amor benevolen-
tiae). This suggests that the love at issue here is not something completely new,
of which Kant has not spoken previously; instead, we are getting an account of
the natural side of love of neighbour, as mentioned previously in the Groundwork
and the second Critique, but now developed differently, as a natural sensory pre-
disposition for subjective receptivity to duty. Even though the parallel with the
previous works is clear and love is here a natural sensation distinct from the
love of benevolence, it is not clear that this aesthetic predisposition is merely
pathological. The above distinction is similar to those from the Groundwork
and the second Critique, but it’s not exactly the same. Further on, we also
learn that it is inappropriate to call benevolence love (MM, 6:401.28–29), and
we should read this claim as saying that benevolence cannot be called love in
the context of sensation, or that it cannot be called love without qualification.
Since we know that having the aesthetic predisposition cannot be a duty, and
since the passage on love of neighbour here begins specifically by identifying
love with sensation [Empfindung] rather than willing, it is clear that the love
at issue here cannot be the practical love of benevolence (practical love implies
duty and willing).
But can the aesthetic predisposition of neighbourly love be identified with
love of delight, as Schönecker claims? Once again, Kant refers to the biblical
commandment of love, and once again his discussion introduces new logical re-
lationships between the different notions of love at play in that context:
Beneficence is a duty. If someone practices it often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent
intention, he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped. So the saying ‘you
ought to love your neighbor as yourself’ does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to
love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, do good to
your fellow human beings, and your beneficence will produce love of them in you (as an
aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general).
Hence only the love that is delight (AMOR COMPLACENTIAE) is direct. But to have a
duty to this (which is a pleasure joined immediately to the representation of an object’s ex-
 ‘Liebe ist eine Sache der Empfindung, nicht des Wollens, und ich kann nicht lieben, weil ich
will, noch weniger aber weil ich soll (zur Liebe genöthigt werden); mithin ist eine Pflicht zu lieben
ein Unding. Wohlwollen (AMOR BENEVOLENTIAE) aber kann als ein Thun einem Pflichtgesetz
unterworfen sein.’ Translation modified.
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istence), that is, to have to be constrained to take pleasure in something, is a contradiction.
(MM, 6:402.14–21)³⁴
Guyer calls this discussion ‘limited and disappointing’ (Guyer 2010, p. 145). Ac-
cording to Guyer, ‘Kant actually claims that feelings of love towards (specific)
others are a consequence or effect of beneficence, not an aesthetic precondition
or cause thereof.’ (Guyer 2010, p. 145) Guyer’s view is understandable, but he
does not really analyse the passage or problematise the love at issue in ‘Introduc-
tion XII’. So what is going on in the above quotation? In harmony with Schöneck-
er’s results, we can note, first, that the love Kant discusses as the object of Jesus’
love commandment cannot be the aesthetic predisposition. This is because Jesus’
commandment concerns practical love, and as I’ve shown above the identifica-
tion of practical love with the aesthetic predisposition of love is already ruled out
in the first sentence of Kant’s discussion of the aesthetic predisposition of love of
neighbour. Second, along the lines of his thinking in the Collins notes (LE,
27:417.11– 19; 27:419.4–7), Kant continues to hold that beneficence from duty
will produce an inclination of love in the beneficent subject. In the ‘Doctrine
of Virtue’, the love that results from beneficence is defined as ‘an aptitude of
the inclination to beneficence in general’ (MM, 6:402.20–21). Building on the
Collins notes, we can identify this derivative love as love of benevolence from in-
clination. It is the supposed identification of this derivative love with the aesthet-
ic predisposition of neighbourly love that disappoints Guyer. But as Schönecker
(2010, pp. 152, 154) has shown, the point is precisely that because the aesthetic
predisposition of love is ‘antecedent’ [vorhergehend] and ‘lies’ subjectively ‘at the
foundation’ [zum Grunde liegen] of morality, the aesthetic predisposition cannot
be identified with the love that results from beneficence – a point that Guyer
does not consider.What we are left with is the last sentence of the long quotation
above, where Kant defines love of delight, and love of delight ‘alone’ [allein], as
direct or immediate pleasure in the presentation of an object’s existence – a
 ‘Wohlthun ist pflicht. Wer diese oft ausübt, und es gelingt ihm mit seiner wohlthätigen Ab-
sicht, kommt endlich wohl gar dahin, den, welchem er wohl gethan hat, wirklich zu lieben.
Wenn es also heißt: du sollst deinen Nächsten lieben als sich selbst, so heißt das nicht: du sollst
unmittelbar (zuerst) lieben und vermittelst dieser Liebe (nachher) wohlthun, sondern: thue de-
inem Nebenmenschen wohl, und dieses Wohlthun wird Menschenliebe (als Fertigkeit der Nei-
gung zum Wohlthun überhaupt) in dir bewirken!
Die Liebe des Wohlgefallens (AMOR COMPLACENTIAE) würde also allein direct sein. Zu
dieser aber (als einer unmittelbar mit der Vorstellung der Existenz eines Gegenstandes verbun-
denen Lust) eine Pflicht zu haben, d. i. zur Lust woran genöthigt werden zu müssen, ist ein Wi-
derspruch.’
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pleasure that it is not a duty to have. This love of delight matches the general
characteristics of the aesthetic predispositions and is the only logical option
left when it comes to identifying the aesthetic predisposition of love of neigh-
bour, given the conceptual resources of love generally at our disposal.
By building on Schönecker’s analysis, I believe I have shown that the ele-
ments of the general division of love are clearly at work in ‘Introduction XII’
and that the aesthetic predisposition of love of neighbour can only be identified
with love of delight. Strictly speaking, this would be enough for the argument I
wish to make in this context, but I think just a bit more should be said about the
kind of love of delight at play here. Recall that the basic division in the Ground-
work and the second Critique is between pathological love and practical love (the
latter being love of benevolence from duty). As love in ‘Introduction XII’ is dis-
tinguished precisely from benevolence, which is a matter of duty, it may be
tempting to identify the aesthetic predisposition with pathological love of de-
light, because this would introduce a very smooth continuity to the natural
side of the concept of love of neighbour among all the main moral philosophical
works from the mature period. But how could a pathological sensation lie at the
subjective basis of receptivity to concepts of duty? Furthermore, regarding the
predispositions in general, Kant holds that: ‘Consciousness of them is not of em-
pirical origin; it can, instead, only follow from a consciousness of a moral law, as
the effect this has on the mind.’ (MM, 6:399.14– 16)³⁵ If love of delight is merely
pathological, how can consciousness of it depend on one’s consciousness of the
moral law?
Fortunately, the Collins notes provide the resources to identify the love of de-
light here as intellectual, which means that the object of the antecedent predis-
position to love one’s neighbour is an immediate delight in the humanity (or the
rational nature) of another person (see LE, 27:418). Again, I owe this point to
Schönecker (2010, pp. 156– 157). The actual feeling of delight will vary according
to the moral perfection of the actual other in question, but Kant does not really
spell this out in much detail, and he never draws a clear distinction between the
aesthetic predisposition (or the capacity) of the feeling of love and the actual
feeling of love. Perhaps it is still possible that the love of delight in question
is both pathological and intellectual, but my argument does not depend on
the answer to this question.³⁶ For my purposes, the context-specific existence
of the general division of love is enough.
 ‘Das Bewußtsein derselben ist nicht empirischen Ursprungs, sondern kann nur auf das eines
moralischen Gesetzes, als Wirkung desselben aufs Gemüth, folgen.’
 For further discussion of the attributes of love of delight in this context, see Schönecker
(2010, pp. 158ff.).
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4.2.2 On Practical Love
I now turn to love of neighbour in the ‘Elements’ of the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. The
basic division here is that between duties to oneself and duties to others. Duties
to others are further divided into duties of love and duties of respect.³⁷ Based on
Kant’s previous accounts in the Groundwork, the second Critique, and ‘Introduc-
tion XII’, which all hold that only practical love can be a duty, we should now
assume that in the light of love’s general division the love that is primarily at
issue in Kant’s overall discussion in ‘On the Duty of Love to Other Human Beings’
(MM, 6:448.7)³⁸ is not love of delight but practical love. And so it is:
In this context, however, LOVE is not to be understood as feeling (aesthetic), that is, as
pleasure in the perfection of others; love is not to be understood as delight in them
(since others cannot put one under obligation to have feelings). It must rather be thought
as the maxim of benevolence (practical love), which results in beneficence. (MM,
6:449.17–22)³⁹
The basic premise of practical love in The Metaphysics of Morals is therefore very
much consistent with the Groundwork and the second Critique (see also MM,
6:450.16– 19). Practical love is once again distinguished from the feeling of
love to which there is no duty (here explicitly delight or Wohlgefallen) and is
now identified as the maxim of benevolence resulting in beneficence. The
duty of practical love is further divided into three distinct duties: beneficence
[Wohltätigkeit], gratitude [Dankbarkeit], and sympathetic participation⁴⁰ [Theil-
nehmung] (MM, 6:452.11– 12). Next, I shall discuss each of these in turn to
 The basic division of duties in general in the Vigilantius lecture notes from 1793 is between
duties of right and duties of love (LE, 27:600.12–19; 27:604.5–6), which suggests that Kant was
still working out the final form of the divisions of the moral system around the time of the pub-
lication of The Metaphysics of Morals.
 ‘Von der Liebespflicht gegen andere Menschen.’
 ‘Die LIEBE wird hier aber nicht als Gefühl (ästhetisch), d.i. als Lust an der Vollkommenheit
anderer Menschen, nicht als Liebe des Wohlgefallens, verstanden (den Gefühle zu haben, dazu
kann es keine Verpflichtung durch Andere geben), sondern muß als Maxime des Wohlwollens
(als praktisch) gedacht werden, welche das Wohlthun zur Folge hat.’ Translation modified. Gre-
gor translates both Gefühl and Empfindung as ‘feeling’, even though for Empfindung, ‘sensation’
could be used. However, it is difficult to make out a consistent technical distinction between the
two terms in Kant. Note how both Gefühl and Empfindung (MM, 6:401.24–28) are related to the
aesthetic or the sensory, which, in the context of love of neighbour, seems to confirm yet again
the parallelism between the general division of love and the nature-freedom division. Gefühl and
Empfindung are terms of nature.
 Following Fahmy’s (2009) suggestion in translating Theilnehmung.
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show that the general division approach and the feeling-action-cultivation ac-
count of love of neighbour are indeed robust. Again, rather than providing an
interpretation of each of these duties, I aim primarily to trace the conceptual out-
lines of my general account of love of neighbour in Kant’s writings. That is, I
hope to show that Kant’s discussions continue to rely on a distinction between
feeling and reason-based action, or between affective and rational elements in
the cognitive apparatus of the agent, and that the notion of cultivation is oper-
ative when it comes to the duties of practical love.
A) Beneficence
Given my foundational aim of systematising the general outlines of a Kant imma-
nent conceptual framework, with regard to beneficence it suffices to make sense
of the logical relationship between beneficence and benevolence and how this
distinction relates to love of neighbour through notions of practical love and cul-
tivation. It should now be basically clear that Kantian amor benevolentiae in-
volves at least goodwill, maxims of action, and actual beneficence. In the ‘Ele-
ments’, the general duty of love for one’s neighbour [Nächstenliebe] is further
characterised ‘as the duty to make others’ ends my own (provided only that
these are not immoral)’ (MM, 6:450.4–5)⁴¹, which would make amor benevolen-
tiae the duty to adopt maxims that further the ends of others, according to
their concepts of happiness (see MM, 6:454.18–20). In the specific discussion
on beneficence, however, we are given new definitions of benevolence and be-
neficence: ‘Benevolence is satisfaction in the happiness (well-being) of others;
but beneficence is the maxim of making others’ happiness one’s end’ (MM,
6:452.26–28)⁴². Here, benevolence is defined as satisfaction, beneficence as
the maxim.
At face value, this seems confused, but I think the new definitions must be
understood in the light of the immediately preceding paragraph, where Kant dis-
cusses degrees of benevolence and explains that ‘the benevolence present in
love for all human beings is indeed the greatest in its extent, but the smallest
in its degree’ (MM, 6:451.21–22)⁴³. This is ‘benevolence in wishes’ [das Wohlwol-
len des Wunsches] (MM, 6:452.1; cf. LE, 27:64.13– 14), which borders on indiffer-
 ‘die Pflicht Anderer ihre Zwecke (so fern diese nur nicht unsittlich sind) zu den meinen zu
machen’.
 ‘Wohlwollen ist das Vergnügen an der Glückseligkeit (dem Wohlsein) Anderer; Wohlthun
aber die Maxime, sich dasselbe zum Zweck zu machen’.
 ‘Das Wohlwollen in der allgemeinen Menschenliebe ist nun zwar dem Umfange nach das
größte, dem Grade nach aber das kleinste’.
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ence. According to Kant, this weak, universal benevolence is a rather passive de-
light [Wohlgefallen] in the well-being of others (MM, 6:452.2–3), and we see Kant
actually using the Wohlgefallen terminology to describe this form of well-wish-
ing. The weak benevolence is distinguished from practical love, which is ‘active,
practical benevolence (beneficence), making the well-being and happiness of
others my end.’ (MM, 6:452.4–5)⁴⁴ The seemingly confused passage ceases to
be confused: we should take the ‘satisfaction definition’ of benevolence as refer-
ring to weak, universal benevolence and the ‘maxim definition’ of beneficence as
referring to active benevolence. Certain cases of rational benevolence are there-
fore merely wishful and do not lead to actual beneficence, which means that ra-
tional benevolence and beneficence can be viewed as logically distinct. Kant al-
lows that acts of beneficence in general can be limited by beneficence toward
individuals closer to oneself. For Kant, in terms of the Christian commandment,
loving the other ‘as oneself ’ refers to the rational ground of universal benevo-
lence, whereas in acting I am allowed to love those further away from me to a
lesser degree and may love those closer to me more, perhaps even ‘as myself ’,
in the closest of cases (see §28, MM, 6:451–452). It is therefore possible that be-
neficence toward, say, one’s parents, may effectively inhibit the actualisation of
beneficence toward someone further away. In the inefficient case, too, rational
benevolence as the ground of obligation remains in place and may at least in
some cases be experienced as what Timmermann calls ‘subjective regret’. (See
Timmermann 2013, esp. pp. 47 ff.) Once again, rational benevolence is not exact-
ly the same as beneficence.⁴⁵ Given the above, it should now be clear that Kant-
ian practical love involves both benevolence and beneficence.
This finding is relevant to the current exegetical debate, as is made clear
when we consider a recent take on practical love in the literature. In her article
‘Kantian Practical Love’, Fahmy (2010) argues that practical love is best under-
stood through what she calls the ‘cultivation account’, according to which
‘[t]he duty of practical love is the duty to cultivate a benevolent disposition to-
ward other human beings as well as practical beneficent desires.’ (Fahmy
2010, p. 321) In particular, and correctly, I would argue, Fahmy refuses to reduce
 ‘ein thätiges, praktisches Wohlwollen, sich das Wohl und Heil des Anderen zum Zweck zu
machen, (das Wohlthun)’.
 Kant does not specify how much is required from us in terms of beneficence, and it is not my
aim here to discuss Kant’s take on the normative issue of demandingness (see e.g. van Ackeren
& Sticker 2015). At a minimum, one should not be so beneficent as to come to need the benef-
icence of others (MM, 6:454).
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practical love to respect or beneficence.⁴⁶ The division between love and respect
is a grounding dualism in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, and benevolence and benef-
icence, while sometimes nearly equivalent, remain logically distinct. I also agree
that throughout the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ Kant emphasises our duty to cultivate a
moral disposition, including our natural feelings.
What does it mean to cultivate something in Kant’s moral philosophy? As
Fahmy (2010, pp. 319–322) has shown, it is essential to keep in mind that one
of the most foundational claims in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is that there are
two ends that are also duties: one’s own perfection and the happiness of others
(MM, 6:385–388). Pursuing these is necessarily an ongoing process, in which an
agent cultivates herself by increasing her fitness or capacity for pursuing these
ends: ‘Natural perfection is the cultivation of any capacities whatever for further-
ing ends set forth by reason.’ (MM, 6:391.29–31⁴⁷; see also 6:418fn.) As regards
morality, cultivation aims at the perfection of doing one’s duty from duty (MM,
6:392), which involves a cheerful heart in carrying out one’s duties with the
thought of duty in mind (MM, 6:484–485). I think we can say generally that
the kind of cultivation that is ethically required of us with regard to the ends
that are also duties is striving to harmonise our emotive or affective faculties
with what duty commands, in order to remove cognitive hindrances that make
it more difficult for us to do our duty.
In the case of beneficence, Kant consistently holds, from the Collins notes
onwards, that beneficent action from duty produces a feeling or an inclination
of love in the virtuous subject, which feeling is in turn prone to yield more be-
neficence (LE, 27:417.11– 19; 27:419.4–7; MM, 6:402.14–21). This would be an in-
stance of cultivating neighbourly love. However, I fear that in correctly distanc-
ing herself from the reductive action account, Fahmy risks undermining the
action component of practical love. She not only holds that practical love is dis-
tinct from beneficence but claims, further, that practical love is one of four dis-
tinct duties of love alongside beneficence, gratitude, and sympathetic participa-
tion (Fahmy 2010, p. 327). From a systematic exegetical perspective, this view is
difficult to maintain. In my opinion, it fails to acknowledge the general consis-
tency in love’s division throughout the Groundwork, the second Critique, and
The Metaphysics of Morals, according to which love of neighbour divides into
 I will therefore not use any further resources to discuss the possibility that in Kant’s ethics
practical love might be reducible to respect or to mere beneficent action. These kinds of ideas are
not in line with the text. For more detailed debate, see Fahmy (2010); cf. e.g. Johnson (1997).
 ‘Physische, d. i. Cultur aller Vermögen überhaupt zu Beförderung der durch die Vernunft vor-
gelegten Zwecke.’ Gregor picks the word ‘perfection’ [Vollkommenheit] from the subheading im-
mediately above the German quote to make the English smoother.
4.2 Love of Neighbour in The Metaphysics of Morals 133
the feeling of love and the duty of love, the latter being everywhere practical
love.We also saw above how in Kant’s text beneficence was a part of the defini-
tion of practical love. Further, in the ‘Elements’ the duty of love is generally iden-
tified with practical love twice in the preliminary main clauses (MM, 6:449.17–22;
6:450.16– 19), and the duties of love are then explicitly divided into three specific
duties further along: ‘They are duties of A) beneficence, B) gratitude, and C) sym-
pathetic participation.’ (MM, 6:452.11– 12)⁴⁸ In my opinion, the charitable view,
which does not assume a significant gap or a radical change in Kant’s ideas
within the critical period, and which is also exegetically consistent with the letter
of Kant’s text, is to see beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy as falling within
the division of practical love.
B) Gratitude
What role does love play in the duty of gratitude? According to Kant, ‘[g]ratitude
consists in honoring a person because of a benefit he has rendered us. The feeling
connected with this judgment is respect for the benefactor (who puts one under
obligation), whereas the benefactor is viewed as only in a relation of love toward
the recipient.’ (MM, 6:454.31–455.1)⁴⁹ On the face of it, gratitude as such involves
not the feeling of love on the part of the grateful agent but rather respect as a
response to received beneficence. In relation to practical love, then, it would
seem to be a duty specifying how we ought to react to love.⁵⁰
We then learn that gratitude may be divided into ‘active’ [thätige] and ‘affec-
tive’ [affectionelle] variants, implying that mere benevolence ‘without physical
results’ occasions affective gratitude (MM, 6:455.1–4)⁵¹. Such benevolence is ‘al-
ready a basis of obligation to gratitude’, in which case the grateful disposition is
called ‘appreciativeness’ [Erkenntlichkeit] (MM, 6:455.22–24)⁵². However, Kant
does not explicitly elaborate the division further, and interpretations of his posi-
tion vary. Some, like Baron and Fahmy, seem to reduce active gratitude to the
cultivation of affective gratitude (Baron & Fahmy 2009, p. 224), somewhat ne-
 ‘Sie sind: A) Pflichten der Wohltätigkeit, B) der Dankbarkeit, C) der Theilnehmung.’ Transla-
tion modified.
 ‘Dankbarkeit ist die Verehrung einer Person wegen einer uns erwiesenen Wohlthat. Das Ge-
fühl, was mit dieser Beurtheilung verbunden ist, ist das der Achtung gegen den (ihn verpflich-
tenden) Wohlthäter, da hingegen dieser gegen den Empfänger nur als im Verhältnis der Liebe
betrachtet wird.’
 I wish to thank Jens Timmermann for bringing this to my attention.
 ‘ohne physische Folgen’.
 ‘schon Grund der Verpflichtung zur Dankbarkeit’.
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glecting those passages that emphasise action in gratitude. Others, such as Smit
and Timmons (2011) and Gudrun von Tevenar (2006), construe gratitude as hav-
ing no necessary connection to feeling (Smit & Timmons 2011, p. 304; Tevenar
2006), but they tend to somewhat neglect the active-affective distinction (Smit
& Simmons, Tevenar) or end up arguing that Kantian gratitude is primarily
about discharging the duty (Tevenar). Given these varied interpretations, I
think that a more balanced view of active and affective gratitude is required in
order to appreciate what I see as the gist of Kant’s discussion from love’s per-
spective.
In the first place, Kant asserts that gratitude is a sacred duty, by which he
means that ‘it cannot be discharged completely by any act in keeping with it
(so that one who is under obligation always remains under obligation).’ (MM,
6:455.16– 17)⁵³ Second, Kant does seem to hold that affective gratitude is a
duty, which at face value presents an interpretative problem since we know
that it cannot be a duty to have a feeling. The duty of affective gratitude might
be understood as an indirect duty to cultivate the moral feeling,which is depend-
ent on reason-induced respect for the moral law. This would be consistent with
Kant’s account of the moral feeling in ‘Introduction XII’ (see MM, 6:399.32–
400.1), but I do not want to force this interpretation and will leave the question
open. Active gratitude is also a duty, however, for Kant maintains that ‘[t]he least
degree⁵⁴ [of gratitude] is to render equal services to the benefactor if he can re-
ceive them (if he is still living) or, if he cannot, to render them to others’ (MM,
6:456.6–8)⁵⁵. This is clearly a demand for action that is missed by Baron and
Fahmy, and if the cultivation account of active gratitude is to make sense, the
action component should be unambiguously incorporated as action.⁵⁶ The
idea, then, is that gratitude cultivates love. Rather than ‘regarding a kindness re-
ceived as a burden one would gladly be rid of ’ (MM, 6:456.8– 11)⁵⁷, we should ac-
tively seek out opportunities to be grateful:
 ‘die […] durch keinen ihr gemäßen Act völlig getilgt werden kann (wobei der Verpflichtete
immer noch verpflichtet bleibt).’ Tevenar (2006, p. 181) mentions this passage at the beginning
of her reading but does not wish to incorporate it in her interpretation of Kant’s actual position.
 The German text gives the impression that what is under discussion in the last paragraph on
gratitude is the least degree of gratitude. This seems somewhat peculiar, if only because Kant
gives no account whatsoever of other degrees of gratitude.
 ‘Der mindeste Grad ist, gleiche Dienstleistungen dem Wohlthäter, der dieser empfänglich
(noch lebend) ist, und, wenn er es nicht ist, Anderen zu erweisen’.
 The implications of gratitude as action have been analysed in some detail by Smit and Tim-
mons (2011).
 ‘eine empfangene Wohlthat […] wie eine Last, deren man gern überhoben sein möchte, […]
anzusehen’.
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taking even the occasion for gratitude as a moral blessing, that is, as an opportunity given
one to unite this duty of love of human beings, which combines the cordiality of a benev-
olent disposition with sensitivity to benevolence (attentiveness to the smallest degree of this
disposition in one’s thought of duty), and so to cultivate love of human beings. (MM,
6:456.11– 16)⁵⁸
Kant’s discussion thus ends with an emphasis on sensitivity, which, since benef-
icence is not mentioned or implied here, should be taken as related to affective
gratitude or the feeling of respect occasioned by even the most minor instances
of benevolence.We may interpret the passage such that respecting benevolence
in other human beings strengthens their incentive to it⁵⁹ and hence cultivates
love of human beings, which in this context can only be viewed as benevolent
love from others. It can therefore be argued that Kantian gratitude, as a sacred
duty of practical love to other human beings, involves the feeling of respect
for one’s benefactor, the active rendering of equal services where possible,
and, through affective sensitivity to benevolence, the cultivation of love of benev-
olence (see fig. 5).
C) Sympathetic Participation
Finally, let us turn to the problem of sympathetic participation [die Theilneh-
mung]. Like gratitude, the duty of Theilnehmung has often been viewed as an ad-
junct to beneficence. In recent years, however, this picture has started to shatter,
 ‘selbst die Veranlassung dazu als moralische Wohlthat aufzunehmen, d.i. als gegebene Ge-
legenheit, diese Tugend der Menschenliebe, welche mit der Innigkeit der wohlwollenden Gesin-
nung zugleich Zärtlichkeit des Wohlwollens (Aufmerksamkeit auf den kleinsten Grad derselben
in der Pflichtvorstellung) ist, zu verbinden und so die Menschenliebe zu cultiviren.’ Translation
modified. The syntax of this passage is fairly difficult to follow. While I take it to be relatively
clear that dazu refers to gratitude, just what is meant to be combined or united with zu verbinden
is far less clear. Gregor takes it that gratitude is united with love of human beings, but the Ger-
man syntax does not imply this. I believe we should read zu verbinden according to sense 5 in
the Grimm dictionary – der begriff des bandes, der bei allen bisherigen bedeutungen hervortrat, as
the concept of the ties by which all meanings thus far surface – in which case verbinden does not
grammatically require that something is combined with something else and may instead refer to
a sort of inner unification. I translate Wohlthat as ‘blessing’ to emphasise the sacredness of the
duty, following sense 2 of Wohltat in Grimm,where the meaning shifts from the action to the ef-
fect of the action and Wohlthat is related to Geschenk, or ‘gift’. I wish to thank Martin Sticker for
his help with the linguistic difficulties of the passage.
 I owe this point to Smit and Timmons, although they make it in terms of beneficence: ‘hav-
ing a grateful disposition that is manifested in acts of sincere gratitude tends to encourage fur-
ther acts of beneficence’ (Smit & Timmons 2011, p. 318).
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with interpreters like Wood (2008, pp. 176– 177)⁶⁰ and Fahmy (2009) pointing out
that in Kant, there is a sense in which Theilnehmung is a direct duty in its own
right. However, the exegetical details of Sections 34 and 35 remain under discus-
sion. I will not attempt a general interpretation of these passages; adopting the
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Figure 5. Gratitude
 Even though Wood problematically conflates beneficence and practical love (Wood 2008,
p. 176; cf. Fahmy 2010). As I have shown, the consistent way of reading Kant in the light of
the general division of love involves viewing beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy as the divi-
sion of practical love (admittedly, beneficence seems to be the paradigm case).
 My only real exegetical disagreement with Fahmy’s interpretation relates to the translation of
the title of Kant’s discussion: ‘Theilnehmende Empfindung ist überhaupt Pflicht’ (MM, 6:456.18),
which Gregor translates as ‘Sympathetic feeling is generally a duty’. As Fahmy (2009, p. 34)
notes, the title presents a problem since we know that in Kant, it cannot be a duty to have a
feeling. Fahmy suggests that the title refers to cultivated sympathetic feeling (Fahmy 2009,
p. 46), in which case I think it would read something like ‘cultivated sympathetic feeling is gen-
erally a duty’. Fahmy herself still finds ‘the title somewhat odd’ (Fahmy 2009, p. 50fn.23), and I
agree, for it seems to imply that to have the cultivated feeling is generally a duty, as opposed to
the idea that to cultivate sympathetic feeling is (only) an indirect duty. According to Fahmy
(2009, p. 49fn.4), Timmermann has suggested that it might be better to translate überhaupt as
as such, but this move doesn’t help to solve this particular issue. I do believe, however, that
a different translation of überhaupt will.While it is clear that the basic abstract meaning of über-
haupt (literally, overhead) refers to generality (as opposed to particularity), the Grimm and Ade-
lung dictionaries show that, at least in 18th-century German, überhaupt often carries the meaning
of ‘in sum’, ‘in all’, or ‘all things considered’. It refers to something along the lines of the end-
point of a calculation or consideration. Grimm B.1 reads: eine mehrheit von gegenständen zusam-
menfassend – the majority of objects summarised or attached together. Adelung 1. reads: In
allem, alles zusammen genommen – in all, all taken together. This would make good sense in
relation to Kant’s accounts (e.g. GW, 4:399.27–34; MM, 6:457.24–25), which hold that sympathet-
ic feeling is not a duty: all in all, when not just the ground of morality but also the final ends of
humanity are taken into account, together with the fact that human beings are natural creatures
with feelings, on which their happiness largely relies, there is an important sense in which sym-
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which the feeling-action division is yet again repeated in the duty of Theilneh-
mung and how cultivation figures in this division from the perspective of the con-
cept of love.
Kant’s basic distinction here is between humanitas practica and humanitas
aesthetica. Humanitas aesthetica is a natural receptivity to ‘joy for others and
pity (SYMPATHIA MORALIS)’, which are ‘sensuous feelings of (what should
therefore be called aesthetic) pleasure or displeasure at the state of gratification
as well as pain of others’ (MM, 6:456.20–22)⁶². According to Kant, ‘to use them as
a means to the advancement of active and rational benevolence is still a partic-
ular, if only conditional, duty under the name of humaneness (HUMANITAS).’
(MM, 6:456.24–27)⁶³ In other words, at the beginning of Section 34, ‘humane-
ness’ [Menschlichkeit] is a conditional duty to use humanitas aesthetica or our
natural receptivity to the feelings of others to promote active benevolence,
which might make the duty of humaneness an adjunct to beneficence. As
Wood and Fahmy have argued, however, a closer look at how Kant elaborates
the notion of ‘humaneness’ (see also C2, 155fn.) seems to reveal the existence
of another, independent direct duty:
Now, it can be seen either as the capacity and will to communicate with one another with
regard to one’s feelings (HUMANITAS PRACTICA), or merely as the receptivity, given by Na-
ture herself, to the feeling of gratification or pain we share with others (HUMANITAS AES-
THETICA). The first is free and is therefore called participating sympathetically (COMMUNIO
SENTIENDI LIBERALIS), and is founded on practical reason. The second is unfree (COMMU-
NIO SENTIENDI ILLIBERALIS, SERVILIS) and can be called communicable (like that of heat
or of contagious diseases) and also compassivity, because it spreads naturally among
human beings living side by side. There is obligation only to the first. (MM, 6:456.28–
457.5)⁶⁴
pathetic feeling is after all a duty, if only an indirect duty of cultivation. I therefore propose what
I call the ‘all-in-all’ intepretation of überhaupt: the title should be translated as ‘All in all, sym-
pathetic feeling is a duty’.
 ‘Mitfreude und Mitleid (SYMPATHIA MORALIS)’ / ‘sinnliche Gefühle einer (darum ästhetisch
zu nennenden) Lust oder Unlust an dem Zustande des Vergügens sowohl als Schmerzens Ander-
er’. Timmermann’s (privately communicated) translation.
 ‘diese als Mittel zu Beförderung des thätigen und vernünftigen Wohlwollens zu gebrauchen,
ist noch eine besondere, obzwar nur bedingte Pflicht unter dem Namen der Menschlichkeit (HU-
MANITAS)’. Timmermann’s (privately communicated) translation.
 ‘Diese kann nun in dem Vermögen undWillen, sich einander in Ansehung seiner Gefühle mit-
zutheilen (HUMANITAS PRACTICA), oder blos in der Empfänglichkeit für das gemeinsame Gefühl
des Vergnügens oder Schmerzens (HUMANITAS AESTHETICA), was die Natur selbst giebt, ge-
setzt werden. Das erstere ist frei und wird daher theilnehmend genannt (COMMUNIO SENTIENDI
LIBERALIS) und gründet sich auf praktische Vernunft: das zweite ist unfrei (COMMUNIO SEN-
TIENDI ILLIBERALIS, SERVILIS) und kann mittheilend (wie die der Wärme oder ansteckender
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Above, Kant states that there is obligation [Verbindlichkeit] only to humanitas
practica. It therefore appears that the direct duty of Theilnehmung based on hu-
manitas practica should not be confused with the duty of humaneness in the ear-
lier sense. Humanitas practica occasions a direct participatory duty of human be-
ings to communicate their feelings to each other or to incorporate their feelings
in their communication (see Fahmy 2009, pp. 35–36, 42). In comparison with
gratitude, we may note that, whereas gratitude includes asymmetrical subject
positions in a respectful reaction to beneficence or benevolence, the direct
duty of Theilnehmung as Mittheilung is symmetrically reciprocal (see fig. 6).⁶⁵
Kant provides one further description of the relationship between these two
duties of sympathy:
But while pity (and thus also joy) for others is not in itself one’s duty, active sympathetic
participation in their fate is; and to this end it is thus indirectly one’s duty to cultivate the
natural (aesthetic) feelings of pity in us, and to use them as so many means to sympathetic
participation from moral principles and [from] the feeling that conforms to them. (MM,
457:24–29)⁶⁶
Krankheiten), auch Mitleidenschaft heißen: weil sie sich unter nebeneinander lebenden Men-
schen natürlicher Weise verbreitet. Nur zu dem ersteren giebts Verbindlichkeit.’ Timmermann’s
(privately communicated) translation. As Fahmy correctly points out, the verbmittheilen involves
giving something to another (Fahmy 2009, p. 35). In fact, according to Grimm, communication is
but one of its instances, and the general meaning is something like ‘imparting’; it hovers close to
the notions of gift [das Geschenk], active favour [die Wohlthat], and even blessing [die Gnade],
bringing its meaning in intimate proximity to beneficence. The English word ‘compassivity’ [Mi-
tleidenschaft] is an archaic word for compassion, which Timmermann uses to emphasise the
‘passive’ nature of this mechanical sympathy (on ‘Mitleidenschaft’, see Timmermann 2016b;
AP, 7:179.15–24).
 Tyler Paytas (2015) has proposed a ‘patient-centred’ account of Kant’s duty of sympathy. I
sympathise with Paytas’s careful and emotionally astute argumentation and agree fully that
the needs of others have a subjectively grounding moral significance. However, I worry that
the term ‘patient-centred’ risks obscuring the basic idea of reciprocity in the direct duty of Theil-
nehmung: it is a duty that human beings owe to each other. Paytas’s position is indeed sensible,
but because he uses Gregor’s translation as his sole source, he cannot see that her translation
does not preserve the construction sich einandern mitzutheilen. It seems that Paytas is talking
more about the duty of cultivation or the role of feelings in beneficence to others.
 ‘Obzwar aber Mitleid (und so auch Mitfreude) mit Anderen zu haben an sich selbst nicht
Pflicht ist, so ist es doch thätige Theilnehmung an ihrem Schicksale und zu dem Ende also in-
directe Pflicht, die mitleidige natürliche (ästhetische) Gefühle in uns zu cultiviren und sie als so
viele Mittel zur Theilnehmung aus moralischen Grundsätzen und dem ihnen gemäßen Gefühl zu
benutzen.’ Timmermann’s (privately communicated) translation. Note that the last instance of
‘Gefühl’ is singular and governed by ‘aus’ (not ‘zur’) (cf. Fahmy 2009, p. 37). It is very likely
that Kant means to suggest that we take the singular feeling as conforming to the moral princi-
ples rather than aesthetic feelings.
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In this passage, it seems that active participation in the fate [das Schicksal] of
others is a duty of humanitas practica, and one might well argue that this in-
cludes, besides communication with regard to feelings, actual beneficence
(this is indeed how the passage is often read). It is reasonable to suppose that
humanitas practica is a direct duty of communication [mittheilen] with regard
to feelings and hence distinct from beneficence. On a broader interpretation, it
may perhaps even be thought to include beneficence in such a way that it is
then beneficence with feelings. This interpretation would unite Fahmy’s ap-
proach with the previous consensus view.
On the other hand, the cultivation of feelings is here clearly supplementary
to the duty of active sympathetic participation. The indirect duty should hence be
understood as the cultivation of compassionate natural feelings that may be of
use both in communication with regard to our feelings and in active benevolence
or beneficence. But the passage implies further that compassionate feelings
should be used as a means to sympathetic participation from [aus] the feeling
that conforms to the moral principles of humanitas practica.We can say that hu-
manitas practica resides in the free rational will and belongs to practical love,
but what the ‘feeling’ and the ‘moral principles’ here actually refer to is less
clear. The feeling appropriate to moral principles could very well be respect
for the moral law. But if the moral principles in question are principles of love
of benevolence (as we are, after all, immersed in the rubric of practical love),
the feeling could also be love of delight. We know that generally, love and re-
spect are the two feelings that relate to the performance of duties of virtue to oth-
ers (MM, 6:448.14–15). The idea might be that while the duty of sympathetic par-
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ticipation (as communication) is grounded in pure practical reason, this commu-
nication necessarily requires love of benevolence and is profoundly facilitated by
love of delight as the feeling of love, for which our mechanical receptivity to the
feelings of others serves as a further aid. But this is speculation, and the conser-
vative view would be to say that Kant is talking about respect. I do not know
whether the feeling referred to in this last instance is love or respect, and I
am happy to leave it open. Remaining at the level of conceptual outline, my
point is that we do encounter the notion of cultivation in this context, and
that it is relatively important.⁶⁷
In Sections 34 and 35 of the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, there is thus a direct duty of
sympathetic participation (reciprocal communication with regard to feelings), as
well as an indirect duty to cultivate natural sympathetic joy and pity, to be used
as means to active rational benevolence and to sympathetic participation from
moral principles and the feeling of love or respect. Quite clearly, the duty of sym-
pathy (or Theilnehmung) includes feelings, the reciprocal action of communica-
tion, and the cultivation of feelings.
4.3 The Feeling-Action-Cultivation Account
To my knowledge, the most general previous account of neighbourly love in
Kant’s moral philosophy is that proposed by Christoph Horn (2008). I believe
I’m now in a position to evaluate what I take to be his main proposition. In
‘The Concept of Love in Kant’s Virtue Ethics’, Horn offers a rich reading of
love in several of Kant’s works, focusing on The Metaphysics of Morals. If I inter-
pret Horn correctly, he ends up viewing love as one of our moral feelings, sug-
 Baron (1995, p. 213) has wondered whether humanitas aesthetica is the same as love of
neighbour or whether it is ‘somewhat narrower’. I believe I can now answer Baron’s question.
Humanitas aesthetica is clearly narrower than love of neighbour in the sense that, systematical-
ly, it belongs to love of neighbour through belonging to the duty of Theilnehmung, which in turn
belongs to practical love – which, alongside the feeling of love, is a primary subset of love of
neighbour. On the other hand, since humanitas aesthetica is defined in natural, emotive
terms, it bears a special relation to the sensory-emotive side of love of neighbour. With this
said, Humanitas aesthetica is identical neither with inclination-based love of benevolence nor
with love of delight; the former is an inclination to benefit the other, and the latter is a particular
positive feeling of delight or immediate pleasure occasioned by the other’s perfections or hu-
manity (perhaps regardless of whether the other feels any love for us or not), or it is a natural
predisposition to have such a feeling. Humanitas aesthetica seems to be a more general capacity
of receptiveness to the positive and negative feelings of others, such that through humanitas aes-
thetica the feelings of others may occasion similar feelings in us.
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gesting that Kant ‘admits only an indirect or secondary role for love and other
moral feelings.’ (Horn 2008, p. 173) I think Horn’s proposition is true in the
sense that Kant would never accept that morality is objectively grounded in
the feeling of love. To equate love with a moral feeling, however, is possible
only if we begin by reading ‘love’ in the unqualified sense (as feeling). Admitted-
ly, there is evidence in support of this interpretation. But in the light of the divi-
sion between the feeling of love and practical love, which Kant uses throughout
his published main works in moral philosophy, Horn’s conclusion cannot be
considered plausible, since practical love belongs to love as part of the division
of love of neighbour. The love of practical love involves goodwill that results in
beneficence and hence cannot be reduced to a moral feeling. In other words, sys-
tematically, practical love of benevolence cannot be reduced to (even if moral)
love of delight. Too much is left out if practical love is omitted from the concept
of love.
Before concluding, there is still one final taxonomical worry that I have yet
to discuss. Indeed, it is possible that I have misconstrued the taxonomy of love of
neighbour altogether, at the foundational level of the basic divisions.⁶⁸ For is it
not the case that when Kant is talking about love of neighbour he is most often
referring to Jesus’ love commandment? And doesn’t he explicitly say that, unlike
practical love from duty, the feeling of love cannot be commanded? And if this is
the case, then shouldn’t we say that love of neighbour actually consists only of
practical love and does not include the feeling of love at all? If Kant’s position in
the context of neighbourly love were indeed reducible to affirming practical love,
this would be the case. In other words, if Kant’s position on love of neighbour
were identical to his interpretation of Jesus’ position, the feeling of love might
actually be ruled out of the framework.⁶⁹ I do not think, however, that the text
warrants this kind of reductivist reading, which would equate love of neighbour
with practical love. First, in ‘Introduction XII’ in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, Kant
does use the term die Liebe des Nächsten (MM, 6:399.6) to refer to love as a feel-
ing, or more precisely, love as ‘a matter of sensation’ [eine Sache der Empfindung]
(MM, 6:401.24), and thus there is direct textual evidence that he does use the
term ‘love of neighbour’ more broadly.⁷⁰ Another point is that when Kant speaks
 I thank Günter Zöller for attacking my position from this perspective at a workshop at the
University of Luxembourg in 2015.
 This is the position held by Streich, who speaks of ‘love of neighbour without love’ [Näch-
stenliebe ohne Liebe] (Streich 1924, pp. 29, 39).
 Schönecker’s position is here similar to those of Zöller and Streich, and Schönecker calls
Kant’s use of the term die Liebe des Nächsten in ‘Introduction XII’ ‘misleading’ [irreführend]
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of love of neighbour, he usually refers to the distinction between pathological
love and practical love, or between the feeling of love and practical love, and
the text seems always to affirm that it is possible to love others from inclination
or with feeling (even though this is not commanded). Thus it is only if we try to
narrow Kant’s account of love of neighbour down to the love that is commanded
that we encounter this taxonomical worry. But if we think that love of neighbour
means the same thing as love of other human beings, it is clear that Kant’s
taxonomy is broader than mere practical love. The third thing is that even if
we try to reduce love of neighbour to practical love, in order to appreciate
how practical love actually works in Kant’s ethics and to account for the notion
of cultivation we must still make sense of how the feelings of love operate within
this conceptual framework. If love of neighbour includes practical love and prac-
tical love produces an inclination of love in the beneficent subject, and if the
aesthetic predisposition of the feeling of love is, to begin with, a subjectively nec-
essary precondition of practical love, then shouldn’t we say that the feeling of
love somehow belongs to love of neighbour? I take it that Kant’s account of
love of neighbour is not identical to what Jesus said, and that Kant’s framework
of love of neighbour does include feeling, action, and cultivation. (For basic di-
visions, see fig. 7.)
In this chapter, I have argued that love of neighbour is best understood in
the light of a general division approach to love in Kant, and that this general di-
vision gives support to a new interpretation of love of neighbour in Kant, which I
call the feeling-action-cultivation account.
I began by grounding the general division of love in Kant’s earlier works,
and I problematised it in the Groundwork and the second Critique from the per-
spective of love of neighbour. I then showed the existence of the general division
of love in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ of The Metaphysics of Morals. A comparison of
the Groundwork, the second Critique, and The Metaphysics of Morals revealed
that while Kant’s account of love of neighbour is constantly in flux, some
basic elements remain consistent throughout the mature period. If the earlier lec-
tures on ethics are included, it is possible to detect inclination-based love of be-
nevolence, active rational love of benevolence, sensuous love of delight, and in-
tellectual love of delight as all appearing in terms of love of neighbour. Despite
all the complexity, in the most general terms of the published main works, love
of neighbour divides into the natural feeling or sensation of love (love of delight)
and the duty of practical love (love of benevolence). Hence, the general division
(Schönecker 2010, p. 153). For a view more like mine, which accepts emotive elements as belong-
ing to love of neighbour, see Green (1992, pp. 276–277).
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of love in love of neighbour consists of a natural, sensory-emotive component
and a rational-moral component that emphasises action in furthering the ends
of others. I have also analysed how feeling, action, and cultivation figure in
the duties of beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy, and in this way I have
shown that love of neighbour includes the moral cultivation of the sensory-emo-
tive aspects of our cognitive apparatus. I have thus provided a conceptual outline
for the feeling-action-cultivation account of love of neighbour.
love of neighbour
love of benevolence love of delight
from inclination practical love pathological intellectual
beneficence gratitude sympathy
active affective humanitas humanitas
(beneficence) (respect) practica aesthetica
Figure 7. Basic Divisions of Love of Neighbour
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5 Love in Friendship
In this final chapter, I discuss love in friendship. Over the past twenty years or
so, a fair amount of discussion has gradually accumulated around the notion
of friendship in Kant. In the previous treatments, three basic propositions con-
cerning love may be detected. First, some hold that friendship in Kant is always
based on the feeling of love (Wood 2015, pp. 12, 16). Second, the majority of
scholars take the view that for Kant, friendship essentially or ideally includes
a union, or a balance, between love and respect (Paton 1993, p. 137; Denis
2001b, p. 4; Filippaki 2012, p. 35; Moran 2012, p. 170; Baron 2013, p. 381; Wood
2015, p. 4). And third, there are those who posit that for Kant, love is even op-
posed to the concept of friendship, or at least bracketed from what Kant calls
‘moral friendship’ (Marcucci 1999, p. 440; Van Impe 2011, p. 137).
What is common to the previous approaches is that they tend not to offer a
very detailed or systematic account of how the word ‘love’ actually operates
within the framework of friendship.¹ In particular, there is relatively little uni-
formity in the literature concerning the logical relations that obtain between
the basic components of love’s general division within this context, that is, rela-
tions between love of benevolence and love of delight. Some accounts leave the
love at issue in friendship relatively unspecified (Marcucci 1999; Moran 2012;Van
Impe 2011; Baron 2013)², some equate love with benevolence (Denis 2001b, p. 7;
Moran 2012, p. 173), and some equate it with both benevolence and delight
(Paton 1993, p. 138; Wood 1999, pp. 278, 280; Wood 2015, pp. 12– 15). Some
view the love at issue as practical love (Denis 2001b, p. 7), whereas others see
it as the feeling of love (Moran 2012, pp. 197– 198; Wood 2015, p. 16).
In what follows, I will offer a systematic reconstruction of Kant’s mature phi-
losophy of friendship from the perspective of the concept of love. The basic ques-
tion to be asked is simply: what does it mean to love one’s friends, according to
Kant – or how does love function in the context of Kantian friendship? Against
the backdrop of the previous discussions, a number of more specific problems
must be highlighted: what is the relationship between love and respect in friend-
 With the possible exception of Wood (1999; 2015), whose account nevertheless has some prob-
lems, to which I will return below.
 Marcucci and Baron do not discuss the components of the general division. Kate Moran notes
that mere ‘well-wishing love’ in the Vigilantius notes seems weaker than the love at issue in
friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals (Moran 2012, p. 173), but she doesn’t connect this to de-
light in terms of love (see Moran 2012, pp. 197– 198). Van Impe recognises the distinctions be-
tween different types of love in the Vigilantius notes but does not analyse their connection to
love in friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals.
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ship? Is friendship based on love or rather on respect, or does it rest equally on
both? What role does the general division of love play in loving friendship? Is the
love at issue in friendship love of benevolence, love of delight, or both? Is love
opposed to the concept of friendship, or at least somehow bracketed in some
kinds of friendship? And finally, what is the role of love and friendship in hu-
manity’s ascent toward the ideal ethical community?
In general, I will argue that if the systematic or architectonic role of friend-
ship in Kant’s philosophy is taken into account and an exegetical interpretation
of how the word ‘love’ operates within the context of friendship is provided, it
becomes clear that love (conditioned by respect) marks the path towards the
highest good in equal and reciprocal human relationships. Kant is not out to
deny the relevance of love but views both love and respect as the necessary con-
ditions of friendship (even though respect has a morally grounding function). To-
gether, love and respect form the relatively sufficient condition of friendship. In
friendship we cultivate benevolence (Liebe des Wohlwollens) and openhearted-
ness while enjoying each other intellectually (Liebe des Wohlgefallens) and re-
specting appropriate distance. Friendship also serves a mediating role in human-
ity’s ascent toward the ideal moral community (see Wood 2015, p. 6): by
cultivating personal friendships, and as friends of humanity in general, we strive
to bring about a cosmopolitan community of love and respect. I call this overall
interpretation (for which I am indebted to Moran and Wood) the ascent view of
love in Kantian friendship.When taken alongside analysis of the general division
of love in friendship and the previous chapters of the study, the ascent view of
love in Kantian friendship serves to corroborate the main claim of this study as a
whole: that the general division approach and the ascent view of love are plau-
sible and defensible general notions regarding Kant on love.
I will begin by summarising Kant’s discussion of love in friendship prior to
The Metaphysics of Morals. I will then reconstruct the ‘official’ mature position in
the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, paying special attention to the distinction between love
and respect and the question of how to interpret the general division of love in
this light. Finally, I show how an ascent towards a community of ‘cosmopolitan
love’ may be detected in Kant’s accounts of friendship.
5.1 Love in Friendship Prior to The Metaphysics of Morals
Depending on which textual source one emphasises, there is more than one pos-
sible way to construct the basic taxonomy of friendship in Kant. The three main
sources that scholars commonly use in this context are the Collins/Kaehler notes
on ethics, the Vigilantius notes on ethics, and the section on friendship at the
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end of the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ of The Metaphysics of Morals. I think it is very im-
portant to note that the discussion in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is the only publish-
ed account of Kant’s conception of friendship. Admittedly, the lecture notes give
a much richer and more nuanced picture of the topic, and it is not at all surpris-
ing that scholars have been keen to draw interpretations on their basis. However,
I believe that for an accurate ‘official’ account of Kant’s mature position, one has
to emphasise the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, even though one should also use the lec-
tures as auxiliary tools for interpretation insofar as they can be harmonised with
the published work. I will begin my discussion by considering how the notion of
love works in the lecture notes on friendship, before turning to The Metaphysics
of Morals.
In the Collins notes’ discussion of friendship, the basic distinction is be-
tween the motives of self-love and morality. Friendship is about overcoming
the motive of self-love: it is chosen on moral grounds and involves an inter-indi-
vidual, reciprocal mode of caring about another’s happiness (LE, 27:422–423). In
the idea of friendship, ‘self-love is swallowed up in the idea of generous mutual
love.’ (LE, 27:423.8–9)³ Kant makes clear that friendship is an unattainable idea
or ideal that marks ‘the maximum of mutual love’ [Das Maximum der Wechsel-
liebe] (LE, 27:423.37–38), which is a state where one loves the other as oneself.⁴
He divides friendship into three forms or types: those of ‘need’ [Bedürfniß],
‘taste’ [Geschmack], and ‘disposition’ [Gesinnung] (LE, 27:424.38–39). The friend-
ship of need is the ‘lowest’ or most rudimentary form of friendship and is about
mutual help in the satisfaction of material needs. It occurs, for instance, ‘when
savages go hunting’ (LE, 27:425.5)⁵. Every friendship presupposes the friendship
of need, which means that friends can rely on each other’s help if necessary,
even though they should avoid asking for help, because this would threaten
the equality of the relationship (LE, 27:425.27–426.21). The friendship of taste
is not real friendship but its ‘analogue’ [Analogon] and occurs when persons
of different occupations (e.g. a scholar and a soldier) take pleasure in each oth-
er’s company, perhaps without a view to each other’s happiness (LE,
 ‘die Selbstliebe verschlungen ist in der Idee der großmüthigen Wechselliebe.’
 The ideal nature of the idea of friendship remains consistent throughout Kant’s discussions.
For analysis of the idea/ideal distinction in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, see Baron (2013, p. 375).Vic-
toria Wike (2014) provides a helpful account of the notion of ‘practical idea’ in this context. For
my purposes, it is sufficient to note that for Kant, moral or practical ideas come with regulative
ideals for action and the cultivation of character, and the idea of friendship means just that: that
friendship has an ideal nature we ought to strive to approximate in practice or in some actual
human relationships.
 ‘Wenn daher Wilde auf die Jagd gehn’.
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27.426.21–37). The third form is the friendship of disposition or sentiment [Senti-
ment]. Friendship of disposition is based on the human need to communicate
thoughts and feelings to others. In society, our prudential mistrust of others pla-
ces constraints on the openness of communication, and the friendship of dispo-
sition is about establishing the trust required for confiding in another individual,
in order to be ‘fully in companionship’ (LE, 27:427.13)⁶. This sort of friendship is
only possible with one or two people (LE, 27:427.20–21), but it may help to open
our hearts more generally (LE, 27:428.12–23). It is about ‘dispositions of feelings,
and not those of actual service.’ (LE, 27:426.39–427.1)⁷ A condition for the possi-
bility of this ‘highest’ form of friendship is that the friends share a similar moral
outlook: ‘They need to have the same principles of understanding and morality,
and then they can fully understand each other’ (LE, 27:429.6–7)⁸.
This brief summary of Kant’s early account reveals the unwavering impor-
tance of love in Kantian friendship. Friendship is contrasted with self-love,
and the idea of friendship is defined as the maximum of mutual love. In a
tone reminiscent of Kant’s approach to (moral) sexual love in the same lectures,
in the idea of friendship one gives oneself (or one’s love) to the other and gets
oneself back through the other’s love. In this way, one may love one’s friend
‘as oneself ’, or as much as oneself. (LE, 27:423.37–424.6; cf. 27:388.23–37; see
ch. 2.2.3; Korsgaard 1996, p. 195; Langton 2009, pp. 319, 363) The account in Col-
lins also brings with it certain questions that are useful to keep in mind as we
proceed towards Kant’s later discussions.While the general division of love is al-
ready given a formulation in the Collins notes (LE, 27:417–418), Kant does not
elaborate on the ‘mutual love’ [Wechselliebe] referred to in the context of friend-
ship in terms of the general division. Indirect evidence suggests that in Collins,
the love at issue in friendship is at least love of benevolence, for with regard to
the extension of friendships Kant states: ‘People do not favour everyone with
their benevolence, but would sooner confine themselves, in that respect, to a
small circle.’ (LE, 27:427.37–39)⁹ But I don’t see anything to exclude the possibil-
ity that friendship in Collins could also include love of delight. Recall that in Col-
 ‘gänzlich in Gesellschaft.’ Translation modified. The German Gesellschaft is ambiguous be-
tween society at large and more restricted companionship or company. Kant might be implying
that by harbouring close special bonds we are also better able to participate in society in general
(see ch. 5.3).
 ‘Gesinnungen der Empfindung und nicht der wirklichen Dienstleistungen.’
 ‘Sie Müssen gleiche Principia des Verstandes und der Moralität haben, denn können sie sich
complet verstehn’.
 ‘Die Menschen machen sich nicht allgemein mit ihrem Wohlwollen, sondern mögen sich gern
darin restringiren auf einen kleinen Zirkel.’
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lins, intellectual love of delight for another’s humanity is defined as a duty (see
LE, 27:418), and in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, love of delight is a necessary natural
predisposition for receptivity to duty (see ch. 4.2.1), and further, one may feel
pathological delight in response to the physical perfections of one’s friend. An-
other interesting fact in comparison with Kant’s later treatments is that the no-
tion of respect is a lot less prevalent in Collins than in Vigilantius or the ‘Doc-
trine of Virtue’. This is explained at least in part by the fact that Kant’s theory
of moral autonomy, which relies largely on the notion of respect for the moral
law, is not yet in place.We do find the notion of respect in Collins¹⁰, and regard-
ing friendship in particular Kant proposes: ‘The name of friendship should in-
spire respect, and even if our friend has somehow become an enemy, we must
still venerate the previous friendship’ (LE, 27:429:27–29)¹¹. This is an isolated in-
stance of Achtung, however, and in the Collins notes friendship is defined nearly
exclusively in terms of love.
The Vigilantius notes from 1793– 1794 explicitly anticipate the publication of
The Metaphysics of Morals, and they are particularly interesting when it comes to
figuring out the details of Kant’s mature conception of love in friendship. As in
Collins, the notion of friendship in Vigilantius still involves an ideal that we can-
not realise and can only strive for and approach (LE, 27:680.34–35). However,
the previous threefold distinction (between friendships of need, taste, and dispo-
sition) is no longer explicitly visible, and it is somewhat unclear whether Kant
still relies on the previous taxonomy. What is clear is that in Vigilantius friend-
ship is defined explicitly in terms of the general division of love, and the notion
of respect now plays a much more important role than it did in Collins. The basic
(ideal) definition of friendship in Vigilantius is: ‘A complete love of benevolence
and delight among equals, in regard to their moral disposition and inclinations.’
(LE, 27:680.28–30)¹²
As in Collins, the basic definition of the concept of friendship is here given
exclusively in terms of love. It is striking that the ideal of friendship in Vigilan-
tius unites the two aspects of love’s general division in a relationship between
equal persons. Kant explains that the concept of friendship actually involves
five elements,which are combined in the (ideal) definition of friendship: 1) recip-
 See e.g. LE, 27:302.33–34, where pure ethics involves respect.
 ‘Man muß Achtung vor vor dem Namen der Freundschaft haben, und wenn auch unser
Freund wodurch Feind geworden ist, so müßen wir doch die vorige Freundschaft veneriren’.
 ‘eine vollständige Liebe des Wohlwollens und Wohlgefallens gleicher Personen in Ansehung
ihrer moralischen Gesinnung und Neigungen.’
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rocal love of benevolence; 2) equality; 3) reciprocal possession of each other; 4)
reciprocal enjoyment of each other’s humanity; and 5) reciprocal love of delight.
Kant describes love of benevolence, the first component of friendship, in a
way that is similar to how he depicts it in the context of love of neighbour in
The Metaphysics of Morals. It is ‘the universal duty of love, which we owe to
every human being’ (LE, 27:675.36–37)¹³. Kant also notes that in comparison
with love of delight, this love is ‘more closely and strictly coupled with the
idea of friendship’ (LE, 27:676.10)¹⁴. Interpreted in terms of the official account
of love of benevolence in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, this love would have to be
practical love, as it is defined as a duty. But there are interesting differences be-
tween Vigilantius and The Metaphysics of Morals in terms of how Kant elaborates
on the duty. In Vigilantius, ‘we must absolutely make it our maxim to promote
goodness in others.’ (LE, 27:675.38–39)¹⁵ In the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, however,
love of benevolence is directed to promoting the happiness of others, not their
goodness. In the context of friendship, we can understand this in terms of
Kant’s idea that it is a duty in friendship to point out our friends’ flaws, even
though this is always risky and must be done cautiously, without loss of respect
(MM, 6:470.21–28; LE, 27:685.4– 19). In general, benevolence in the intimacy of
friendship also involves promoting the moral progress of the other.
The second ideal component says that the friends must be equally capable of
promoting each other’s well-being in terms of ‘powers’ [Kräfte], ‘wealth’ [Reich-
tum], and ‘influence’ [Einfluß] (LE, 27:676.29–31). Third, the friends possess each
other intellectually or morally, which means that ‘each mutually shares in every
situation of the other, as if it were encountered by himself ’ (LE, 27:677.13– 14)¹⁶.
Interestingly, Kant here explicitly compares this mutual possession with mar-
riage, but unlike marriage, where the foundation of the union is sexual love,
in friendship the ‘reciprocal possession is founded […] on moral principles
and a mutual love derived from that’ (LE, 27:677.4–5)¹⁷. This suggests that the
sharing and sympathetic concern [teilnehmen] are based on rational love of be-
 ‘die allgemeine Pflicht der Liebe, die wir jedem Menschen schuldig sind.’
 ‘Näher aber und stricte verbindet sich mit der Idee der Freundschaft’.
 ‘wir das Gute in andern zu befördern uns schlechthin zur Maxime Machen müssen.’
 ‘wechselseitig an jeder Lage des andern teilnehmen, so als wenn es ihm selbst wiederfahren
wäre’.
 ‘wechselseitige Besitz ist aber auf moralische Grundsätze und eine daher abgeleitete Wech-
selliebe gegründet’. Another obvious difference in comparison with marriage is that according to
Kant (in Vigilantius), the marriage relation is not equal and is instead a relation of ‘superioris
erga inferiorem’ (LE, 27:683.9), such that the husband is superior to the wife (see ch. 2.2.3).
For an elaborated list of six differences between friendship and marriage in Kant, see Denis
(2001b, pp. 13– 16).
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nevolence or intellectual love of delight. The fourth component is ‘the reciprocal
enjoyment of their humanity’ (LE, 27:677.23)¹⁸, which occurs through openheart-
ed communication [Mitteilung], where the friends ‘communicate not only their
feelings and sensations to one another, but also their thoughts.’ (LE,
27:677.26–27)¹⁹ It is thus clear that the friends enjoy each other through both
the sensory-aesthetic and the rational parts of their humanity. That is, the com-
munication that brings about this enjoyment involves both humanitas practica
and humanitas aesthetica (see MM, 6:456–457; ch. 4.2.2.C) and relates both to ra-
tional and to inclination-based loves in accordance with the general division.
Kant points out, however, that our friends might become our enemies in the fu-
ture, and in contrast to the ideal he expresses a significant amount of prudential
caution with regard to actually opening up one’s heart to another: ‘Trust him
with caution only, and disclose to him nothing which he might be able to mis-
use, to the detriment of your respect.’ (LE, 27:679.11–13)²⁰
The fifth component is ‘love for mutual delight’ (LE, 27:680.22)²¹. The de-
scription of this component is very brief. In the definition, we are told only
that it ‘lies solely in the intellectual disposition of the friends, engendered
through the material of reciprocal esteem, and on this rests the intellectual
need for friendship.’ (LE, 27:680.23–25)²² The notion that the love of delight be-
longs exclusively to ‘the intellectual disposition of the friends’ must clearly be
understood in terms of the Collins notes distinction between sensuous and intel-
lectual delight: ‘The love of delight is the pleasure we take in showing approval
of another’s perfections. This liking may be either sensuous or intellectual.’ (LE,
27:417.21–24)²³ I think what is ruled out in Vigilantius is (ideal) friendship’s being
based on, for instance, sexual inclination, or more generally a delight in the
physical perfections of another (since we are, however, dealing with a ‘complete
love’ also with respect to inclinations, the possibility of sensuous delight is not
ruled out of the framework altogether – it might be irrelevant, but it is not ‘pro-
hibited’). The ‘intellectual need’ [das intellectuelle Bedürfnis] seems to refer to a
 ‘Der wechselseitige Genuß ihrer Humanität’.
 ‘sich nicht allein ihre Gefühle und Empfindungen, sondern auch ihre Gedanken einander
mitzuteilen.’
 ‘Traue ihm nur mit Vorsicht, entdecke ihm nichts, wovon er mit Nachteil deiner Achtung Mis-
brauch machen könnte.’
 ‘Die Liebe zu dem wechselseitigen Wohlgefallen.’ Translation modified.
 ‘liegt aber blos in der intellectuellen Gesinnung der Freunde, durch den Stoff wechselseitiger
Werthschätzung erzeugt, und darauf beruht das intellectuelle Bedürfnis zur Freundschaft.’
 ‘Die Liebe des Wohlgefallens ist das Vergnügen, welches wir haben, den Vollkommenheiten
des andern Beyfall zu beweisen. Dieses Wohlgefallen kann sinnlich und intellectual seyn.’ See
ch. 4.1.
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special kind of reciprocal desire to take delight in the moral perfections or the
humanity of another. This moral love of delight is not mere respect, for the effect
does not seem to be described as essentially humbling, and Kant’s use of the
word ‘need’ implies the idea of approaching each other or coming together in
communion. Recall that in Collins, the object of intellectual love of delight is
at bottom the sheer humanity of another human being (see LE, 27:418.19–20;
ch. 4.1). We may thus take it that in friendship 1) reciprocal intellectual love of
delight has the humanity of the other person as its object. And, since the defi-
nition of love of delight includes pleasure or satisfaction [Vergnügen] in the per-
fections of another (MM, 6:449.17–20; LE, 27:417.21–24), 2) there can be a greater
or a lesser amount of intellectual love of delight, depending on the actual moral
dispositions of the agents involved.
It seems that this is exactly what Kant has in mind when he speaks of intel-
lectual love of delight in the context of friendship in the Vigilantius notes. The
above considerations map very closely onto the fourth ideal component of
friendship, where the reciprocal enjoyment of the friends’ humanity is brought
about by comprehensive communication. In other words, when, as friends, we
come to appreciate each other’s moral standing or disposition through various
acts of communication, we love each other by approving of each other’s human-
ity. The more morally perfect we become, the more complete our intellectual love
of delight for each other.²⁴ In this sense,we may speak of an ascent of love in this
context. Our moral ascent has a correlate in the love we experience when we ob-
serve each other’s moral attributes as unifying through sympathetic communica-
tion:
So when friendship demands a reciprocal love, in that it is based on unity of the moral dis-
position, this is not a natural inclination, but rather an intellectual unification of the feel-
ings and thoughts of the parties, and the well-being that springs from this constitutes re-
ciprocal love. (LE, 27:682.16–20)²⁵
 Wood goes so far as to say that mutual love of delight ‘is the characteristic of friendship that
makes it the final end of morality.’ (Wood 2015, p. 15) I think Wood is right, if we can take the
Vigilantius notes as truly capturing Kant’s final position. The reciprocal delight human beings
would take in view of each other’s moral disposition in the state of the perfect moral community
is perhaps best expressive of what Kant might mean by ‘moral happiness’ as an ideal cosmopol-
itan notion. (See also Korsgaard 1996, pp. 193– 194.)
 ‘Daher wenn die Freundschaft eine wechselseitige Liebe erfordert, indem sie sich auf Einheit
der moralischen Gesinnung stützt, so ist dies nicht natürliche Zuneigung, sondern es ist dies
eine intellectuelle Vereinigung ihrer gefühle und Gedanken; und das daraus entsprießende
Wohlbefinden macht die Wechselliebe.’
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Here, the reciprocal love must be love of delight since the love at issue is defined
as well-being that is an effect of intellectual communion. In the context of friend-
ship, love of delight is thus intellectual pleasure rooted in the friends’ reciprocal
openhearted moral approval of each other (this cannot be directly commanded,
since it cannot be a direct duty to be delighted by another’s existence).
In the Vigilantius notes, Kant clearly makes use of love’s general division,
which now lies at the heart of his concept of friendship. Whether Kant still im-
plicitly relies on the threefold taxonomy found in Collins is not clear (nor is it
essential to my argument), but it seems that what Kant is mainly talking about
in Vigilantius is a kind of ‘moral friendship’ that matches roughly what in Collins
is called ‘the friendship of disposition’.²⁶ In contrast to the Collins notes, respect
is now also given a fundamental role. Kant emphasises that in friendship, mutu-
al love must be accompanied by ‘mutual respect for humanity in the person of
the friend’ (LE, 27:683.23–24)²⁷, and hence respect must restrict reciprocal love.
This means that we should not force ourselves on our friends, neither in terms of
our beneficence nor in terms of our needy demands, since this will always pose a
threat to the equality of the friendship.
5.2 Love in Friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals
I will now move on to investigate love and friendship in Kant’s mature moral
philosophical work. This discussion appears as the ‘Conclusion of the elements
of ethics’ (MM, 6:469.13)²⁸, and, as mentioned above, it is the only published
source for Kant’s conception of friendship. I will try to understand the relation
between love and respect by first aiming to identify the love at issue in Kant’s
official account and then taking a careful look at the claims made by Silvestro
Marcucci (1999) and Stijn Van Impe (2011), according to whom love is in fact op-
posed to the concept of friendship, or at least bracketed from what Kant calls
‘moral friendship’. The section will show 1) that the love now at issue in friend-
ship is (at least) love of benevolence, and 2) that love is not opposed to the con-
cept of friendship. In fact, the available evidence does not even seem to support
the claim that love is bracketed from (any kind of) friendship.
 This link seems to be taken for granted by Moran (2012, p. 170) and Wood (2015, p. 7).
 ‘wechselseitiger Achtung für die Menschheit des andern’.
 ‘Beschluß der Elementarlehre’.
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5.2.1 Identifying the Love at Issue
In the Collins and Vigilantius notes, (ideal) friendship is defined solely in terms
of love. In Collins, it is ‘the maximum of mutual love’ (27:423.37–38); in Vigilan-
tius, ‘the complete love of benevolence and delight among equals’
(27:680.28–30). In the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, the definition is different to the extent
that it now explicitly includes respect. First, the heading of Kant’s discussion is
‘On the Most Intimate Union of Love with Respect in Friendship’ (MM,
6:469.14– 15)²⁹. The definition given immediately under the heading is: ‘Friend-
ship (considered in its perfection) is the union of two persons through equal mu-
tual love and respect.’ (MM, 6:469.17– 18)³⁰
To understand what love Kant is now talking about, it will be helpful to take
a closer look at what he says generally about the interplay of love and respect in
the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. In the introductory section on the duty of love, Kant ex-
plains that the laws of duty are analogous to the laws of physical nature. This
nature is governed by the Newtonian forces of attraction and repulsion, and
by analogy similar forces operate in the moral realm, where love functions as at-
traction and respect as repulsion³¹:
The principle of MUTUAL LOVE admonishes them constantly to come closer to one another;
that of the RESPECT they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance from one an-
other; and should one of these great moral forces fail, ‘then nothingness (immorality), with
 ‘Von der innigsten Vereinigung der Liebe mit der Achtung in der Freundschaft.’
 ‘Freundschaft (in ihrer Vollkommenheit betrachtet) ist die Vereinigung zweier Personen
durch gleiche wechselseitige Liebe und Achtung.’
 For more detailed analysis of the relation between Kant’s natural philosophy and moral
theory with regard to these Newtonian commitments, see Filippaki (2012). Note that Filippaki
correctly distinguishes between the duty of love and the feeling of love. But then she divides
the feeling of love into ‘aesthetic’ and ‘moral’; she apparently thinks that the ‘aesthetic’ feeling
of love is love of delight, whereas the ‘moral’ feeling of love is the natural predisposition to love
one’s neighbour as described in ‘Introduction XII’ in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ (Filippaki 2012,
pp. 31–32). But in ‘Introduction XII’, the latter (Filippaki’s ‘moral love’) is explicitly defined
as aesthetic. There, love of neighbour is one of the Ästhetische Vorbegriffe. A logically less cum-
bersome interpretation is that ‘Introduction XII’ speaks of love of delight as an aesthetic predis-
position to be subjectively affected by the duty of love (even though Kant’s distinction between
the feeling of love and the aesthetic capacity (of love) to be affected by duty is not clear). A po-
sition similar to mine, which identifies the love in ‘Introduction XII’ as love of delight, is held by
Schönecker (2010; see ch. 4.2.1 above). In the broadest sense, the ‘feeling’ [Empfindung, Gefühl,
Neigung] of love can refer at least to 1) the sexual impulse, 2) love of benevolence from inclina-
tion, 3) sensuous love of delight, and 4) intellectual or moral love of delight, which includes
both the aesthetic predisposition and the actual feeling.
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gaping throat, would drink up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings like a drop of water’ (if
I may use Haller’s words, but in a different reference). (MM, 6:449.8– 15)³²
The next paragraph goes on to explain that the mutual love now at issue is the
duty of love (or practical love) and not the feeling of love. On this basis, it is safe
to say that when Kant speaks of love as a moral force (which brings human be-
ings closer to each other) and contrasts this love with respect, the love he is talk-
ing about is love of benevolence. The general point is the same as that found in
Vigilantius: although we should approach each other through active rational be-
nevolence, our actions must be limited by respect, by means of which we are
(ideally) able to secure proper limits of intimacy and to preserve the equality
of the relationship. This point is made explicitly in the section on friendship
in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’: ‘For love can be regarded as attraction and respect
as repulsion, and if the principle of love bids friends to draw closer, the principle
of respect requires them to stay at a proper distance from each other.’ (MM,
6:470.4–7)³³ Connecting these two passages in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, we are
now in a position to identify the love that is contrasted with respect in the con-
text of friendship as the practical love of benevolence. At issue is the ‘principle’
[Princip] of love. Now I do not want to claim that this is the complete picture of
love in friendship, and feelings of love do figure in the framework, but the find-
ing does have consequences with regard to previous research.
Wood holds both that love of benevolence is a feeling and that friendship is
based on the feeling of love: ‘But friendship is nevertheless based on love as feel-
ing. The feeling of love as benevolence or well-wishing takes the form of friend-
ship when it is reciprocal’ (Wood 2015, p. 13). Wood bases his interpretation on
the Collins and the Vigilantius notes. When he reaffirms that ‘[t]he basis of
friendship is always love as feeling’ (Wood 2015, p. 16), I think he is not sensitive
enough to the fact that in the Groundwork (GW, 4:399.27–34), the second Critique
(C2, 5:83.3– 12), and The Metaphysics of Morals (MM, 6:449.17–22), the practical
 ‘Vermöge des Princips der WECHSELLIEBE sind sie angewiesen sich einander beständig zu
nähern, durch das der ACHTUNG, die sie einander schuldig sind, sich im Abstande von einander
zu erhalten; und sollte eine dieser großen sittlichen Kräfte sinken, “so würde dann das Nichts
(der Immoralität) mit aufgesperrtem Schlund der (moralischen) Wesen ganzes Reich wie einen
Tropfen Wasser trinken” (wenn ich mich hier der Worte Hallers, nur in einer andern Beziehung,
bedienen darf).’
 ‘Denn man kann jene [Liebe] als Anziehung, diese [Achtung] als Abstoßung betrachten, und
wenn das Princip der ersteren Annäherung gebietet, das der zweiten sich einander in geziemen-
dem Abstande zu halten fordert’.
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love of benevolence is consistently distinguished precisely from love as feeling.³⁴
Perhaps Wood thinks that practical love is also a feeling, but he doesn’t argue for
this controversial position (what seems to be missing from Wood’s discussion is
a distinction between love of benevolence from inclination and love of benevo-
lence as practical love, which distinction can only be grasped by careful compa-
rative analysis of the earlier lectures and the mature published works; see ch. 4).
Korsgaard, too, thinks that Kant’s discussion of friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Vir-
tue’ is about feelings (Korsgaard 1996, p. 191), and, like Wood, she does not take
into account that the principle of love can only be rational love of benevolence
(as distinguished from love as feeling). In possible contrast with Wood and Kors-
gaard, Denis (2001b, p. 4) holds that the love at issue in friendship is indeed
practical love, but she does not problematise this view.
The basic difficulty in establishing the operation of the general division of
love in the context of friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is that in the publish-
ed work, love of delight is not directly mentioned even once. But Kant does (at
least indirectly) speak about the feeling of love in this context. He notes that one
reason for the unattainability of the ideal of friendship is that it is difficult to ac-
count for ‘what relation there is in the same person between the feeling from one
duty and that from the other (the feeling from benevolence and that from re-
spect)’ (MM, 6:469.32–34)³⁵. In this passage, benevolence is clearly viewed as
a duty, so if it is love of benevolence, it must be practical love. The syntax
makes clear that the feeling connected with the duty cannot be identified with
the duty: it is a feeling from [aus] benevolence.We also know that, in effect, prac-
tical love (as benevolence leading to beneficence) will also bring about the feel-
ing of love in the broad sense, which can be identified as either love of benev-
olence from inclination or the pleasure of love of delight (see MM,
6:402.14–21; cf. LE, 27:417.11– 19; 27:419.4–7). So it is perhaps implied that love
 See ch. 4.1; cf. ch. 4.2.2. One reason for Wood’s seemingly odd view might be that he thinks
that love of benevolence is caused by love of delight (Wood 2015, p. 4). It is difficult to make out
what Wood bases this claim on since the passages he refers to (LE, 27:416; C3, 5:276; MM, 6:449)
do not contain any such idea. The evidence we do have suggests that the feeling of love or in-
clination-based love can at least sometimes be brought about by practical love (love of benev-
olence) (MM, 6:402.14–21; cf. LE, 27:419.4–7), even though love of delight is indeed the aesthetic
predisposition for the subjective receptivity to the duty of love (MM, 6:399–402). It is also the
case that there is such a thing as love of benevolence from inclination (which is not moral).
As I have just shown above, however, the love in friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ must
be identified at base as practical moral love of benevolence.
 ‘noch mehr aber, welches Verhältniß das Gefühl aus der einen Pflicht zu dem aus der andern
(z.B. das aus dem Wohlwollen zu dem aus der Achtung) in derselben Person habe’.
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of delight also figures in friendship, but in the mature work this love does not
seem to be the basis of friendship.
Kant also explicitly denies that the love in friendship could be an ‘affect’
(MM, 6:471.22–24), but we know from elsewhere that affects are particularly
rash emotional states that arise suddenly, drastically hindering one’s reflective
capacities, and then die out quickly (MM, 6:407.29 ff.; AP, 7:252–253). Kant’s re-
jection of love as affect cannot be taken to imply a general rejection of love as
feeling in the context of friendship.
One further place to look for the feeling of love in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’
account of friendship stems from Kant’s distinction between ‘moral’ friendship
and ‘aesthetic’ or ‘pragmatic’ friendship³⁶: ‘But that (pragmatic) friendship,
which burdens itself with the ends of others, although out of love, can have nei-
ther the purity nor the completeness requisite for a precisely determinant
maxim; it is an ideal of one’s wishes³⁷’ (MM, 6:472.27–30)³⁸. Here, the love can-
not be the moral love of benevolence since that belongs to moral friendship. But
since the love ‘burdens itself with the ends of others’, it is very likely love of be-
nevolence from inclination. The probable interpretation is that the pragmatic
friendship here is roughly equivalent to the earlier friendship of need, but this
 It is not entirely clear whether ‘aesthetic friendship’ and ‘pragmatic friendship’ are the same,
but I would argue that they are. The clue comes from Wood, who takes it for granted that ‘prag-
matic friendship’ corresponds to the friendship of need (Wood 2015, p. 7). We must remember
that in Kant’s original formulation in the Collins notes, the friendship of taste is only an ana-
logue of friendship, whereas the ‘friendship of need’ is presupposed in every friendship (LE,
27:425.27–28), and the ‘friendship of disposition’ is very close to his later discussions of
moral friendship. So there are actually only two friendships in the original classification, and
in the mature philosophy this arguably maps onto the phenomenal-moral or the nature-freedom
dualism. If we then look at the distinctions in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ – first between ‘moral
friendship’ and ‘aesthetic friendship’, and only a moment later between ‘moral friendship’
and ‘pragmatic friendship’ – we may plausibly conjecture that ‘pragmatic friendship’ and ‘aes-
thetic friendship’ mean the same thing and that the distinction between ‘aesthetic-pragmatic
friendship’ and ‘moral friendship’ corresponds roughly to the previous distinction between
‘friendship of need’ and ‘friendship of disposition’. This merely assumes that ‘aesthetic’ is
here read in the sense of ‘pertaining to’ or ‘arising from’ natural sensory experience. My identi-
fication of ‘aesthetic’ with ‘pragmatic’ friendship is highly conjectural and very uncertain, and
the main points of the chapter stand or fall regardless of its success.
 The fact that pragmatic friendship is defined as an ideal of one’s wishes shows (perhaps)
that the ideal of friendship includes not only moral perfection and an idealised balance between
the dispositions of the friends and all the moral components of the friendship but also a kind of
maximum of the sensory-aesthetic elements of friendship.
 ‘jene aber mit den Zwecken anderer Menschen sich, obzwar aus Liebe, belästigende (prag-
matische) kann weder die Lauterkeit, noch die verlangte Vollständigkeit haben, die zu einer
genau bestimmenden Maxime erforderlich ist, und ist ein Ideal des Wunsches’.
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is uncertain. My point is merely that we do find at least some kind of notion of
the feeling of love or pathological love in Kant’s official account of friendship,
but it seems that this cannot be the proper basis of moral friendship. Of course,
the aesthetic predisposition of love of neighbour as love of delight must still be
assumed to be generally operative as the subjective ground for receptivity to the
moral benevolence required for friendship (even though the predisposition is not
the objective ground of moral benevolence; see ch. 4.2.1).
We are now in a position to make the general claim that if one accepts the
Vigilantius notes as a reliable source, the general division of love is strongly
present in friendship, such that love of benevolence (as active rational benevo-
lence) is the primary basis of friendship in terms of love, and intellectual love of
delight is pleasurable moral approval, which is brought about by intimate sym-
pathetic sharing and communication of feelings and thoughts. But if only the
published work is accepted as a source, the existence of love of delight in this
specific context looks doubtful, and it is fairly clear that the love which ought
to unite with respect in friendship is rational love of benevolence (and not so
much love as feeling, though we know generally that the feelings of love are re-
lated to, and will also be brought about by, rational love of benevolence).
5.2.2 Can We Bracket Love from Friendship?
Given that Kant’s general definitions of friendship always include the word
‘love’, it is somewhat difficult to understand how love could be ‘opposed’ to
friendship, or ‘bracketed’ from moral friendship. However, precisely these claims
have been made in the literature, and since the claims have not yet been dis-
cussed critically by other interpreters, I think it is important to analyse them
here (Marcucci 1999; Van Impe 2011). Doing so will also clarify the logical rela-
tionship between love and respect in friendship in light of The Metaphysics of
Morals and the Vigilantius notes.
In the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, Kant’s emphasis on what he calls ‘moral friend-
ship’ becomes increasingly clear. As already mentioned, the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’
contains a division between ‘moral’ friendship and ‘aesthetic’ friendship [ästhe-
tischen] or ‘pragmatic’ friendship. Here, Kant defines moral friendship as ‘the
complete confidence of two persons in revealing their secret judgments and feel-
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ings to each other, as far as such disclosures are consistent with mutual respect.’
(MM, 6:471.27–29)³⁹
It is the above notion of moral friendship that supposedly warrants Marcuc-
ci’s claim, according to which respect becomes ‘very important’ and ‘love is put
between brackets’ (Marcucci 1999, p. 440). First, Marcucci seems to think that
this is obvious given the definition of moral friendship. Supposedly, if love is
not mentioned in the definition of moral friendship, then it does not belong to
the concept. But if we unpack the definition, three elements can be recognised
within it: 1) complete confidence or trust [das völlige Vertrauen]; 2) revealing in-
timate thoughts and feelings; and 3) respect. Now if we understand moral friend-
ship as a special relationship between individuals, a relationship that does not
automatically obtain between all human beings, we must also ask how such a
relation is possible – that is, how it can occur. What can it be that draws
some individuals closer to each other in such a way that they are able to form
this special bond? It might be self-love, but then the relationship would not
be moral at heart. Even though Kant does not mention love in the definition
cited by Marcucci, he is very clear that there are two forces operative in the
moral sphere: respect and love. Now the basis for trusting one another, and shar-
ing intimate thoughts and feelings, might well be respect rather than love. As
Kant explains, however, in the moral sphere between individuals respect is a
force of repulsion: respect keeps individuals at a distance from each other. It
seems that on this definition of the moral forces as analogous to Newtonian nat-
ural forces, respect cannot be responsible for bringing individuals into an inti-
mate union with each other. But (moral) love as attraction establishes just
that: ‘The principle of MUTUAL LOVE admonishes them constantly to come clos-
er to one another’ (MM, 6:449.8– 10⁴⁰; see 6:470.4–5). Without love, there is no
intimate relation to begin with, as the principle that draws individuals closer to-
gether is lacking. I do not see anything in the definition of moral friendship that
would make it the case that love of benevolence is no longer a necessary condi-
tion of friendship. Further, revealing intimate thoughts and feelings and being
responsive to our friend’s disclosures are dependent on a kind of principled em-
pathy, which Kant elsewhere discusses in terms of ‘sympathetic participation’ or
‘communication’ [Teilnehmung, Mitteilung]. According to Kant, this ‘sympathetic
participation’ is actually a duty of love, and thus it systematically belongs to the
concept of love (see MM, 6:456–457; ch. 4.2.2.C). It can also be argued that the
 ‘das völlige Vertrauen zweier Personen in wechselseitiger Eröffnung ihrer geheimen Urtheile
und Empfindungen, so weit sie mit beiderseitiger Achtung gegen einander bestehen kann.’
 ‘Vermöge des Princips der WECHSELLIEBE sind sie angewiesen sich einander beständig zu
nähern’.
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trust or confidence required for moral friendship gradually comes about via the
pleasure taken in mutual moral approval, which in the Vigilantius notes is dis-
cussed by Kant in terms of love of delight. It does not follow from the mere fact
that love is not mentioned in the definition of moral friendship that love is brack-
eted from its concept, since the conceptual components of moral friendship (ex-
cluding respect) seem to assume or presuppose the presence of love. However, if
the notion of love is qualified to mean merely the pathological feeling of love,
then one may say that love is bracketed from moral friendship – but Marcucci
does not analyse the divisions of love.⁴¹
Marcucci’s second point is that ‘Kant even opposes love to the concept of
friendship itself ’ (Marcucci 1999, p. 440). How does he argue for this? As evi-
dence for his point, Marcucci quotes the following passage from the ‘Doctrine
of Virtue’: ‘“the relation between the protector as benefactor, and the protected,
as obligated to gratitude, is […] a relation of mutual love, but not of friendship,
because their mutual respect is not the same in both parties.”’ (Marcucci 1999,
p. 440; citing MM, 6:473.5–8; Marcucci’s italics) Unfortunately, other than citing
the passage, Marcucci does not elaborate on the rationale for his conclusion.
Kant’s point in the passage is that a friend of human beings [Freund der Men-
schen]⁴² not only loves human beings but also takes into account ‘the equality
among them’ [der Gleichheit unter Menschen] (MM, 6:473.1–2). The reason for
this is that the relationship between a mere benefactor and the person being pro-
tected is not one of friendship, since even though love is present, respect is not
equal. It appears to me that Marcucci’s argument is a non sequitur: from the
premises that 1) equal respect is a necessary condition of friendship and 2)
not all relations of love are relations of friendship, it does not follow that 3)
love is opposed to the concept of friendship.
More recently, Marcucci’s arguments have been repeated by Van Impe (2011).
Van Impe derives the bulk of his discussion on love in friendship directly from
Marcucci’s article, and the only new consideration that he adds is the claim
that ‘Kant already seemed to consider this bracketing of love in the late Lectures
on Ethics by arguing that “only a reciprocal love based on [gebaut]⁴³ respect can
secure a lasting friendship”’ (Van Impe 2011, p. 137; citing LE, 27:683.16– 18; Van
Impe’s italics). Even though Van Impe does not say it, I gather that he thinks that
 He is especially unaware of the existence of love of benevolence and its operation in friend-
ship.
 I discuss the notion of a ‘friend of human beings’ in more detail in ch. 5.3.
 The verb Kant uses to describe the relationship between love and respect in that passage is
bauen, to build, and thus a more appropriate translation might be ‘a reciprocal love built on re-
spect’.
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if love were somehow reducible to respect or based on respect, then love would
be bracketed, and friendship would essentially be about respect. The context of
the passage cited by Van Impe is Kant’s idea that friendship is similar to mar-
riage because both involve a unity of persons, but that unlike marriage, where
the wife respects the husband more than the husband respects the wife, in
friendship the parties are obligated to equally ‘preserve the other’s respect’
(LE, 27:683.15)⁴⁴. From this the passage quoted by Van Impe above follows as
a conclusion. But does it follow from the passages that love is a mere effect of
respect or that we should think that love is ultimately only about respect?
Elsewhere in Vigilantius Kant describes the appropriate relationship be-
tween love and respect by noting that love must be ‘coupled’ with or ‘tied to’
[verbunden seyn] respect (LE, 27:682.24–25), or that respect must impose a ‘re-
striction’ [Einschränkung] on love (LE, 27:682.35). It is also the case that intellec-
tual love of delight is grounded in a moral ‘esteem’ [Schätzung] (see
27:680.23–25) for another person’s characteristics. Further, in ‘The End of All
Things’, Kant holds that respect is a necessary condition of ‘true love’ [wahre
Liebe] (8:337.33–34; see Wood 2015, p. 4). Thus it is indeed the case that, for
Kant, respect plays a crucial and fundamental role in any kind of moral love.
From a moral perspective, respect (for the moral law, for the humanity of the
other) forms the ground level on which subsequent moral relations are then
built. But if we think of the basic distinction between (moral) love and respect
in The Metaphysics of Morals, we see that love is still attraction and respect is
still repulsion: the two are clearly different.We must also remember that through
the aesthetic predisposition of love of delight, even the duty of love retains a spe-
cial connection to love as a sensory-aesthetic phenomenon: the bond between
love of benevolence and love of delight is close and complicated, and the inter-
relations between the elements of the general division of love cannot be thought
of in terms of mere respect. It therefore seems to me that even though respect is
morally primary (as Wood (2015, p. 4) correctly notes), love cannot be reduced to
respect. The identification or equation of love with respect would go against one
of the most fundamental distinctions of Kant’s moral philosophy. Therefore, love
cannot be bracketed this way.
The last thing to remember is that during Kant’s mature period, the basic
definitions of friendship are ‘the complete love of benevolence and delight
among equals’ (LE, 27:680.28–30) and ‘the union of two persons through
equal mutual love and respect.’ (MM, 6:469.17– 18) If Kant thought that love
(in general) was opposed to the concept of friendship or bracketed from some
 ‘des Andern Achtung zu erhalten’.
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kind of friendship, this would introduce a fairly dramatic contradiction between
Kant’s definitions and his actual position.⁴⁵ As I have shown, the evidence does
not support this interpretation. The exegetical stance favours the view that in
Kant’s philosophy of friendship, love and respect must be balanced.
5.3 Cosmopolitan Friendship: Love’s Ascent Toward the Ideal
Moral Community
Throughout his discussions, Kant makes clear that friendship is an intimate and
special bond between a very limited number of individuals: friendship is usually
held between two people. In such relationships, the friends embark on a joint
journey of moral progress, sharing their personhood, correcting each other’s
faults cautiously (through love of benevolence limited by respect), and taking in-
tellectual pleasure (love of delight) in each other’s improving moral attributes.
They help each other to cultivate virtue and to approach moral happiness in
an openhearted union (see Moran 2012, pp. 168 ff.). As they become more virtu-
ous, their active rational benevolence (Liebe des Wohlwollens) for each other
grows stronger and more consistent, and the more virtuous they are, the greater
the delight (Liebe des Wohlgefallens) they take in their friendship. In this way,
friendship, and the love that grows as the friends make progress, marks a
path towards the highest good between two people (see Moran 2012, p. 203).
We may therefore speak of an ascent of love in friendship, which means that
by attending to the duty of friendship, the friends’ love becomes greater and
more perfect.
But there is another notion closely interwoven with friendship that is more
general and that points towards an ascent of love as a more communal or even
cosmopolitan notion. This is the notion of being a friend of human beings [Men-
schenfreund], not in an intimate relationship with someone in particular but with
regard to humanity as a whole. I will end my discussion with an investigation of
what it means to be a friend of human beings from the perspective of love.
In the Collins notes, Kant points out that as society arises from natural crud-
ity or ‘savagery’ to civilisation, people tend to have fewer intimate friendships:
‘The more civilized men become, the more universal their outlook, and the small-
er the incidence of special friendships. The civilized man seeks a general friend-
 Neither Marcucci nor Van Impe addresses this point.
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ship and amenity, without having special ties.’ (LE, 27:428.30–33)⁴⁶ This sort of
‘universal friendship’ [Die allgemeine Freundschaft] does not mean that the civi-
lised person would be friends with everyone, but rather concerns a capacity for
establishing friendship with anyone. Such people are few in number: they are
optimistic and possess benevolence, good-heartedness, understanding, and
taste. Kant calls them ‘world citizens’ [Weltbürger]. (LE, 27:430.11–27)
In the Vigilantius notes, Kant’s attitude toward universal concern or affec-
tion is more ambivalent. Here he warns that ‘the friend to all humanity […] can-
not fail to dissipate his inclination through its excessive generality, and quite
loses any adherence to individual persons, […] though there is no denying that
the great value of human love rests in the general love of humanity as such.’
(LE, 27:673.25–31)⁴⁷ So while we should aim for a generalised attitude of love,
in doing so we risk losing proper sight of particular individual relationships.
Kant explains further that in contrast to intimate reciprocal friendship, which in-
volves amor bilateralis, being everyone’s friend is a unilateral disposition of love:
amor unilateralis. This unilateral love, which we ought to cultivate, is here clearly
love of benevolence: ‘being everyone’s friend; it does no more than formulate the
duty to harbor love of benevolence for the happiness of others, and is quite dif-
ferent from the term: to make friends with everyone.’ (LE, 27:676.19–22)⁴⁸
Kant’s definitive account of what it is to be a friend of human beings is given
at the very end of his discussion of friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. This
brief discussion serves as important evidence for Kant’s cosmopolitan outlook
as a part of his philosophy of love. On this basic definition, a friend of human
beings [Menschenfreund] is ‘one who takes an affective⁴⁹ interest in the well-
being of all human beings (rejoices with them)’ (MM, 6:472.34–35)⁵⁰. Kant
 ‘Je mehr die Menschen gesittet werden, desto allgemeiner werden sie, und desto weniger fin-
den die besondern Freundschaften statt. Der Gesittete sucht eine allgemeine Freundschaft und
Annehmlichkeit, ohne besondre Verbindung zu haben.’
 ‘der Weltliebhaber […], da es nicht fehlen kann, daß er seine Neigung durch die zu große
Allgemeinheit zerstreut und eine einzelne persönliche Anhänglichkeit ganz verliert, […] obgleich
nicht zu leugnen ist, daß der große Wert der Menschenliebe in der allgemeinen Menschenliebe
als solcher beruhet.’ Note that the word Kant uses in this passage is not Menschenfreund but
Weltliebhaber.
 ‘jedermanns Freund seyn: er drückt nichts mehr, als die Pflicht aus, Liebe des Wohlwollens
für anderer Menschen Glück zu hegen, und ist ganz verschieden von dem Ausdruck: mit jeder-
mann Freundschaft stiften.’
 Translating ästhetisch as affective with Baron, who follows Gregor’s 1991 translation (Baron
2013, p. 366). Note that Gregor’s Cambridge translation contains a typo: she uses ‘effective’ for
ästhetisch when she clearly means ‘affective’.
 ‘der, welcher an dem Wohl aller Menschen ästhetischen Antheil (der Mitfreude) nimmt’.
5.3 Cosmopolitan Friendship: Love’s Ascent Toward the Ideal Moral Community 163
then introduces a distinction between being a Menschenfreund and a Freund der
Menschen (both of which translate to ‘friend of human beings’), such that being
a friend of human beings [Freund der Menschen] also involves ‘thought and con-
sideration for the equality among them’ (MM, 6.473.1–2; see 6:450,19–22)⁵¹. It is
this concern for equality that in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ prevents us from equat-
ing a friend of human beings with someone who merely possesses love of benev-
olence.⁵² The beneficence of a friend of human beings [Freund der Menschen] in-
cludes ‘a necessary humbling of oneself ’ [eine nothwendige Herablassung] (MM,
6:473.8–9). It is also noteworthy that the interest described is affective or senso-
ry-aesthetic, which might include love of benevolence from inclination or even
pathological love of delight in the love of the friend of human beings.⁵³
In an appendix immediately following the discussion on being a friend of
human beings, Kant explicitly connects the cosmopolitan outlook with the cul-
tivation of virtue in reciprocal relationships, suggesting that, indirectly, this cul-
tivation of reciprocity will lead to what is best for the world. I wish to quote this
passage at length:
It is a duty to oneself as well as to others not to isolate oneself […] but to use one’s moral
perfections in social intercourse […]. While making oneself a fixed center of one’s princi-
ples, one ought to regard this circle drawn around one as also forming part of an all-inclu-
sive circle of those who, in their disposition, are citizens of the world – not exactly to pro-
mote as the end what is best for the world but only to cultivate what leads indirectly to this
end: to cultivate a disposition of reciprocity – agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and
respect […]. (MM, 6:473.16–24)⁵⁴
 ‘die Vorstellung und Beherzigung der Gleichheit unter Menschen’.
 The notion of Menschenfreund is similar in the Groundwork, in that in the first instance the
interest theMenschenfreund has for the well-being of others is aesthetic – or to be precise, based
on inclination (GW, 4:398.20–34). It is unclear whether the concept of Menschenfreund in the
Groundwork is also supposed to cover the case where the agent lacks sympathy but is nonethe-
less beneficent from duty (see GW, 4:398.32–399.2).
 The references to Menschenfreund in the Groundwork point in this direction (GW,
4:398.20–34).
 ‘Es ist Pflicht sowohl gegen sich selbst, als auch gegen Andere, mit seinen sittlichen Voll-
kommenheiten unter einander Verkehr zu treiben […], sich nicht zu isoliren […]; zwar sich
einen unbeweglichen Mittelpunkt seiner Grundsätze zu machen, aber diesen um sich gezogenen
Kreis doch auch als einen, der den Theil von einem allbefassenden der weltbürgerlichen Gesin-
nung ausmacht, anzusehen; nicht eben um das Weltbeste als Zweck zu befördern, sondern nur
die wechselseitige, die indirect dahin führt, die Annehmlichkeit in derselben, die Verträglich-
keit, die wechselseitige Liebe und Achtung’.
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The passage contains a sweeping vision from the narrowly circled individual to
‘what is best for the world’ [das Weltbeste]. Since Kant obviously thinks that the
highest good is what is best, I take it that his notion of ‘what is best for the
world’ can here be identified as the complete highest good (moral happiness
of all rational beings) with regard to humans. However, Kant seems to think
that this communal notion of ‘what is best for the world’ can only be approached
indirectly, through social intercourse. The basic components of friendship are ex-
plicitly operative in this cultivation of sociality: reciprocity as disposition and
mutual love and respect (alongside agreeableness and tolerance). It seems
that by cherishing and cultivating love and respect in friendships, and by grad-
ually opening our ‘narrower circles’ to people who are not yet our friends, we as-
cend towards the ideal ethical community. As Langton reminds us, friendship
unlocks ‘the “prison” of the self ’ (Langton 2009, p. 319; see MM, 6:472.12– 13).
Its concept provides us with an ideal model of what human relationships in gen-
eral ought to be like.Wood suggests that it is friendship ‘that is ultimately to en-
compass the entire human race’ (Wood 1999, p. 316). Of course, cosmopolitan
friendship will not contain the level of intimacy characteristic of certain exclu-
sive relationships, but we may say that close to the end of the ‘Doctrine of Vir-
tue’, Kant clearly gives the elements of friendship a decisive role when describ-
ing the ascent to what is best for the world. In the words of Moran, friendship is
crucial for ‘our progress toward the highest good’ (Moran 2012, p. 203).⁵⁵
We are now in a position to appreciate the place of love in friendship in the
overall structure of love in Kant’s philosophy. We have come far from the crude
natural impulses of self-love and have temporarily bracketed love of God be-
cause we are now considering human moral relations. We now know that love
of neighbour alone is not able to bring about the highest communal good –
since love of neighbour as such is not necessarily properly conditioned by re-
spect. Only the profound acknowledgment of the equality of all human beings
can make one a friend of human beings – one in whom the disposition of
love towards the whole race is conditioned by respect for the humanity of all.
By becoming friends of human beings, we gradually ascend toward a cosmopol-
itan community of love and respect. But most of us may only become friends of
 At this stage, I do not feel a need to distance myself from the basic positions formulated by
Wood and Moran with respect to the relationship between friendship and the highest good. I
don’t feel the urge for ‘scientific dissensus’. I take it that their generic propositions are viable
and can be adopted by my ascent account of love in friendship. What remains novel in my ap-
proach is the relatively detailed analysis of the concept of love in this context, as well as the
more general ascent model of love, to which the ascent of love in cosmopolitan friendship be-
longs – as the final element of the general model.
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human beings by engaging in particular friendships, where we approach moral
happiness by cultivating intimate love of benevolence conditioned by intimate
respect. In order to ascend toward the highest communal good, we must gradu-
ally open up our love and extend it to those who are not yet our friends. This we
can only learn to do while loving our friends and by striving to love people
around us more wisely.
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Conclusion
In the Preface to the first edition of the Religion, Kant explains that while the
foundation of morality abstracts from the presentation of ends altogether, it is
still impossible for humans to act without conceiving of ends. Because human
beings naturally desire happiness, morality leads to the presentation of the
final regulative end as the highest good, which is perfect happiness proportion-
ate to perfect virtue. With regard to this highest purpose, Kant writes in a foot-
note: ‘Now in this end human beings seek something that they can love, even
though it [the end] is being proposed to them through reason alone.’ (R,
6:7.26–28fn.)¹ What is this love that human beings seek in the highest good?
And how should one understand the connection between love and the highest
good anyway?
I believe there is no simple answer to this question, and Kant does not spell
out what he means by love in the above quotation.² There are passages in ‘The
End of All Things’ (1794) that seem somewhat parallel to the above. In that essay,
Kant explains that while respect is morally primary and a necessary condition of
‘true love’ [wahre Liebe], love, ‘as a free assumption of the will of another into
one’s maxims, is an indispensable complement to the imperfection of human na-
ture’ (8:338.3–5)³. Given the context, Kant is probably talking about incorporat-
ing the will of God (see ch. 3.1), but he might also be talking about love more
generally. In human terms, I take the quotation to mean that love makes us at-
tentive to the ends of others in a way that goes beyond mere acknowledgement of
their autonomy. Furthermore, Kant tells us in ‘The End of All Things’, without
love we will not be moral gladly [gern]. Without love, our moral actions will
be scanty [kärglich], and we will be prone to evade what duty commands. (LE,
8:338.6–7) Based on what Kant says above and elsewhere, it appears that
love, too, is essential for the moral lives of imperfect rational creatures like us.
 ‘An diesem Zwecke nun, wenn er gleich durch die bloße Vernunft ihm vorgelegt wird, sucht
der Mensch etwas, was er lieben kann’.
 David Sussman thinks this love is close to ‘pathological love’, by which he means ‘a love that
fully integrates our feelings, our imagination, and our attention around a particular object of
concern’ (Sussman 2010, p. 143). While Sussman’s understanding of ‘pathological love’ seems
to be broader than what we find in Kant’s texts, and while I would not rule out practical love
as quickly as Sussman does (especially given that the object of love here is proposed ‘through
reason alone’), I nevertheless think that from a broader, non-exegetical perspective, Sussman is
on the right track.
 ‘als freie Aufnahme des Willens eines Andern unter seine Maximen, ein unentbehrliches Er-
gänzungsstück der Unvollkommenheit der menschlichen Natur’.
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Respect is fundamental, but mere respect for the law will not account for our lov-
ing God or furthering the happiness of other human beings. By itself, respect can
never make us happy.Without love, the path toward the highest good will not be
open.
But what love are we now talking about? In ‘The End of All Things’, Kant ex-
plains further that there is something loveable or loveworthy [liebenswürdig]
about the Christian religion, which stems from Christianity’s ‘liberal way of
thinking’ [die liberale Denkungsart] (8:338.23). Apparently, it is the freedom
one feels in the choice of making the highest good one’s ultimate end that occa-
sions love in this context. In ‘The End of All Things’, this love is ultimately con-
nected to God’s benevolent disposition towards humanity. It seems that the ideas
of God’s benevolence and kindness [Gütigkeit] are what make Christianity love-
able (8:338.23–339.19; cf. C2, 5:131.10– 19). But can we interpret the love that
human beings seek in the highest good as reducible to rational Christian love
of God? Given the ambiguous nature of the highest good (see ch. 1.3), and
given the results of my investigations of love in the five chapters of this study,
this kind of reduction would be an oversimplification of Kant’s position.
At least if we emphasise striving towards the highest good in this life and in-
finite, intergenerational, species-level progress, and if we put less weight on spec-
ulations regarding what the supposedly incorporeal afterlife is like, then we
should understand the love that we ultimately seek as a more holistic notion,
as the regulative, rational ideality that all the different aspects of love bring
with them in their own contexts. In this way, the love we seek is the ideal
union of the different kinds of love that condition our lives. In self-love, we
seek happiness and love from others; in sexual love, a moral union of two people
to procreate and enjoy each other’s sexual attributes. In love of God, we strive to
practice our duties to others gladly, with a benevolent disposition pleasing to God,
which disposition at its ideal endpoint could also be called love for the law. In
love of neighbour, we take delight in the humanity of others and aim to love
them practically with active rational benevolence, adopting their ends as our
own. In love in friendship, we strive to cultivate benevolence and delight in inti-
mate, equal, and reciprocal human relationships while seeking to open up this
love so that one day we might all be able to call each other friends as members
of the human race.
In this study, I have provided the first systematic, exegetical, and compre-
hensive account of the concept of love as it appears in the philosophy of Kant.
In particular, I have formulated and defended two major claims: 1) The general
division of love in Kant is a key to understanding love in Kant; and 2) the ascent
model of love is a plausible general model of love in Kant. I have not claimed that
my approach and results are flawless, absolutely comprehensive, or all-encom-
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passing, and that no more work remains to be done within this field of enquiry. I
am also not saying that the conceptual framework of love in Kant cannot be con-
strued otherwise. In future research on this topic, further historical considera-
tions might be added, so that Kant’s conceptions can be situated within a broad-
er framework of love in the history of Western philosophy. On the other hand,
Kant’s multifaceted concept could be used to formulate a post-Kantian philoso-
phy of love – with a view to contemporary developments, for instance in evolu-
tionary philosophy or analytical metaphysics and ethics. In this work, I am say-
ing merely that the general division of love does provide a key to understanding
love in Kant, that the aspects I discuss do exist in Kant’s philosophy, and that,
taken together, it is rational to view these aspects in terms of an ascent from
crude natural impulses to the highest moral-physical good in cosmopolitan
friendship. (See fig. 8; see also Appendix.)
I want to conclude by noting the existence of an aspect of love that underlies
the whole conceptual framework presented here. This is the foundational meth-
od that necessarily connects my approach with that of Kant’s. The research object
and the method of the study are both in themselves instances of love of wisdom –
that is, philosophy. Historically, it was the philosophical method that brought
about rational enquiry into love in the first place. Sure, people of the distant
past experienced love, worshipped love, and so on. But it was Empedocles
who first introduced the notion of love in a post-Milesian naturalist framework,
h i g h e s t g o o d
(love of God – delight)
(love for the law)
mo r a l i t y n a t u r e
– love in friendship (general division) – love in friendship (general division)
– love of neighbour (general division) – love of neighbour (general division)
mediates – love of beauty (delight)
– sexual love – sexual love (animality + general division)
(general division)
– self-love – self-love (general division + love of honour as inclination)
(delight)
– animal self-love (love of life, sexuality + parenting, sociality)
(love of God – benevolence)
s u p e r s e n s i b l e g r o u n d o f b e i n g
Figure 8. Love’s Ascent in Kant
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in order to make sense of love’s place in physis, or nature. The status of love as
an object of rational enquiry was solidified by Plato. I feel that even though we
now have a concept of love in Kant, we must still ask: what is Kant’s conception
of love of wisdom? Surely, if we are after a Kantian philosophy of love, the aspects
of love and the ascent model must be understood in this context. But does Kant
even speak of love of wisdom? And can we say that ‘philosophy’ itself is a kind of
love, for Kant, if he does not use the word ‘Liebe’ in the immediate vicinity of
‘Philosophie’?
Kant’s references to ‘philosophy’ in his writings are abundant, and a proper
account of the various connotations would be a topic for another volume. How-
ever, the notion of love of wisdom comes up only once in the published works,
and an analysis of this passage will be the final task of the present study. The
passage appears in the second Critique, close to the beginning of the ‘Dialectic
of Pure Practical Reason’. The issue is once again the highest good, and more
precisely how to determine its idea practically. Here, Kant calls this determina-
tion the ‘doctrine of wisdom’ [Weisheitslehre], or the science of ‘philosophy’ in
the ‘ancient sense’:
We would do well to leave this word [philosophy] in its ancient sense, as a doctrine of the
highest good so far as reason strives to bring it to science. For, on the one hand the restric-
tive condition attached would suit the Greek expression (which signifies love of wisdom)
while yet sufficing to embrace under the name of philosophy love of science and so of
all speculative rational cognition insofar as it is serviceable to reason for that concept as
well as for the practical determining ground, without letting us lose sight of the chief
end on account of which alone it can be called doctrine of wisdom. (C2, 5:108.18–28)⁴
What to make of this somewhat obscure passage and the place of love within it?
In general, we know from elsewhere that Kant understands philosophy as the sys-
tem of rational cognition from⁵ concepts (see e.g. C1, A713/B741; A732/B760;
A838/B866; C3, 5:171) and that philosophy divides into theoretical and practical
 ‘Es wäre gut, wenn wir dieses Wort bei seiner alten Bedeutung ließen, als eine Lehre vom
höchsten Gut, so fern die Vernunft bestrebt ist, es darin zur Wissenschaft zu bringen. Denn ei-
nestheils würde die angehängte einschränkende Bedingung dem griechischen Ausdrucke
(welcher Liebe zur Weisheit bedeutet) angemessen und doch zugleich hinreichend sein, die
Liebe zurWissenschaft, mithin aller speculativen Erkenntniß der Vernunft, so fern sie ihr sowohl
zu jenem Begriffe, als auch dem praktischen Bestimmungsgrunde dienlich ist, unter dem Namen
der Philosophie mit zu befassen, und doch den Hauptzweck, um dessentwillen sie allein Weish-
eitslehre genannt werden kann, nicht aus den Augen verlieren lassen.’
 I do not wish to debate the correctness of this English preposition. In different places, Kant
uses at least the German prepositions aus, nach, and durch to describe how rational cognition
pertains to concepts in terms of philosophy.
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philosophy, where theoretical philosophy concerns what is and practical philoso-
phy what ought to be (e.g. C3, 5:171; C1, A840/B868; see also A850/B878).⁶ In the
first Critique he states: ‘Philosophy refers everything to [the goal of] wisdom. But
it does so by the path of science’ (C1, A850/B878)⁷. Often when Kant speaks of wis-
dom or being wise, he connects it with the idea of God.We view the world as if it
were the product of a wise author or supreme wisdom, organised purposively with
regard to the highest good (see e.g. C1, A628/B656; A687/B715; A699/B727; A826/
B854; C2, 5:130–131; C3, 5:444). Sometimes wisdom is discussed as the union of
benevolence and justice (C3, 5:444; see 8:257ff.), and for humans, wisdom is an
ideal (C1, A569/B597). In terms of these divisions, the main point that Kant
seems to be making with regard to love of wisdom in the second Critique is
that there are two different kinds of components in the doctrine of wisdom and
the way it relates to the highest good: there is a theoretical or scientific aspect
and a practical aspect. In the second Critique, wisdom is given a twofold defini-
tion explicitly in terms of the theoretical/practical distinction: ‘wisdom consid-
ered theoretically signifies cognition of the highest good, and practically the fitness
of the will for the highest good’ (C2, 5:130.36–131.1⁸; see also 8:256fn.;
cf. 8:336.5–7). And at the very end of the conclusion of the second Critique:
In a word, science (critically sought and methodically directed) is the narrow gate that leads
to the doctrine of wisdom, if by this is understood not merely what one ought to do but what
ought to serve teachers as a guide to prepare well and clearly the path to wisdom which
everyone should travel (C2, 5:163.27–31)⁹.
If we now interpret the passage on love of wisdom in the light of the above re-
flections, the theoretical and practical components of the doctrine of wisdom
within the passage are brought to the fore, which helps to clarify the word
‘love’ in that context. First, the ‘restrictive condition’ [einschränkende Bedingung]
must refer to science: the doctrine of wisdom must be scientific. However, this is
 Kant also uses ‘transcendental philosophy’, ‘speculative philosophy’, and ‘philosophy of na-
ture’ to refer to the theoretical approach, and ‘moral philosophy’ to refer to practical philosophy.
As I have already mentioned, however, fine-grained analysis of these taxonomies is beyond my
current aims.
 ‘Diese [Philosophie] bezieht alles auf Weisheit, aber durch den Weg der Wissenschaft’.
 ‘Weisheit, theoretisch betrachtet, die Erkenntniß des höchsten Guts und praktisch die Angemes-
senheit des Willens zum höchsten Gute bedeutet’.
 ‘Mit einem Worte: Wissenschaft (kritisch gesucht und methodisch eingeleitet) ist die enge
Pforte, die zur Weisheitslehre führt, wenn unter dieser nicht blos verstanden wird, was man
thun, sondern was Lehrern zur Richtschnur dienen soll, um den Weg zur Weisheit, den jeder-
mann gehen soll, gut und kenntlich zu bahnen’.
Conclusion 171
merely love of science if the practical determining ground [praktische Bestim-
mungsgrund] is not included. The context implies that the ‘chief end’ [Hauptz-
weck] is the end of the highest good, and so we can say that it is love of science,
together with the practical determining ground (both taken with reference to the
highest good) that warrants the term ‘love of wisdom’. Immediately following
this passage Kant continues to explain that, from another perspective, wisdom
can be understood ideally as an object of striving in the sense that its completion
is an objective rational idea, ‘whereas subjectively, for a person, it is only the
goal of his unceasing endeavors’ (C2, 5:109.2–3)¹⁰.
This, I think, is connected to how Kant uses the word ‘love’ in the context of
‘love for the law’. In these two cases (love for the law and love of wisdom), love
seems to denote an ideal object of striving. The object is, at least to a certain ex-
tent, a product of our reason; it is in a sense ‘higher’ than us, something the com-
pletion of which we lack. This reminds one of how Eros is discussed in the Sym-
posium. Kant’s love of wisdom seems to denote precisely this relation of lack, of
pursuit, of strenuous ascent towards what we do not yet possess. It therefore
seems that, in addition to the most paradigmatic cases of love, where the object
of love is a person and the love relation is described directly in terms of the gen-
eral division of love, there is another category of objects, where the object of love
is a rational ideal that one desires and for which one strives. In comparison with
animality, these ideals are at the other end of the spectrum of desire (cf. ch. 1.1).
The ideal cases are not paradigm examples of love in Kant precisely for the reason
that they lack an explicit connection to the general division, but they cannot be
glossed as mere anomalies, because the links or the structural similarities to the
historical tradition of the concept of love, especially in the case of love of wisdom,
are strong and obvious. If we think of Kant’s discussions of God as divine wisdom
or as possessing supreme wisdom, we can venture one step further and say, in
terms of the general division, that there is no wisdom without love of benevo-
lence, which in religious terms is the ground of creation. In general, love of wis-
dom signifies the unity of theoretical cognition and practical cognition in the pur-
suit of the highest good.
In summary, the aim of this book was to provide the first relatively detailed
analysis of the concept of love in Kant’s philosophy. Utilising a novel general di-
vision approach, I have pointed out how love permeates human existence from
the strongest impulses of nature to the highest ideals of moral happiness. Overall,
my analysis has yielded a new ascent model of love in Kant. More generally, I be-
 ‘subjectiv aber, für die Person, nur das Ziel seiner unaufhörlichen Bestrebung ist’.
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lieve that I have shown that a comprehensive understanding of Kantian ethical
life is not possible without acknowledging the multidimensional presence of love.
To step outside of the exegetical framework, I wish to say, as a person and a
philosopher, that love is a very complicated concept, and concepts in general are
not the kinds of things one grasps in the blink of an eye. Concepts are proposi-
tional worlds, worlds one needs to explore without rushing, in peace and quiet, if
one is to come to terms with them – even though it all happens in the midst of
life. The acquisition, construction, or comprehension of a concept is very much
about coming to inhabit relatively stable propositional structures with one’s mind.
We study reality, strive to understand it, and place our sentences under its ru-
bric. A concept as broad and complex as love can only be approached gradually,
and when one has understood something, it does not imply a complete compre-
hension of the phenomenon. Love is a concept with both theoretical and practi-
cal elements.We can formulate descriptive propositions, or more widely, models
that outline the structural features of the concept of love, and attempt to say
things regarding what love is, in the philosophy of Kant, for example.We can ob-
serve reality and use our reason to criticise the proposition sets we have suggest-
ed, and through the critical process we may replace our old propositions with
better ones. Or we may be able to formulate propositions that endure, that
come to appear as sustainable within the critical process, the process through
which our fallible knowledge of reality grows and becomes more refined. But
this is not something for us to decide as authors of propositions, but a matter
of later critical scrutiny. In practice, learning love is slow. It is not a sprint but
a never-ending walk towards what is better. A climb, if you will. While a given
proposition can perhaps be theoretically understood relatively quickly – it can
be analysed and given an interpretation within its model or a confined semantic
universe – this is not so when it comes to incorporating the concept of love into
one’s life or one’s moral behaviour. The normative requirements of the model
must be embraced in a deeper way. That is the difficult part, and that is
where the real work of practical philosophy happens. What is comforting is
that, due to the very slow acquisition process of the concept of love, the love
thus obtained is not a mere chimera but instead becomes an integral part of
one’s life experience. One must become so immersed in the practical concepts
one studies that the concepts become dynamic forms of life that are communi-
cated both rationally and emotionally on various levels of interaction with oth-
ers. Love is real. It is not a dream one wakes up from in the morning, so that then
it’s gone. It is here, in this reality and on this planet, and it can be studied. If we
persevere and work diligently to understand love better, we are entitled to the
rational hope that gradually, over the course of time, reality will become more
loving.
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Appendix: Explanatory Note on Fig. 8
It is quite possible that after reading the whole study, fig. 8 (see Conclusion) will
appear self-explanatory. However, despite their illustrative power, diagrams nec-
essarily lose so much information that I think a brief explanatory note on the pic-
torial image of the ascent model is in order, if for no other reason than to pre-
serve some of the ambiguity that interpretative positions within the exegetical
study of Kant necessarily involve. There are also some philosophical commit-
ments made in fig. 8 that should not appear necessary based on the propositio-
nal results of the chapters, and I wish to clarify these points of emphasis, which
are prevalent in the image but may seem to contrast or be ambiguous in relation
to what I say about a particular aspect of love in my actual discussion.
I note that love of God and love for the law are bracketed as idealisations,
and they depict rational conditions and endpoints of moral striving. It should
be transparent that arational animal mechanical self-love lies completely on
the side of nature and consists of the impulses of love of life, narrow sexual
love and parenting, and instinctive sociality. The self-love for which reason is re-
quired can be viewed in terms of nature through the general division, so that
love of benevolence is wanting things to go well for oneself and to be loved
by others and love of delight is taking pleasure in those maxims. As an inclina-
tion, love of honour belongs taxonomically to this level of self-love, whereas
‘true’ love of honour is a function of respect. In the study I argued that in certain
moral contexts it is possible to speak of a moral self-love, which would have to
be love of delight, but I feel the need to emphasise that for most purposes it suf-
fices to say more robustly that there is nothing moral about self-love as such. The
model should never be read as saying that just any kind of delight in oneself
counts as moral self-love. Based on textual evidence, broad sexual love unites
the animal impulse especially with love of benevolence, but as I don’t see any-
thing to prevent pathological delight, inclination-based benevolence, and intel-
lectual delight from entering the picture, I present the general division on both
sides of the nature-freedom distinction.We can hardly avoid being physically de-
lighted by another’s physical perfections when such perfections appear, and
moral benevolent love will bring about feelings of love (as inclinations to benef-
icence). Moreover, we take intellectual delight in the humanity and moral perfec-
tion of all human beings. Love of beauty appears to lie somewhere between na-
ture and morality (intellectual delight in other human beings hovers somewhat
similarly on both sides of the nature-freedom divide). In the figure, I treat love of
neighbour and love in friendship in the same lenient way as sexual love. Even
though only rational benevolence is commanded, and the predisposition of
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love of neighbour is (perhaps intellectual) love of delight, I allow inclination-
based benevolence and pathological delight to figure in the framework, as
these loves, too, will at least occasionally appear when one strives to love others
morally.With friendship, published evidence only allows for talk of moral love of
benevolence, but the same considerations apply (the lectures further emphasise
intellectual love of delight).
In life, all the loves are intermingled, and the higher, actual (non-ideal) as-
pects in fig. 8 reflect that view. Supposing one strives to become more moral, I
see no need to restrict the operation of the general division of love with regard
to the highest loves, as long as feelings of love are conditioned by respect, which
is the phenomenal foundation of morality. I realise that for a hard-boiled exe-
gete, my treatment of the loves in sexual love, love of neighbour, and love in
friendship in fig. 8 may appear too unrestricted or permissive, and if this is
the case, I recommend going back to the chapters for my exact positions with
reference to given aspects. Fig. 8 is merely a skeleton for understanding love
in Kant, and meaning has to be sought elsewhere. What I do wish to portray
with the figure, in addition to the basic conceptual structure of the ascent
model, is that while the general division of love will figure differently and
with varying emphases with respect to different aspects of love, we will experi-
ence both moral and natural benevolence and delight in loving relationships,
and this (as long as respect is in place) is as such nothing to be worried
about. The loves are beautiful, and it is a wonderful feature of life that they
are there. Finally, the inclusive attitude of fig. 8 with respect to the loves related
to other persons is also meant to depict the insight of the mature Kant, according
to whom the frame of mind connected to love is liberal.
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